




**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***



## **Soviet Union**

***Military Affairs***

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3**

**19981105 052**

# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-90-027

### CONTENTS

30 November 1990

#### MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Biographic Data on Military People's Deputies of Union Republics [KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 14, No 15, Jul & Aug 90] .....	1
OGONEK Discussion of Col Gen Rodionov Letter [Z. Zolotova; OGONEK No 35, Aug 90] .....	23
Russian Leadership Meets with Military Deputies [N. Burbyga, I. Demchenko; IZVESTIYA, 4 Nov 90] .....	25

#### MILITARY SCIENCE

Moiseyev Interviewed on Improving C3 [M. Moiseyev, K. Kobets; VOYENNY VESTNIK No 10, Oct 90] .....	27
---	----

#### ARMED FORCES

Lt-Gen Just Petukhov on Servicemen's Protection Decree [N. Petukhov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Sep 90] .....	31
Maj-Gen Chudov: In Opposition to Computerized Command and Control [V. Chudov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Sep 90] .....	32
Turkestan MD Appeals to Troops Not to Desert [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 15 Sep 90] .....	33
Crimea: 8 Killed, 1 Wounded in Raid Near Feodosiya [MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, 11 Oct 90] .....	34

#### GROUND FORCES

Tank Competition Raises Question of Training Quality [A. Yegorov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 15 Sep 90] .....	35
--	----

#### AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Local Executive Committee Seeks to Close Pipeline to Airfield [E. Uus; SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, 14 Oct 90] .....	37
---	----

#### NAVAL FORCES

Reduction Hits Pacific Fleet Computer Center [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Sep 90] .....	38
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Journalists Personae Non Grata at Naval Main Staff [V. Maryukha; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Sep 90] .....	38
Aging of Navy's Long Range Bombers [S. Markin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 13 Nov 90] .....	39

#### CIVIL DEFENSE

Col-Gen Kozhbakhteyev Discusses Changes to USSR Civil Defense [V. Kozhbakhteyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Sep 90] .....	40
---	----

#### REAR SERVICES, LOGISTICS

Designer of T-64 Interviewed [N.A. Shomin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Sep 90] .....	42
--	----

#### MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES

Latvian Commentary on Fall Draft [V. Teymer; SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, 23 Aug 90] .....	44
Concern Over Fall Draft in Armenia [V. Kaushanskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Sep 90] .....	45

## MILITARY HISTORY

Lithuanian Territorial Problem in Inter-war Years [S.A. Gorlov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 7, July 90] .....	48
1978 Turret Explosion Aboard Cruiser 'Adm Senyavin' [O. Odnokolenko; Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Sep 90] .....	56
Air Support to Egypt in Early 1970's [K.A. Korotyuk and Yu. Nastenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 20 Sep 90] .....	58

## DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL CONVERSION

Udmurt ASSR Problems from Defense Conversion [V. Solovyev; IZVESTIYA, 22 Sep 90] .....	60
Commercial Use of Military Transport Flights [A. Andryushkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Sep 90] .....	62
Troops Work in Food Distribution System [F. Semyanovskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Nov 90] .....	64

### Biographic Data on Military People's Deputies of Union Republics

90SV0023A Moscow *KOMMUNIST*

*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 14 (Signed to press 16 Jul 90) Jul 90 pp 50-57, No 15 (Signed to press 27 Jul 90) Aug 90 pp 46-62*

[Letter to the editor and *KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* reply listing deputies of the Union republics in the military and a short biographical sketch of each]

[No 14 Jul 90 (signed to press 16 Jul 90), pp 50-57]

[Text] "Dear Editor! Last year your publication acquainted readers with all the USSR people's deputies who are military servicemen (No 10 and 12). Which army and navy representatives have been elected people's deputies of the Union republics?

M. Kozlov.  
City of Sosnovyy Bor, Leningrad Oblast."

Similar requests came to us from Colonel A. Sipaty, Lieutenant Colonels V. Galushkin, P. Shakhov, V. Koval, and A. Lobzenko, Major N. Goriglyad, Warrant Officers N. Beluzhnyy and V. Chalyy, Soviet Army employee N. Kuzmina.

In this and subsequent issues, we provide our readers a short biography of people's deputies of the republics who are representatives of the USSR Armed Forces. The sequence in which the elected deputies are presented has been determined in consideration of when the elections to the highest organs of state power of the Union republics took place: Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] (7 January), Uzbek (18 February), Kirghiz, Moldavian, Tajik (25 February), Belorussian, Russian, Ukrainian (4 March), Latvian, Estonian (18 March), Kazakh (25 March).

In Lithuania (18 February) and Armenia (20 May), not a single military serviceman has become a people's deputy.

Elections of people's deputies in Azerbaijan and Georgia have not yet taken place.

Generalized Data. In a difficult pre-election campaign, credentials as people's deputies of Union republics were obtained by 114 representatives of the USSR Armed Forces: RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]—42, Belorussia—14, Ukraine—14, Uzbekistan—10, Latvia—7, Kazakhstan—7, Kirghizia—6, Moldavia—5, Tajikistan—4, Estonia—3, Turkmenia—2.

In six electoral districts, army candidates had no rival. In the remainder, there were from two to 22 competing candidates. Almost every third serviceman sustained victory as a result of the first vote.

Of those elected, 46 are generals, 59 are senior officers, four are junior officers, two are warrant officers, three are employees of the Soviet Army and retired officers.

Among the people's deputies, 48 are commanders of various ranks, 49 are political officers, 17 are instructors at military training institutes. Almost all the servicemen-deputies are CPSU members (with the exception of non-party member Senior Warrant Officer Zelenin, Major Gribanov—who left the party voluntarily in 1989, and VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] member Lieutenant Palagecha, all from Belorussia).

Of the republic people's deputies who represent the army and navy, five served in the Great Patriotic War. One out of five fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan, five are Heroes of the Soviet Union, ten are doctors or candidates of science. One is a USSR people's deputy. Twelve individuals were elected previously to republic supreme soviets. Forty-seven have experience working in rayon, city, oblast, and kray soviets of people's deputies.

### People's Deputies of the Turkmen SSR

**Petr Makarovich Korotkiy**

Colonel.

Born 15 June 1948 in the village of Knyazevo, Lozovskiy Rayon, Kharkov Oblast, in a kolkhoz ((collective farm)) worker's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1970. Member of the USSR Armed Forces since 1966. Completed Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Institute imeni V.I. Lenin (1970), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1981). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1983 through 1985.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with two sons.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy at assemblies of servicemen of several military units.

Elected people's deputy of the Turkmen SSR from Grazhdanskiy Electoral District No. 8, city of Ashkhabad, as a result of a runoff election. (Seven candidates were on the district ballot).

**Nikolay Maksimovich Novikov**

Colonel, chief of political department.

Born 15 April 1950 in the family of a stable-man at Horsebreeding Farm No. 34, Zolskiy Rayon, Kabardino-Balkar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. Russian. CPSU member since 1972. Member of the USSR Armed Forces since 1968. Completed Armavir Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1972), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1981).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by collectives of military units.

Elected people's deputy of the Turkmen SSR from Kongurskiy Electoral District No. 78 as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Was elected previously as deputy of a settlement soviet of people's deputies.

### **People's Deputies of the Uzbek SSR**

#### **Boris Nikolayevich Belousov**

Major General.

Born 27 June 1939 in the city of Barnaul, Altay Kray, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1965. Member of the USSR Armed Forces since 1956. Completed Odessa Anti-Aircraft Artillery School of the Air Defense Forces (1959—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1972—with distinction, by correspondence).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married. Wife is a nurse. He has a daughter and grandchild.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Bildinskiy Electoral District No. 122 on the first vote. (There were no competing candidates).

Was elected previously as deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

#### **Nikolay Kuzmich Demik**

Major General. Chief of the special department of the USSR KGB, Red Banner Turkestan Military District.

Born 13 May 1938 in the village of Kulazhintsy, Grebenkovskiy Rayon, Poltava Oblast, in a peasant family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1961. Member of the USSR Armed Forces since 1957. Completed Saratov Military Institute (1961), USSR KGB Higher School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (1970).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.

Married. Wife is a teacher. He has two daughters.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collective of Chirchik Aircraft Repair Plant.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Lenin-skiy Electoral District No. 76 as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

#### **Vladimir Aleksandrovich Dzhaniybekov**

Aviation Major General, administration director at the Cosmonaut Training Center imeni Yu.A. Gagarin.

Born 13 May 1942 in the settlement of Iskandar (now a city-type settlement), Bostanlyk-skiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast, in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1970. Member of the USSR Armed Forces since 1961. Completed Tashkent Suvorov Institute (1960), Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1965). Made five flights in space as spacecraft commander.

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic. Five times awarded the Order of Lenin. Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many Soviet and foreign medals. Bronze bust erected to him in Tashkent. USSR State Prize laureate in 1989, Uzbek SSR State Prize in 1986.

Married. Wife is a music school teacher. He has two daughters.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of several enterprises in the city of Tashkent.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Kuybyshev Electoral District No. 17, city of Tashkent, on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

He was previously elected deputy of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

#### **Valentin Anatolyevich Vasin**

Colonel.

Born 15 June 1946 in the village of Mozharov-Maydak, Pilsenskiy Rayon, Gorkiy Oblast, in a large peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1965. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1963. Completed Chelyabinsk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Navigators (1967), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1977).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, many medals.

Married. Wife is a teacher. Has a son and daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by a trade union conference of the unit, and by the labor collective of the building materials plant, city of Tashkent.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Lzhunovskiy Electoral District No. 50, city of Tashkent, on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

**Aleksandr Imametdinovich Zakharov**

Lieutenant General, member of the military council and director of the political directorate of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District.

Born 13 April 1938 in the city of Kuybyshev, in the family of an office worker. Tatar. CPSU member since 1959. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1955. Worked as a milling-machine operator prior to service in the army. Completed the Engels Military-Technical Institute for Air Defense Forces (1958—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1970). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1987 through 1989 in the position of member of the military council and chief of the political department of the limited contingent of Soviet forces.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of the "Badge of Honor," Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, four orders of the Republic of Afghanistan, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with a daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by collectives of the "Termez" Sovkhoz [state farm], Kolkhoz imeni V.I. Lenin and "Namuna" Kolkhoz of Termezskiy Rayon, Surkhandarya Oblast, and military unit personnel.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Uch-Kizilskiy Electoral District No. 339, Surkhandarya Oblast, on the first vote. (There were no competing candidates).

Previously elected deputy of the oblast soviet of people's deputies and the republic Supreme Soviet.

**Georgiy Grigoryevich Kondratyev**

Lieutenant General, first deputy commander of troops of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District.

Born 17 November 1944 in the city of Klinty, Bryansk Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1965. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1962. Completed Kharkov Armor Academy (1965—with distinction), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy (1973—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1985—with gold medal). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1986 through 1988 in the position of first deputy commander of the limited contingent of Soviet forces.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, orders of the Republic of Afghanistan—"Red Banner" and "Star," many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter.

Nominated as candidate for people's deputy by personnel of the Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Institute imeni V.I. Lenin.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Pushkinskiy Electoral District No. 16, city of Tashkent, on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

**Vladimir Nasyrovich Makhmudov**

Colonel, military commissar of the Uzbek SSR.

Born 2 October 1944 in the city of Samarkand, Uzbek SSR, in an office worker's family. Uzbek. CPSU member since 1970. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1963. Completed Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Institute imeni V.I. Lenin (1967), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1977). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1979 through 1981.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order of the "Badge of Honor," many medals.

Married, with son and daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collective of the Sovkhoz imeni Yu. Fuchik, Arnasayskiy Rayon, Dzhizak Oblast.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Arnasayskiy Electoral District No. 364 on the first vote. (There were no competing candidates).

Previously elected deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

**Aleksandr Petrovich Soluyanov**

Colonel.

Born 19 December 1953 in the village of Ponomarevka, Ponomarevskiy Rayon, Orenburg Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1973. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1971. Completed the Suvorov Institute (1971), Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault Command Institute imeni Lenin Komsomol (1975—with gold medal), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1987—with gold medal). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1982 through 1984.

Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Star, Order of the Red Banner, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married with two sons. Wife is a doctor.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Frunzenskiy Electoral District No. 398 as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the oblast soviet of people's deputies.

**Farkhad Ziyadullayevich Fuzaylov**

Medical Services Colonel, ward chief at the okrug Military Hospital imeni P.F. Borovskiy.

Born 17 February 1943 in the village of Yezh, Peshkunskiy Rayon, Bukhara Oblast, Uzbek SSR, in an office worker's family. Uzbek. CPSU member since 1971. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1966. Completed Tashkent State Medical Institute (1966).

Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan.

Awarded many medals. Meritorious public health worker, Uzbek SSR.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a pediatrician.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collective of the okrug military hospital.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Vysokovoltnyy Electoral District No. 19, city of Tashkent, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

**Dzhamshir Shakhmardanov**

Colonel, chairman of the DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] Central Committee of the Uzbek SSR.

Born 1 April 1943 in the city of Samarkand, Uzbek SSR, in the large family of a violinist. Uzbek. CPSU member since 1964. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1961. Completed Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Institute imeni V.I. Lenin (1965), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1976).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with two daughters.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collective of the Kolkhoz imeni V.I. Lenin, Karakulskiy Rayon, Bukhara Oblast.

Elected people's deputy of the Uzbek SSR from Karakulskiy Electoral District No. 188, Bukhara Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

**People's Deputies of the Kirghiz SSR**

**Viktor Valeryanovich Belotskiy**

Colonel.

Born 1 January 1942 in the village of Starovshchina, Shchuchinskiy Rayon, Grodno Oblast, in a large peasant family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1966. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1961. Completed Kachinsk Higher Military Air Institute for Pilots imeni A.F. Myasnikov (1965), Military Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin (1976—by correspondence).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a trade employee.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the military unit collective.

Elected people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR from Kantskiy Electoral District No. 83 as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

**Ivan Vasilyevich Zubko**

Colonel.

Born 1 September 1951 in the village of Selovshchina, Berezovskiy Rayon, Brest Oblast, in a worker's family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1972. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1968. Completed Tashkent Higher Combined Arms Command Institute imeni V.I. Lenin (1972), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1980). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1983 through 1985.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Republic of Afghanistan "Red Banner," many Soviet and Afghan medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a pharmacist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by collectives of the military unit and border troops detachment.

Elected people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR from Zapadnyy Electoral District No. 211 on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the oblast soviet of people's deputies.

**Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Karabanov**

Colonel, military commissar of the Kirghiz SSR.

Born 12 September 1946 in the city of Volokolamsk, Moscow Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1973. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1966. Completed Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command Institute imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet (1969), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1977).

Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan in the position of motorized rifle regiment commander from 1985 through 1986.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with three daughters.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of the rayon hospital, rayon communications center, savings bank, and the Chuyskiy Rayon High School.

Elected people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR from Chuyskiy Electoral District No. 136, Frunze Oblast, on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

**Valentin Mikhaylovich Lukyanov**

Major General.

Born 18 June 1946 in the city of Mogilev-Podolskiy in a worker's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1971. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1965. Completed Kharkov Armor Institute (1968), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy (1980—with distinction).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a nurse.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit collectives.

Elected people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR from Issyk-Kul'skiy Electoral District No. 143 on the first vote. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

**Igor Stefanovich Furmanov**

Major General, first deputy director of the political directorate of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District.

Born 6 June 1940 in the village of Sablino, Leningrad Oblast, in a serviceman's family (his father perished at Stalingrad in 1942). Russian. CPSU member since 1962. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1959. Completed Leningrad Military Combined Arms Command Institute imeni S.M. Kirov (1964—with distinction), Leningrad State University (1973—philosophy department, by correspondence), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1976), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1985). Participated in elimination of the aftereffects of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident.

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, Order of the "Badge of Honor," many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a candidate of medical sciences.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of Ala-Too Sovkhoz, Council of War and Labor Veterans of Alamedinskiy Rayon, military unit collectives.

Elected people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR from Tash-Maynokskiy Electoral District No. 62 on the first vote. (There were no competing candidates).

Previously elected deputy of rayon, city, and oblast soviets of people's deputies. Delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

**Kazbek Orozakunovich Shaimbetov**

Senior Warrant Officer, battery first sergeant.

Born 24 February 1955 in the village of Bosteri, Issyk-Kul Oblast, Kirghiz SSR, in a large peasant family. Kirghiz. CPSU member since 1983. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1973. Completed Warrant Officer School (1976). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1981 through 1983.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many Soviet and Afghan medals.

Married with two sons and a daughter. Wife is an economist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of the transportation office, reinforced concrete works, inter-rayon trading base of Issyk-Kul Oblast, the military unit collective.

Elected people's deputy of the Kirghiz SSR from Pristan'skiy Electoral District No. 148 as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

**People's Deputies of the Moldova SSR**

**Vitaliy Nikolayevich Zavgorodniy**

Colonel, military commissar of Oktyabrskiy Rayon of the city of Kishinev.

Born 25 March 1947 in the village of Novo-Sysoyevka, Yakovlevskiy Rayon, Maritime Kray, in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1969. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1965. Completed the Far Eastern Suvorov Military Institute (1965), Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault Command Institute imeni Lenin Komsomol (1968), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1980). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1983 through 1984.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.



Married, with daughter. Wife works in the military commissariat.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the Council of Internationalist Soldiers of Oktyabrskiy Rayon, city of Kishinev, and by the collective of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon DOSAAF Committee.

Elected people's deputy of the Moldova SSR from Shtefan-chel-Mare Electoral District No. 31 as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon soviets of people's deputies.

#### **Sergey Georgiyevich Zatsarin**

Lieutenant Colonel, chief of the unit [soyedineniye] political department.

Born 29 June 1949 in the city of Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast, in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1971. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1968. Completed Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Armor-Artillery Institute (1973), Military Academy imeni G.S. Rakovskiy in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1983—with gold medal).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a librarian.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the military unit collective.

Elected people's deputy of the Moldova SSR from Promyshlennyy Electoral District No. 96 as a result of a runoff election. (14 candidates were on the district ballot).

#### **Mikhail Yuzefovich Katkov**

Lieutenant Colonel, deputy chief of unit [soyedineniye] political department.

Born 25 August 1945 in the village of Pervomayskoye, Pervomayskiy Rayon, Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1967. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1965. Completed Donetsk Higher Military-Political Institute of Engineer and Communications Troops (1974—by independent study), Kishinev State University (1982—history department, by correspondence). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1982 through 1983, and was seriously wounded, as a result of which his right leg was amputated to the knee and he was declared group-three disabled.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collectives of several military units with the support of the Council of Veterans of the Great Patriotic War and Internationalist Soldiers.

Elected people's deputy of the Moldova SSR from Yuzhnyy Electoral District No. 86 as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of settlement and city soviets of people's deputies.

#### **Vladlen Serafimovich Kolesov**

Colonel General. Born 26 November 1931 in the city of Kiev in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1956. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1949. Completed the Caucasus Suvorov Officers Institute (1951—with distinction), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1963), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1972).

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner twice, Order of the Red Banner of Labor, Order of the Red Star, Order of the Hungarian Republic, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married with son and daughter, grandchildren.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the military unit collective.

Elected people's deputy of the Moldova SSR from Dokuchayevskiy Electoral District No. 13 as a result of a runoff election. (12 candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation.

#### **Gennadiy Ivanovich Yakovlev**

Lieutenant General.

Born 27 November 1942 in the settlement of Shirmaksha, Sokolskiy Rayon, Ivanovo Oblast, in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1969. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1961. Completed Ulyanovsk Armor Command Institute imeni V.I. Lenin (1963—by independent study), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy (1974—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1986).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with a son.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the military unit collective.

Elected people's deputy of the Moldova SSR from Kuybyshevskiy Electoral District No. 116 as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

#### **People's Deputies of the Tajik SSR**

##### **Yuriy Dmitriyevich Bukreyev**

Lieutenant General, chief of staff and first deputy commander of troops of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District.

Born 19 May 1941 in the village of Vtoraya Alekseyevka, Oktyabrskiy Rayon, Kursk Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1968. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1960. Completed Tashkent Armor Command Institute imeni P.S. Rybalko (1962—by independent study), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy (1974), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1985—with gold medal).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order of the "Badge of Honor," many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of the Kolkhoz imeni V.I. Lenin, "Kommunizm" Kolkhoz, and "Moskva" Kolkhoz, Proletarskiy Rayon, Leninabad Oblast.

Elected people's deputy of the Tajik SSR from Proletarskiy Electoral District No. 141, Leninabad Oblast, on the first vote. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon, city, and oblast soviets of people's deputies.

##### **Muminzhan Mamadzhanovich Mamadzhanov**

Colonel, military commissar of the Tajik SSR.

Born 17 June 1950 in the city of Kurgan-Tyube, Tajik SSR, in a large kolkhoz family. Tajik. CPSU member since 1977. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1968. Completed Tashkent Higher Armor Command Institute imeni P.S. Rybalko (1972), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy (1980). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1983 through 1986.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, orders of the Republic of Afghanistan and Mongolian People's Republic, many medals.

Married, with daughter and two sons.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by eight labor collectives of Kanibadanskiy Rayon of Leninabad Oblast.

Elected people's deputy of the Tajik SSR from Kanibadanskiy Electoral District No. 98, Leninabad Oblast, on the first vote. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the oblast soviet of people's deputies.

##### **Akhmadzhan Makhmudzhanovich Saidov**

Lieutenant Colonel.

Born 3 October 1946 in the settlement of Pakhta, Tashkent Oblast, in the large family of a worker. Uzbek. CPSU member since 1979. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1967. Completed Orenburg Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1971—with gold medal).

Awarded many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married with son and three daughters. Wife is a doctor.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collective of Polyclinic No. 10, and the assembly of residents of Frunzenskiy Rayon, city of Dushanbe.

Elected people's deputy of the Tajik SSR from Navoiskiy Electoral District No. 16, city of Dushanbe, as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

##### **Nikolay Alekseyevich Senshov**

Colonel.

Born 18 December 1952 in the city of Nevel, Pskov Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1975. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1970. Completed Leningrad Higher Military Combined Arms Command Institute imeni S.M. Kirov (1974—with distinction), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1980—with distinction).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married with two daughters. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected people's deputy of the Tajik SSR from Barbadskiy Electoral District No. 25 as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

[No 15 Aug 90 (signed to press 27 Jul 90), pp 46-62]

[Text]

### **People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR**

#### **Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich Bocharov**

Major General.

Born 20 October 1948 in the city of Kursk in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1970. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1966. Completed Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault Command Institute imeni Lenin Komsomol (1970—with distinction), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1979—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1988). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1984 through 1986, and from 1988 through 1989.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner (twice), Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, orders of the Republic of Afghanistan—of the Red Banner (three times) and "Star," many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with two sons. Wife is an economic planner.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the DOSAAF Organization of Oktyabrskiy Rayon, city of Vitebsk.

Elected from Vitebsko-Pravdinskiy Electoral District No. 179 on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

#### **Vladimir Mikhaylovich Griбанov**

Major, senior instructor.

Born 13 January 1949 in the village of Kibirshchina, Krasnogorskiy Rayon, Bryansk Oblast, in the family of a rural teacher. Russian. Joined the CPSU in 1975, left the party in 1989. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1967. Completed Saratov Higher Command Engineering Institute (1972).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is an accountant.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the personnel of warrant officer school.

Elected from Kuleshovskiy Electoral District No. 7, city of Minsk, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

#### **Viktor Petrovich Dubynin**

Lieutenant General, commander of the Northern Group of Forces.

Born 1 February 1943 in the city of Kamensk-Uralskiy, Sverdlovsk Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU

member since 1970. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1961. Completed Blagoveshchensk Armor Command Institute (1964—with distinction), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy (1978—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1984—with distinction). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1984 through 1987 as first deputy, and then commander of the limited contingent of Soviet forces.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, Order of the Red Banner of the Republic of Afghanistan (twice), many Soviet and foreign medals.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collective of the Kolkhoz imeni 1 May, Khotimskiy Rayon, Mogilev Oblast, and by the personnel of several military units.

Elected from Khotimskiy Electoral District No. 307, Mogilev Oblast, on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon soviets of people's deputies.

#### **Valeriy Ivanovich Zelenin**

Senior Warrant Officer. Communications center chief.

Born 24 March 1949 in the city of Sverdlovsk in a worker's family. Russian. Non-party member. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1969.

Married with a son. Wife is an economist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by a general assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Kamenetskiy Electoral District No. 124 on the first vote. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

#### **Vladimir Vasilyevich Kobalenok**

Aviation Major General, deputy department director at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Born 3 March 1942 in the village of Beloye, Krupskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast, in a peasant family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1962. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1960. Completed Balashov Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1963), Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin (1976). Accomplished four flights in space as spacecraft commander. USSR pilot-cosmonaut.

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of the German Democratic Republic, Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic. Three times awarded the Order of Lenin, many foreign decorations, Soviet and foreign medals. Bronze bust erected to him at his birthplace.

Married. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by several labor collectives of Krupskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast.

Elected from Krupskiy Electoral District No. 65, Minsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

**Viktor Frantsevich Kuchinskiy**

Senior Lieutenant, deputy unit commander for political affairs.

Born 2 July 1958 in the village of Zabrodye, Zhitkovichskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast, in a peasant family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1981. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1976. Completed Kurgan Military-Political Aviation Institute (1984—by independent study), took five courses at the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin.

Medal recipient.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife works at a canery.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by a plenum of the city Komsomol organization and by military unit personnel.

Elected from Kobrinskiy Electoral District No. 125, Brest Oblast, on the first vote. (Six candidates were on the district ballot).

**Nikolay Ivanovich Laktyushin**

Retired Colonel, civil defense chief of staff at the foundry equipment plant, city of Volkovyssk, Grodno Oblast.

Born 25 April 1926 in the village of Suglits, Yelninskiy Rayon, Smolensk Oblast, in a peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1953. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1943. Completed military school (1950), one-year course work at the Military Academy for Rear Services and Transportation (1961). Served in the Great Patriotic War.

Awarded the Order of the Patriotic War first degree, Order of the Red Star, Order of Glory third degree, many medals.

Married, with son and daughter, grandchildren. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the veterans' social organization of the city of Volkovyssk.

Elected at a republic plenum of the Council of War and Labor Veterans. (207 candidates competed for 29 seats).

**Valeriy Vladimirovich Pavlov**

Lieutenant Colonel. Chief of political section.

Born 23 February 1952 in the city of Saryye Dorogi, Minsk Oblast, in a serviceman's family. Belorussian.

CPSU member since 1976. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1974. Completed the Belorussian Polytechnical Institute (1974), Sverdlovsk Higher Military-Political Armor and Artillery Institute (1977—by independent study), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1987—with distinction). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1980 through 1981.

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the personnel of three military units.

Elected from Vostochnyy Electoral District No. 32 on the first vote. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

**Igor Ivanovich Palagecha**

Lieutenant. Aircraft technician.

Born 4 May 1966 in the city of Kiev in a serviceman's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1980. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1983. Completed Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Engineering Institute (1988).

Married. Wife is a nurse.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected from Shchuchinskiy Electoral District No. 271, Grodno Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Nine candidates were on the district ballot).

**Grigoriy Fedorovich Prishchep**

Retired Major, civil defense chief of staff in Yelskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast.

Born 5 April 1924 in the village of Danilovka, Yelskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast, in a worker's family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1947. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1941. Completed Military Frontline Courses (1941), Higher Party School of the CPSU Central Committee (1964). Served in the Great Patriotic War.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the Belorussian Organization of War and Labor Veterans.

Elected at a republic plenum of the Council of War and Labor Veterans. (207 candidates competed for 29 seats).

Previously elected deputy of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

**Leonid Petrovich Privalov**

Colonel. Chief of staff.

Born 2 January 1940 in the village of Terekhovka, Terekhovskiy Rayon, Gomel Oblast, in an office worker's family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1962. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1959. Completed Ulyanovsk Armor Institute imeni V.I. Lenin (1963—with distinction), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy (1972).

Awarded many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married with two daughters. Wife is a music teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by several labor collectives and military unit collectives.

Elected from Grodnensko-Proletarskiy Electoral District No. 240, city of Grodno, as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

**Viktor Grigoryevich Samoilenko**

Colonel General, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of sector troops.

Born 9 June 1931 in the city of Glukhov, Sumy Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1953. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1954. Completed Sumy Teachers College (1954—history department, with distinction), Khmel'nitskiy Military Command Armor Institute (1956), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1972). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1980 through 1982 as chief of a group of military advisers.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, orders of the German Democratic Republic and Republic of Afghanistan, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the personnel of several military collectives.

Elected from Rossonskiy Electoral District No. 159 on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 9th, 10th, and 11th convocations.

**Anatoliy Dmitriyevich Sokolov**

Lieutenant Colonel.

Born 3 October 1949 in the village of Predzhechino, Konstantinovskiy Rayon, Donetsk Oblast, in a worker's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1970. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1967. Completed Kiev Suvorov Military Institute (1967), Kharkov Guards Higher Armor Command Institute (1971), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskiy (1979).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a kindergarten teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by residents of the military post and military unit personnel.

Elected from Vostochnyy Electoral District No. 52 on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

**Viktor Vladimirovich Sheyman**

Major, senior political department instructor.

Born 26 May 1958 in the village of Soltanishki, Voronovskiy Rayon, Grodno Oblast, Belorussian SSR, in a worker's family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1977. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1975. Completed Blagoveshchensk Higher Armor Command Institute (1979—with distinction). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1985 through 1987.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many Soviet and Afghan medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected from Brest-Yuzhnyy Electoral District No. 105, city of Brest, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

**People's Deputies of the RSFSR****Mikhail Alekseyevich Aleksandrov**

Captain 1st Rank, instructor at the Military Academy for Communications imeni S.M. Budennyy.

Born 5 March 1946 in the city of Dyatlovo, Grodno oblast, Belorussian SSR, in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1969. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1964. Completed Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering Institute (1969), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1979).

Awarded many medals.

Married with two sons and a daughter. Wife is a doctor.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collective of Territorial-Medical Association No. 14, Kalininskiy Rayon, city of Leningrad.

Elected from Akademicheskii Territorial District No. 106 as a result of a runoff election. (Six candidates were on the district ballot).

**Anatoliy Alekseyevich Alekseyev**

Captain 3d Rank, military unit instructor at the Leningrad Naval Base.

Born 1 January 1950 in the village of Zamostye, Dedovicheskii Rayon, Pskov Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1973. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1967. Completed Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering Institute imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (1972).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a merchandising specialist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collective of the "Sevzapgeologiya" Production Association, Vasilyevskii Island, city of Leningrad.

Elected from Kronshtadtskii Electoral District No. 113 as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

**Vladislav Alekseyevich Achalov**

Colonel General, commander of Airborne Assault Troops.

Born 13 November 1945 in the village of Atamysh, Arskii Rayon, Tatar ASSR. Russian. CPSU member since 1965. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1963. Completed Kazan Armor Institute (1966—with distinction), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovskii (1973), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1984—with gold medal).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" first, second, and third degree, many medals.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the Council of Veterans of the city of Yefremov and the personnel of several military units.

Elected from Yefremovskii Territorial District No. 708, Tula Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of city soviets of people's deputies.

**Gennadiy Matveyevich Benov**

Aviation Lieutenant General, member of the military council and director of the political department of the Air Force.

Born 29 September 1941 in the city of Kemerovo in a large miner's family. (His father perished at the front). Russian. CPSU member since 1963. In the USSR Armed

Forces since 1959. Completed Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1964—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1975—by correspondence).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with three sons. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by personnel of the air training regiment of Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots.

Elected from Tikhoretskii National-Territorial District No. 18 of Krasnodar Kray as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

**Anatoliy Lvovich Bugrimov**

Lieutenant Colonel, instructor at the Military Engineering Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy.

Born 20 April 1954 in the city of Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1978. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1971. Completed the Military Engineering Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (1976—with distinction), Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov, Department of Mechanics and Mathematics (1984). Candidate of technical sciences.

Married, with son. Wife works as a coordinator at the "Soyuzpechat" Central Agency.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the academy collective.

Elected from Avtozavodskii Territorial District No. 2, city of Moscow, as a result of a runoff election. (11 candidates were on the district ballot).

**Igor Ivanovich Vishnyakov**

Aviation Major General, director of Chelyabinsk Higher Military Air Institute for Navigators imeni 50th Anniversary of the VLKSM.

Born 27 November 1944 in the city of Orsha, Vitebsk Oblast, in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1972. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1963. Completed Tambov Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1967), Military Air Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin (1977).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, many medals.

Married with a daughter. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military and labor collectives of the institute, military units, and the air training regiment.

Elected from Kurchatovskiy Territorial District No. 743, Chelyabinsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

**Aleksandr Petrovich Volkov**

Colonel General, first deputy commander-in-chief of Strategic Missile Forces.

Born 7 February 1934 in the village of Nadezhdino, Selivanovskiy Rayon, Vladimir Oblast, in a large peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1954. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1952. Completed Ryazan Artillery Institute (1954), Military Engineering Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (1966), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1985).

Awarded the Order of the October Revolution, Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order of the "Badge of Honor," many medals.

Married with two children.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected from Leninskiy National-Territorial District No. 113, Mari ASSR, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon, city, oblast, and republic soviets of people's deputies.

**Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov**

Colonel General, director of the Military History Institute.

Born 22 March 1928 in the village of Mangut, Kyrinskiy Rayon, Chita Oblast, in an office-worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1951. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1949. Completed Orel Armor Institute (1952—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1963—with distinction). Doctor of philosophical sciences, doctor of historical sciences, professor.

Awarded the order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by enterprise labor collectives of the city of Buguruslan, and the Kolkhoz imeni Progress, Severnyy Rayon, Orenburg Oblast.

Elected from Orenburg National-Territorial District No. 60, Orenburg Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (11 candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

**Aleksandr Ivanovich Voronin**

Lieutenant General, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Far East Military District.

Born 12 July 1936 in the village of Yelkhovka, Sergiyevskiy Rayon, Kuybyshev Oblast, in a peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1958. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1953. Completed Orel Red Banner Military Institute imeni M.V. Frunze (1956—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1969—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1980).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, Order of the Combat Banner of the Mongolian People's Republic, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with two daughters.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel and the Komsomol Conference of Bikinskiy Rayon.

Elected from Vyazemskiy Territorial District No. 251, Khabarovsk Kray, as a result of a runoff election. (Seven candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon and kray soviets of people's deputies.

**Sergey Aleksandrovich Glotov**

Major, instructor in the department of Marxism-Leninism, Krasnodar Higher Military Command and Engineering Institute for Missile Troops.

Born 14 February 1959 in the city of Moscow in a serviceman's family. CPSU member since 1978. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1976. Completed Riga Higher Military-Political Institute imeni S.S. Biryuzov (1980). Candidate of philosophical sciences. Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a doctor and therapist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the institute collective.

Elected from Leninskiy Territorial District No. 163, Krasnodar Kray, as a result of a runoff election. (14 candidates were on the district ballot).

**Grigoriy Petrovich Dorofeyev**

Major, air wing commander.

Born 2 October 1953 in the city of Dushanbe, Tajik SSR, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1974. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1970. Completed Borisoglebsk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots imeni V.P. Chkalov (1974).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with two sons. Wife is a Soviet Army employee.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected from Buturlinovskiy Territorial District No. 342, Voronezh Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Seven candidates were on the district ballot).

**Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Yevstratov**

Major General.

Born 20 February 1939 in the village of Veretenino, Zheleznogorskiy Rayon, Kursk Oblast, in a peasant family. (His father perished at the front). Russian. CPSU member since 1961. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1959. Completed Saratov Military Artillery Institute (1962), Leningrad State University (1973—by correspondence), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1981).

Married, with two sons.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collective of the civil aviation aircraft enterprise of the city of Chita, and by assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Chernovskiy Territorial District No. 764, Chita Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Nine candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

**Viktor Fedorovich Yermakov**

Colonel General, commander of troops of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District (as of July 1990—USSR deputy minister of defense for personnel and chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense).

Born 9 September 1935 in the city of Dnepropetrovsk in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1961. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1953. Completed Kiev Military Combined Institute of Self-Propelled Artillery (1956), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1970—with gold medal), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1976—with gold medal).

Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1982 through 1984 as commander of the limited contingent of Soviet forces.

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, two orders of foreign states, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with two sons. Wife is a construction engineer.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of the Vsevolozhskiy Rayon Consumers Society and "Vyborgskiy" Sovkhoz, and by assemblies of the personnel of military units.

Elected from Vsevolozhskiy Territorial District No. 137, Leningrad Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

**Vitaliy Yakovlevich Yermolayev**

Major General, director of Voronezh Higher Military Engineering Institute of Radioelectronics.

Born 29 May 1939 in the city-type settlement of Shumilino, Sirotinskiy Rayon, Vitebsk Oblast, Belorussian SSR, in a family of teachers. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1960. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1957. Completed Krasnoyarsk Radio Engineering Institute for Air Defense Forces (1960), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1973—with distinction).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with a daughter. Wife is a stomatologist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the institute collective.

Elected from Leninskiy Territorial District No. 333, Voronezh Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

**Vladimir Dmitriyevich Kadyshev**

Colonel, director of the Department of Marxism-Leninism, Ulyanovsk Higher Military Engineering Institute of Communications imeni G.K. Ordzhonikidze.

Born 7 October 1945 in the city of Ulyanovsk in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1967. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1965. Completed Ulyanovsk Military Institute of Communications (1968), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1976).

Awarded orders, many medals.



Married with son and daughter. Wife is a trade employee.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by a general assembly of military servicemen, workers, and other employees of Ulyanovsk Higher Military Engineering Institute of Communications imeni G.K. Ordzhonikidze.

Elected from Leninskiy Territorial District No. 732, Ulyanovsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (16 candidates were on the district ballot).

**Konstantin Ivanovich Kobets**

Colonel General, chief of communications of the USSR Armed Forces and deputy chief of the General Staff.

Born 16 July 1939 in the city of Kiev in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1959. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1956. Completed Kiev Military Communications Institute (1959—with distinction), Military Communications Academy imeni S.M. Budennyi (1967), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1978). Doctor of military sciences.

Awarded the Order of the October Revolution, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with a son.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of the Minatomenergoprom Construction Administration, and of the communications center of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Elected from Chekhovskiy Electoral District No. 100, Moscow Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Nine candidates were on the district ballot).

**Leonid Illarionovich Kovalev**

Lieutenant General.

Born 25 January 1944 in the city of Borisoglebsk, Voronezh Oblast, in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1966. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1962. Completed Voronezh Suvorov Military Institute (1962), Baku Higher Combined Arms Command Institute (1965), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1978—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1986).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a librarian.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by an assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Kasimovskiy Territorial District No. 626, Ryazan Oblast, on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the oblast soviet of people's deputies.

**Aleksandr Vasilyevich Kovtunov**

Colonel General, commander-in-chief of sector forces.

Born 12 April 1933 in the village of Lutsepkovo, Alekseyevskiy Rayon, Belgorod Oblast, in a family of village teachers. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1954. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1951. Completed Odessa Red Banner Infantry Institute (1953—with distinction), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1964—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1972).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, many medals.

Married, with two sons and a daughter. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by Komsomol City Conference (city of Ulan-Ude), and labor collectives of the "Prigorodnyy" Sovkhoz, Ivolginskiy Rayon, and "Erkherinskiy" Sovkhoz, Zaigraevskiy Rayon, of the Buryat ASSR.

Elected from Ivolginskiy Territorial District No. 806, Buryat ASSR, on the first vote. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the Supreme Soviets of the Azerbaijan and Belorussian SSR's, and of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

**Anatoliy Borisovich Koltunov**

Major General.

Born 16 November 1943 in the village of Chusovlyana, Irbitskiy Rayon, Sverdlovsk Oblast, in a peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1967. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1961. Completed Vilnius Radio Engineering Institute for Air Defense Forces (1964), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1977).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, Order of the "Badge of Honor," many medals.

Married, with daughter. Wife works in a teachers college.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by an assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Nenetskiy Territorial District No. 274, Arkhangelsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon, city, and oblast soviets of people's deputies.

**Aleksandr Alekseyevich Kotenkov**

Lieutenant Colonel, deputy director of political section.

Born 23 September 1952 in the village of Belyy, Leninogradskiy Rayon, Krasnodar Kray, in a servicemen's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1977. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1975. Completed Rostov-on-Don Institute of Agricultural Machine Building (1974—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1988—with distinction).

Married, with son. Wife is an engineer and economist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected from Birobidzhanskiy Territorial District No. 257, Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Khabarovsk Kray, as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

**Yuriy Alekseyevich Litvinov**

Major, unit director of intelligence.

Born 4 June 1953 in the People's Republic of Poland in the family of a Soviet Army serviceman. Russian. CPSU member since 1975. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1970. Completed Ryazan Higher Airborne Assault Command Institute imeni Lenin Komsomol (1974). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1979 through 1981.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is an engineer.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected from Territorial District No. 457, Kostroma Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

**Boris Ivanovich Lysenko**

Aviation Major General, director of Ufa Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots.

Born 8 May 1940 in the village of Uspenskiy, Krasnodar Kray, in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1963. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1959. Completed Syzran Military Institute for Pilots (1963), Syzran Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1970—with distinction, by correspondence), Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin (1975—by correspondence).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married with son and daughter. Wife works in an enterprise personnel section.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the administration collective at Ufa Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots.

Elected from Leninskiy Territorial District No. 782, Bashkir ASSR, as a result of a runoff election. (Ten candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

**Vladimir Afanasyevich Maldov**

Aviation Major General, member of the military council and director of the air force political section of the Western Group of Forces.

Born 10 May 1937 in the city of Leningrad in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1961. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1954. Completed the Military Aviation Institute for Navigators (1957—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1971), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1980).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a nurse.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by assembly of military unit servicemen.

Elected from Teykovskiy Territorial District No. 379, Ivanovo Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon, city, and oblast soviets of people's deputies.

**Igor Mikhaylovich Maltsev**

Aviation Colonel General, chief of the Main Staff and first deputy commander-in-chief of Air Defense Troops.

Born 6 August 1935 in the city of Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1958. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1952. Completed Bataysk Military Aviation Institute for Pilots imeni A.K. Serov (1954—with distinction), Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin (1964—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1975—with distinction).

Awarded the Order of the October Revolution, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, many medals, orders and medals of foreign states.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by assembly of military unit servicemen.

Elected from Balashikhinskiy Territorial District No. 61, Moscow Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the kray soviet of people's deputies, and of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet 11th Convocation.

**Andrian Grigoryevich Nikolayev**

Aviation Major General, first deputy director of the Cosmonaut Training Center imeni Yu.A. Gagarin, USSR pilot-cosmonaut.

Born 5 September 1929 in the village of Shorshely, Mariinsko-Posadskiy Rayon, Chuvash ASSR, in a peasant family. Chuvash. CPSU member since 1957. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1950. Completed the Air Force Engineering Academy imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy (1968), candidate of technical sciences.

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, and many medals. A bronze bust has been erected to him in Mariinsko-Posadskiy Rayon.

He has a daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the Chuvash Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans, labor collectives of the Shorshely Village Kolkhoz, Construction Trust No. 4 of the city of Novocheboksarsk, and the "Chuvashkabel" Plant of the city of Cheboksary.

Elected from Oktyabrskiy National-Territorial District No. 142, Chuvash ASSR, as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

**Boris Nikolayevich Pekedov**

Vice Admiral, member of the military council and director of the political administration of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet.

Born 24 July 1937 in the settlement of Ulyanovka, Tosnenskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1958. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1956. Completed Leningrad Higher Naval Institute imeni M.V. Frunze (1961—political department), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1968).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.

Married, with son.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the ship-repair plant labor collective and servicemen's assembly of the nuclear-powered cruiser "M. Frunze."

Elected from Partizanskiy Territorial District No. 228, Maritime Kray, as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

**Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Piskunov**

Lieutenant Colonel, department head at the computer center of "Plesetsk" Cosmodrome.

Born 5 November 1951 in the city of Taganry, Rostov Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1978. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1969. Completed the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (1974).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a computer technician.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by servicemen's assembly of the military unit.

Elected from Plesetsk Territorial District No. 270, Arkhangelsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Six candidates were on the district ballot).

**Yevgeniy Konstantinovich Pudovkin**

Captain 2d Rank, technical organization head, Soviet Navy.

Born 11 August 1946 in the city of Rostov in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1971. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1964. Completed Leningrad Higher Naval Engineering Institute imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (1969), Leningrad Institute of Finance and Economics (1990—by correspondence).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a doctor.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by a residents' assembly of Kirovskiy Rayon, city of Leningrad.

Elected from Narvskiy Territorial District No. 118, city of Leningrad, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

**Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskey**

Colonel, student at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

Born 16 September 1947 in the city of Khmel'nitsk, Ukrainian SSR, in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1970. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1966. Prior to army service, he worked two years as an aviation mechanic. Completed Barnaul Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1971), Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin (1980).

Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1985 through 1986, and from 1987 through 1988 served in the capacity of aviation regiment commander and deputy air force commander of the limited contingent of Soviet troops.

Hero of the Soviet Union. Awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner, Orders of the Republic of Afghanistan "Red Banner" and "For Bravery," many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with two sons.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy as an honorary citizen of the city of Kursk by labor collectives of "Biokombinat" and Kursk "Geomash."

Elected from Kursk National-Territorial District No. 52, Kursk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Nine candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the rayon soviet of people's deputies.

**Ivan Titovich Rymarev**

Lieutenant General, member of the military council and director of the political administration of the Order of Lenin Transbaikalian Military District.

Born 18 July 1936 in the village of Kapustino, Nedovskiy Rayon, Mogilev Oblast, in a large peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1959. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1955. Completed Tashkent Armor Institute (1959—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1968).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by labor collectives of 36 enterprises and kolkhozes of Chita Oblast, and by an assembly of military units.

Elected from Borzinskiy Territorial District No. 765, Chita Oblast, on the first vote. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon, city, and oblast soviets of people's deputies.

**Valeriy Vasilyevich Ryumin**

Lieutenant Colonel, instructor at Ryazan Higher Military Air Assault Command Institute imeni Lenin Komsomol.

Born 3 March 1950 in the city of Tomsk in a large worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1970. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1967. Completed Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms Institute, Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1978). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the

Republic of Afghanistan from 1980 through 1982, was wounded. Assigned to instructor duty after being wounded.

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, Order of the Republic of Afghanistan "Star," many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son. Wife is a technological engineer.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collectives of Ryazan State Teachers College, "Plazma" Association, and nine other enterprises of the city of Ryazan.

Elected from Sovetskiy Territorial District No. 625, city of Ryazan, as a result of a runoff election. (10 candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

Currently chairman of the Ryazan City Soviet of People's Deputies.

**Vladimir Valentinovich Seleznev**

Colonel, deputy director of the department of Marxism-Leninism, Chelyabinsk Higher Military Motor Vehicle Engineering Institute.

Born 5 June 1949 in the city of Chelyabinsk in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1969. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1966. Completed Perm Higher Command and Engineering Institute (1971), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1980). Candidate of historical sciences, senior lecturer.

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by assembly of servicemen, workers, and office employees of the institute.

Elected from Kalininskiy Territorial District No. 742, Chelyabinsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Six candidates were on the district ballot).

**Aleksandr Gerontyevich Selivanov**

Rear Admiral, member of the military council and director of the political administration of the Red Banner Northern Fleet.

Born 23 August 1941 in the city of Melitopol, Zaporozhye Oblast, in the family of a construction engineer. (Father perished at the front). Russian. CPSU member since 1963. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1960. Completed the Higher Naval Institute imeni M.V. Frunze (1967—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1977—by correspondence).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with two sons.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the crew of the cruiser "Baku."

Elected from Severomorsk Territorial District No. 512, Murmansk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Seven candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of kray soviets of people's deputies.

**Mikhail Vadimovich Seslavskiy**

Lieutenant, deputy battery commander for political affairs.

Born 28 February 1964 in the city of Dzerzhinsk, Gorkiy Oblast, in a lawyer's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1989. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1989. Completed Gorkiy State University imeni I.I. Lobachevskiy (1986—history department), was conscripted into the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces for two years.

Bachelor.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collective of teachers and students of the Dzerzhinsk Branch of Gorkiy Polytechnic Institute.

Elected from Dzerzhinskiy Territorial District No. 364, Gorkiy Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

**Gennadiy Nikolayevich Sorokin**

Lieutenant Colonel, subunit commander.

Born 31 January 1950 in the city of Kursk in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1980. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1968. Completed Kemerovo Military Communications Institute (1971), Military Academy for Communications imeni S.M. Budennyi (1985).

Married, with two daughters.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by an assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Verkhnesaldinskiy Territorial District No. 665, Sverdlovsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

**Boris Vasilyevich Tarasov**

Lieutenant General, member of the military council and director of the political administration of the Volga-Ural Military District.

Born 28 February 1932 in the city of Serpukhov, Moscow Oblast, in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1952. In the USSR Armed Forces since

1951. Completed Alma-Ata Air Assault Institute (1954), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1969).

Awarded two Orders of the Red Star, the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" second and third degree, many medals.

Married, with daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by an assembly of military construction detachment personnel.

Elected from Volzhskiy National-Territorial District No. 49, Kuybyshev Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Seven candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the kray soviet of people's deputies.

**Vasiliy Nikolayevich Teterin**

Lieutenant Colonel, instructor at Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots.

Born 1 June 1950 in the village of Vannoye, Kazachinskoye-Lenskiy Rayon, Irkutsk Oblast, in a peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1979. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1968. Completed Yeysk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1979—with distinction).

Awarded the medal "For Combat Achievement," other medals.

Married, with two sons. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit personnel.

Elected from Yeysk Territorial District No. 173, Krasnodar Kray, as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

**Vasiliy Timofeyevich Khaustov**

Colonel, head of the department of Marxism-Leninism, Borisoglebsk Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots imeni V.P. Chkalov.

Born 8 September 1946 in the village of Listopadovka, Gribovskiy Rayon, Voronezh Oblast, in a peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1968. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1964. Completed Syzran Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots (1967), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1977).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a telecommunications worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by an assembly of personnel of the air training regiment of the institute.

Elected from Borisoglebsk Territorial District No. 341, Voronezh Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon soviets of people's deputies.

**Aleksey Yuryevich Tsarev**

Lieutenant Colonel, deputy unit commander for political affairs.

Born 21 December 1953 in the city of Kuybyshev in a worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1975. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1971. Completed the Kiev Suvarov Military Institute (1971), Rostov Higher Command and Engineering Institute imeni M.I. Nedelin (1975), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1987).

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a swimming coach.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by military unit assembly.

Elected from Tselinnyy Territorial District No. 555, Orenburg Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

**Andrey Fedorovich Chaykovskiy**

Captain 1st Rank, special department head of USSR KGB administration.

Born 1 January 1947 in the city of Boyarka, Kiev Oblast, in a large worker's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1967. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1965. Since 1973 he has served in the organs of the USSR KGB. Completed Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering Institute, Higher Training Institution of the USSR KGB (with distinction).

Awarded many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a nurse.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Kaliningradskiy National-Territorial District No. 41, Kaliningrad Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (15 candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

**Ravkat Zagidulovich Chebotarevskiy**

Rear Admiral.

Born 3 September 1947 in the city of Troitsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast, in a worker's family. Tatar. CPSU member since 1969. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1964. Completed the Pacific Higher Naval Institute (1969), Naval Academy imeni A.A. Grechko (1984—with distinction).

Awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Star, many medals. Merited the title "Honorary Polar Explorer of the USSR."

Married, with two sons. Wife is an office worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by personnel of the major unit.

Elected from Kolskiy Territorial District No. 511, Murmansk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (12 candidates were on the district ballot).

**Sergey Nikolayevich Yushenkov**

Lieutenant Colonel, instructor in the philosophy department, Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin.

Born 27 June 1950 in a large peasant family in the village of Medvedevkovo, Kuvshinovskiy Rayon, Kalinin Oblast. CPSU member since 1974. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1969. Completed Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms Institute, Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1983—with distinction). Candidate of philosophical sciences.

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a kindergarten teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collectives of the Institute for Slavic and Balkan Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Linguistics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Elected from Kiyevskiy Territorial District No. 20, city of Moscow, as a result of a runoff election. (Nine candidates were on the district ballot).

**People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR**

**Stefan Vasilyevich Batyushko**

Lieutenant Colonel, senior instructor in the department of Marxism-Leninism, Kharkov Higher Military Aviation Institute for Pilots imeni Twice Hero of the Soviet Union S.I. Gritsevets.

Born 16 April 1949 in the village of Rylovichi, Ivanovskiy Rayon, Brest Oblast, in a peasant family. Belorussian. CPSU member since 1979. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1968. Completed Kurgan Higher Military-Political Aviation Institute (1973), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1983), postgraduate work at Kharkov State University imeni A.M. Gorkiy (1988). Candidate of philosophical sciences.

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the collective of the military institute.

Elected from Ordzkonikidzevskiy Electoral District No. 374, city of Kharkov, on the first vote. (Three candidates were on the district ballot).

**Gennadiy Ivanovich Vaneyev**

Captain 1st Rank retired, department professor at the Black Sea Higher Naval Institute imeni P.S. Nakhimov.

Born 23 June 1927 in the village of Vaneyevy, Khalturinskiy Rural Soviet, Kotelnicheskii Rayon, Kirov Oblast, in a peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1950. In the USSR Armed Forces from 1944 through 1978. Completed the Second Kiev Naval Political Institute (1953—with distinction), Kiev State University imeni T.G. Shevchenko (1961—by correspondence, with distinction).

Doctor of historical sciences, professor, Ukrainian SSR professor emeritus of science and technology. Served in the Great Patriotic War.

Awarded many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by general assembly of personnel of the naval institute.

Elected from Gagarinskiy Electoral District No. 238, city of Sevastopol, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

**Boris Innokentyevich Dukhov**

Colonel General, director of the Ground Forces Air Defense Military Academy imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy.

Born 9 November 1937 in the city of Krasnoyarsk in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1960. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1955. Completed Kiev Higher Artillery Engineering Institute imeni S.M. Kirov (1959), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1977).

Awarded the Order of the Red Banner, Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married. Wife is a librarian.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by general assembly of academy personnel.

Elected from Zaliznichnyy Electoral District No. 7, city of Kiev, as a result of a runoff election. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

**Valeriy Nikolayevich Izmalkov**

Lieutenant Colonel, deputy unit commander for political affairs.

Born 20 April 1955 in the city of Weimar (GDR) in the family of a Soviet Army serviceman. Russian. CPSU

member since 1975. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1972. Completed Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined Arms Institute (1976), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1989). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1979 through 1981.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order of the Republic of Afghanistan "Star," Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by general assembly of military unit servicemen.

Elected from Shevchenkovskiy Electoral District No. 185, city of Zaporozhye, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

**Fedor Sergeyevich Kiparis**

Major General, director of the Poltava Higher Military Command Communications Institute imeni K.S. Moskalenko.

Born 11 May 1940 in the village of Katashin, Chechekhnitskiy Rayon, Vinnitsa Oblast, in a large peasant family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1964. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1959. Completed Ulyanovsk Military Communications Institute (1964), Military Academy for Communications imeni S.M. Budennyi (1975).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with son. Wife is a Soviet Army employee.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by general assembly of military institute personnel.

Elected from Kiyevskiy Electoral District No. 317, city of Poltava, as a result of a runoff election. (Eight candidates were on the district ballot).

**Mikhail Ivanovich Maslov**

Lieutenant Colonel, deputy director for political affairs of the "Khmelnik" Central Military Sanatorium.

Born 29 November 1948 in the village of Dvulichnoye, Urazovskiy Rayon, Kursk Oblast, in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1972. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1967. Completed Lvov Higher Military-Political Institute (1972), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1985—by correspondence). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan in the post of deputy regimental commander for political affairs.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with daughter. Wife is a trade employee.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the sanatorium collective.

Elected from Khmelnytskyi Electoral District No. 28, Vinnitsa Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

**Nikolay Viktorovich Naumenko**

Colonel, senior instructor at Khmelnytskyi Higher Military Command Institute.

Born 1 February 1945 in the village of Rubezhnoye, Klimovskiy Rayon, Bryansk Oblast, in a peasant family. Russian. CPSU member since 1965. Completed Omsk Higher Military Combined Arms Command Institute imeni M.V. Frunze (1967), Military Academy for Armor Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky (1981). In the USSR Armed Forces since 1963. Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1981 through 1982, where he was seriously wounded.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, many medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a seamstress.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the institute collective.

Elected from Tsentralnyy Electoral District No. 404, city of Khmelnytskyi, as a result of a runoff election. (11 candidates were on the district ballot).

**Vladilen Petrovich Nekrasov**

Vice Admiral, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet.

Born 17 July 1934 in the village of Dor-Vaganskiy, Prechistinskiy Rayon, Yaroslavl Oblast, in an office worker's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1957. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1954. Completed Leningrad Naval Political Institute imeni A.A. Zhdanov (1958—with distinction), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1967—with distinction).

Awarded the Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals, including foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collectives of "Zolotaya Balka" Agricultural Firm and "Krasnyy Oktyabr" Sovkhoz, and by the veterans council of the city of Balaklava.

Elected Ukrainian SSR people's deputy from Balaklavskiy Electoral District No. 237, Krymsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Six candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies.

**Vitaliy Kupriyanovich Pavlichenko**

Major General, director of the Simferopol Higher Military-Political Construction Institute.

Born 14 February 1937 in the village of Vodyano, Sofiyevskiy Rayon, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, in a serviceman's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1959. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1956. Began his working career as a high school teacher after completion of teachers college. He then completed the Military-Political Institute of the Soviet Army (1961), Higher Military-Political Institute of the Soviet Army and Navy (1964—by correspondence, department of journalism), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1978).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with two daughters. Wife is a medical worker.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by general assembly of the institute and five labor collectives.

Elected from Tsentralnyy Electoral District No. 242, Krymsk Oblast, as a result of a runoff election. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

**Igor Nikolayevich Ploskonos**

Major, unit chief of staff.

Born 26 April 1959 in the city of Pavlodar, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, in a worker's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1982. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1976. Completed Baku Higher Military Combined Arms Command Institute (1980), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1985—with distinction). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1982 through 1984.

Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Star, Order of the Republic of Afghanistan "Star," many medals.

Married, with son and daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by general assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Trostinetskiy Electoral District No. 353, Sumy Oblast, on the first vote. (Four candidates were on the district ballot).

**Vladimir Ivanovich Sevastyanov**

Colonel, deputy director of the training department, Simferopol Military Combined Institute.

Born 15 August 1943 in the city of Kislovodsk, Stavropol Kray, in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1965. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1961.



Completed Sverdlovsk Suvorov Military Institute (1961), Leningrad Higher Military Combined Arms Institute imeni S.M. Kirov (1964), Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1974). Fulfilled internationalist duty obligation in the Republic of Afghanistan from 1979 through 1981, where he was seriously wounded.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order of the Republic of Afghanistan "Star," many Soviet and foreign medals.

He has a son.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collectives of "Santekhpribor" Plant and Cannery imeni S.M. Kirov, and by the oblast council of internationalist soldiers.

Elected from Kiyevskiy Electoral District No. 241, city of Simferopol, as a result of a runoff election. (Nine candidates were on the district ballot).

#### **Vladimir Konstantinovich Strelnikov**

Colonel General, director of the Military Radio Engineering Academy for Air Defense Forces imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov.

Born 2 July 1925 in the village of Ilovay-Rozhdestvenskoye, Michurinskiy Rayon, Tambov Oblast, in a serviceman's family. Russian. CPSU member since 1946. In the USSR Armed Forces since 1943. Completed Third Leningrad Artillery Institute, Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze (1955—with distinction), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1967). Professor, candidate of military sciences.

Awarded the Order of the October Revolution, Order of the Labor Red Banner, Order of the Red Star (twice), Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many Soviet and foreign medals.

Married, with son and daughter. Wife is a teacher.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by the labor collective of Merefa Electromechanics Plant, Kharkov Oblast.

Elected from Kharkov Electoral District No. 392, Kharkov Oblast, on the first vote. (Two candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected as deputy of rayon, city, and oblast soviets of people's deputies, and of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

#### **Vladimir Borisovich Tolubko**

Major General.

Born 3 September 1948 in the city of Krasnograd, Kharkov Oblast, in a worker's family. Ukrainian. CPSU member since 1969. In the USSR Armed Forces since

1966. Completed Kharkov Higher Command and Engineering Institute for Missile Troops (1971), Military Engineering Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy (1979—with gold medal), Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (1986), candidate of technical sciences.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with two sons. Wife is a doctor and therapist.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by assembly of military unit personnel.

Elected from Pervomayskiy Electoral District No. 287, city of Pervomaysk, as a result of a runoff election. (Six candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of the city soviet of people's deputies.

#### **Boris Ivanovich Sharikov**

Lieutenant General, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Central Group of Forces.

Born 17 October 1936 in the village of Arkhangelskoye, Budennovskiy Rayon, Stavropol Kray, in the family of a party worker. (His father perished at the front). Russian. CPSU member since 1957. Completed Arzamas Military Communications Institute (1957—with distinction), the history department of Kishinev State University (1971—by correspondence), Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1976—by correspondence), Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee (1980).

Awarded the Order of the Red Star (twice), Order "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces" third degree, many medals.

Married, with a daughter.

Nominated as a candidate for people's deputy by a general assembly of 26 military units.

Elected from Velikolepivskiy Electoral District No. 398, Kherson Oblast, on the first vote. (Five candidates were on the district ballot).

Previously elected deputy of rayon soviets of people's deputies.

COPYRIGHT: "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil", 1990.

**OGONEK Discussion of Col Gen Rodionov Letter**  
90SV0071A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 35,  
Aug 90 pp 26-27

[Article by Zoya Zolotova, correspondent for the Department of Ethics and Letters, under the rubric "Letters From the Army": "Honor Should Not Remain Silent"]

[Text] Recently, OGONEK has received a particularly large number of letters, in which the readers raise the subject of our Armed Forces. They write about various topics—about political agencies and the professional army, about military reform, about the difficulties associated with military cutbacks, and, of course, about soldiering. We publish them under the rubric "Letters From the Army".

And of course, just today we were sent several copies of an article by Col Gen I. N. Rodionov, commandant of the General Staff Academy. I assume the author is well known to everyone by the tragic events in Tbilisi and I think it is somewhat useful to be familiar with the very treatise "which is being circulated among the general and flag officers of our protectors and yours" (and this is precisely what the readers, who sent this work, wrote). Especially since many questions have cropped up among those who sent it. By the way, even the general himself sent his work right away to several publications, including OGONEK.

The article is entitled "On the Honor of the Army and the State".

Nevertheless, our most Party oriented newspaper has already accepted the article with all its heart and soul. Alas, none other than PRAVDA has added I. N. Rodionov's ideas and his words, which, God forbid, could become buzzwords, to its armory and made the people aware of them (although without reference to the general's authorship\*). The recent speech at the RSFSR Communist Party Congress by another Colonel General—Makashov, who suddenly became well known, literally repeats the treatise word for word in places. Borrowing? Coinciding ideas? It happens, of course... It is worse if all generals' speeches are conceived and written in the same place.

\* PRAVDA 2 July, V. Izgarshev's article, "Firing Upon One's Own..."

The generals begin—"Of all structures in society, none other than the army and navy are the most perfect symbols of the State. One wanting to demolish the State begins with the defamation of the Armed Forces. Clausewitz's idea that a nation, which does not respect its army, will feed a foreign army is true even today".

Is it worth arguing that it is everyone's wish to see one's own country strong and well defended. Was it not in the name of this that for decades after the last great war we "fed" the military-industrial complex, and along with it the army, absolutely to satiety. True, the evidence is becoming more and more plentiful that, as the saying

goes, it was far from always money well spent and this money was distributed unfairly. As regards the allusions to the sustenance of "foreign" armies, the great Clausewitz lived some one hundred and fifty years ago and, I dare say, the Prussian military theorist simply died without knowing anything about the politics of the new thinking, which is conquering more and more of the globe, or about the mutual peace initiatives, like when Manfred Woerner himself, the NATO Secretary General, visited us offering cooperation. And did we ourselves imagine only two-three years ago that we would hear these words about reducing the numbers of personnel and arms: "Now we want to reduce personnel and arms to the maximum extent possible so that you will have a real guarantee: no matter what happens, no one will be able to attack the Soviet Union". Thank God, for some reason, Mr. Woerner doesn't want our sustenance...

Your business, comrade general, is to trust or not trust these words. And not, as I see it, to judge how many and what kind of weapons we should have under the new conditions or whether someone should "demand the abolishment of the completed aircraft carrier, in which billions of the people's rubles have been invested". But why invest so secretly and then generalize so angrily and absurdly?

Jupiter, you are angry... If we crave disarmament, it is for one very substantial reason: for 70 years we have been hungry and we are dead tired of "feeding" everyone, we have all we can do to get by... Us, we are the ones... Or haven't you seen and heard (maybe you do not want to see or hear?) how those, upon whom you so persistently call to defend themselves, "are fed"?

However, you are not only concerned with the military threat, you are more concerned with a "vicious Russophobia", with "defamation", and with "the pet journalists of the stagnant period and perestroika"... About the fact that "arousing brutish instincts in one's self and the readers for the cause of the generals" has become "the most favorite pastime for the yellow cossack squadron". Allow me to quote: "The sycophantic savoring of the general's theme should show everyone how these replete journalists and sleek academicians care for the common people after journeys across the ocean".

And granted, for some reason or other, dashing and bellicose generals have become a topic for OGONEK. They build dachas for themselves on scores of hectares, on the very best land, as a matter of fact directly over common graves—and let them go ahead and build... Even if only one is offended and complains that he was wrongfully accused, they are by no means silent... Well, we interpret silence as a sign of consent, as the saying goes. As regards the generals' and journalists' comparative satiety—there is also something to be said about this.

Especially since the officers, warrant officers, and enlisted personnel are speaking out. They are writing to

the editorial staff about the hazing of new conscripts by conscripts with 18 months of service, about their own lack of civil rights, and about their destitute lives. I will not cite examples—there are too many of them. There are no prospects, no housing, no foodstuffs, no medical care... While at the same time the general is outraged by any doubts regarding the billions of rubles invested in the construction of aircraft carriers, and hushes up (is this coincidental?) about the sums, which the dachas, costing many hundreds of thousands of rubles, for the top army leadership take from the country's defense budget. When we show how "really difficult life is for our officers, perhaps, the most socially unprotected portion of society", OGONEK is accused of slander. Oh how I wish they were writing about "genuine greatness", "the brotherhood of nations", "stability", and "unity in peace for the alliance of nations" instead! It would be so much more comforting, right?..

Comrade General, you write that "society has contaminated the army with attitudes that are contrary to regulations and the army itself is blamed". I think this is true—society is the original cause of this. As well as the "unprofessionalism of the officer corps"—which is a derivative of the widespread incompetence, and also the "haughtiness of the generals", which comes from the system of undeserved privileges. By the way, officers and generals are entitled to a better life in exchange for difficult and extremely "sacrificial" service. But one must actually be morally depraved and completely "sacrifice" one's conscience in order to live in the manner that many of your fellow military leaders have commanded for themselves. When you, for your part, reproach the "replete journalists" after "journeys across the ocean" because they "care for the common people", allow us to once again observe that across the ocean, to our regret and shame, food is more plentiful for the majority and after visiting abroad, many people really do begin to care even more profoundly for our common people, who have been reduced to dire straits. This is a noble pursuit, it is a pity that you think otherwise. Yes, there is plenty of food overseas for those who know how and are able to work. And for example what do those soldiers of ours, who fly across the borders with unpolished stone after unpolished stone, care about?

I beg your pardon, I have not exercised self-restraint—I am sorry to say... I did not want to adopt your tone... We should never forget how our forefathers did not restrain themselves 70 years and took up arms against one another—and the Motherland still has not recovered. How many millions of her children were lost during those years—Russia could not endure another civil war...

Now, I find that you have a new dreadful statistic: "In 1988, one officer was killed in our country. Last year, not counting Karabakh, the Baltic republics, and Fergana, 59 officers were killed in our homeland. Maliciously and deliberately killed. These innocent people had families, children, and mothers and fathers. Russia has not known such nightmarish abomination for a thousand years of

history". (Excuse me, about the casualties in the Baltic republics—was that for the sake of being witty? Or was it preliminary information?)

You feel that "the blood of these officers is on those, who for the past five years have been conducting a deliberate and sordid persecution of the army and navy using mass shock techniques, headed by television, OGONEK, MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, SOBESEDNIK, and other organs of the press." This is a serious accusation. And an even more serious guilt if this is proven. But has it been proven? When and by whom was this corroborated? If this is true, the story must be told and it should become a grim lesson... But if this also is an attempt to be witty?.. Or because of irresponsibility, the very same irresponsibility that begets your torrent of unfounded abuse?

But I am asking about another statistic, no less dreadful for myself and mothers. "Just during the years of perestroika, 15 thousand soldiers have been killed in the army as a result of criminal acts and attitudes that are contrary to regulations—this is more than during ten years of war in Afghanistan." MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, which you find objectionable, reported this. Who is guilty here? The newspaper itself? OGONEK? The Komsomol newspaper?

What should we do with regard to this dreadful statistic? Not believe it? But we must believe it, there are hundreds of letters in every editorial office's mail about humiliations in the army, murders, and rapes. Mother, fathers, and conscripts, who were unable to endure the torment come into the editorial office. Must we simply wait until society changes? Put the blame on others? Comrade generals, at long last ask yourselves this question! Stop only justifying yourselves.

Our goal is not to "defame", "slander", nor "present a distorted view" of life in the Soviet Armed Forces, but to change and improve it together with you. And who, other than yourselves, respected military leaders, should act in such a manner that it would become unnecessary for the press play up "the subjects of the hazing of new conscripts, the unprofessionalism of the officer corps, the haughtiness of the generals, the enlisted men's lack of civil rights, and the 'gendarme functions' of the army"...

The general called his work "On the Honor of the Army and State. SUVOROVSKIY NATISK, a military newspaper in the far east has already published it, under the heading "For Whom Do the Bells Toll?" The story of the article, which did not forgo principles and was reprinted by oblast newspapers, is still fresh in N. Andreyevaya's memory. Will it be repeated?

Well if there really is to be a discussion of honor, let us be honest. In the past Russian officers always had honor and it remained with them.

Yes, one could be proud of our State, but living in it has turned out to be not especially happy. Discord, which has been brought into the light of day, is tearing the State

to pieces and it has fallen to the army's lot to treat it with weapons. But simply to treat it and not to drive it inwards. You have emphasized time and again that you follow directions, that you have carried out the will of the government and the political leaders and president, and that you continue to do so. True, the army is built upon discipline and carrying out orders. But when the order has been carried out, one's honor should be intact. No one has yet been decorated for carrying out dishonorable orders.

Allow me a final quotation: "The corrupters did not get their own way. The yellow daub only united the officer corps and brought them even closer to their soldiers. They understood that they are carrying out the historic mission of saving the State by the mere fact of their own existence".

I try not to hear insults. But I will attempt to shed some light on the "secret of our readers' solution". It is simple: we desire a peaceful and quiet life for ourselves and our compatriots and the peoples of the entire world. And if God wills it, the words about the unity of the officer corps and about their becoming closer to their soldiers will prove to be correct, and the generals will come to terms more quickly with those majors and colonels, who courageously argue with them from the rostrums of the highest congresses.

Let us acknowledge that our main concern must be the welfare of the Motherland. And the general's old, far-fetched argument: "If you are so smart, why don't you march?" has become outdated. Take some advice—In the future decide issues without command proclamations, dear general.

We have discussed at length the fact that our army is building roads, houses, dachas, and it fulfills many more commitments, which has turned it into detachments of a very cheap and mobile labor force lacking civil rights, but by no means into an army of the type that it should be. Perhaps, after returning part of the healthy and strong young people to field teams and road building cooperatives, it really is possible to reduce it. And part of the generals could be assigned to the national economy, where their conviction, temperament, and knowledge could be used. General, do not love yourself so boundlessly, the Motherland is also worth caring for.

We, for our part, dare to hope that the Ministry of Defense's draft resolution on reducing the number of generals' positions and the resolution of the Moscow Soviet presidium on protecting conscripts were adopted with the participation of the public, including the press.

COPYRIGHT: "Ogonek", 1990

**Russian Leadership Meets with Military Deputies**  
91UM0092A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Nov 90  
Union Edition p 3

[Article by N. Burbyga and I. Demchenko: "Society and the Army—Ways of Consolidation"]

[Text] On 2 November the Russian leadership met with people's deputies who are members of the Armed Forces, elected to soviets of all levels in the territory of our republic. About 600 individuals gathered in the assembly hall of the Russian parliament. This is the second meeting of the Russian leadership with military servicemen.

At the very outset, several officers stated the inadvisability of conducting this meeting which, in their view, might put the military servicemen-deputies of the Russian soviets in a confrontational posture with officers of the soviets of other republics. In this regard one meeting participant expressed a desire which was supported by everyone—to request that the USSR president find time for a discussion with the conference participants. This proposal was conveyed to the chief of state and I. Silayev read the response received that evening—M. Gorbachev was prepared to meet 13 November at 10:00. The fact that the leadership of the country and of the republic are finding time for such meetings is an indication of the seriousness with which they view the problems of the Armed Forces and their position in the state.

It seems our society has exhausted all allotted reserves for coming to terms with the relationships among various groupings, political currents, movements, and other forces. Everyone is now convinced that our further existence depends on coordinated actions alone. It is for this reason that appeals for consolidation of effort are resounding so urgently from every quarter. Located at the epicenter of this work are the renewed soviets, which do not as yet possess sufficient experience. The Armed Forces also find themselves at the epicenter, and stability and the possibility of consolidation depend to a great degree on their positions. Like it or not, the Army is gradually being drawn into intra-Union political dispute, into clarification of the question as to whom it serves, into problems of the mutual relations among political forces and leaders. Addressing this point, for example, Major General A. Dorofeyev noted that conference participants violated military regulations in essence, failing to greet the RSFSR prime minister in the prescribed manner.

It is no accident in today's complicated situation that we see references coming to light from time to time concerning the possibility of a military coup. On the one hand, this puts on guard those who are attempting to effect necessary transformations more quickly—don't hurry, the military has its own view of these problems. And on the other hand, it emphasizes the Army's special role under today's conditions. A great deal depends on what position it takes—at this particular moment perhaps everything.

We cannot disregard the fact that, historically speaking, a definite attitude toward the Armed Forces has taken shape in society. They are seen traditionally as a reliable defender, the guarantor of state security, and a source of help in difficult situations. At the same time there is an absolute alienation between the defender and those it

serves. We might say that the civilian population is virtually ignorant of the problems and interests of the Army. Only right now, when democratic transformations have come to affect military service as well, is society making discoveries about the legal, moral, and social defenselessness of the very defenders, about the fact that the Army—in which so much strength and resources have been invested—is in a state of crisis... Civilians and the military still relate to one another in guarded fashion by inertia. But even now it is entirely apparent that neither one will resolve problems in isolation from each other.

Here a great role can be played by military servicemen elected as people's deputies. And this is why the leadership of Russia, and judging from all indications, the head of state, consider such meetings and such effort necessary. Typically, the deputies who serve in the military also consider this necessary. Many of them came of their own will, uninvited, because they felt the need to communicate their problems.

As was emphasized during the meeting—and the discussion here was very tense and complex—Russia is not posing, nor does it intend to pose, the question of creating its own army. It believes that functions of defense, of guarding the Motherland, must be the prerogative of Union organs of power. But Russia does pose the question of servicemen enjoying the same rights, and having the same guarantees, as those enjoyed by all other citizens, and does not relinquish responsibility for resolving these issues.

It is unfortunate that even this meeting, at which everyone spoke of the need for consolidation, was not devoid of attempts to effect a split. At first, representatives of the "Shchit" [Shield] society attempted to distribute leaflets in the hall caricaturing the minister of defense, and toward the end of the session they used their caricatures to "decorate" the foyer of the RSFSR House of Soviets. This elicited the indignation of officers. Could it be possible everyone is not yet aware that such approaches today constitute nothing less than playing with fire while sitting on the powder keg?

### Moiseyev Interviewed on Improving C3

91UM0094A Moscow VOYENNY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 10, Oct 90 pp 3-7

[Interview with Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff and first deputy USSR defense minister, and Colonel General K. Kobets, deputy chief of the General Staff, by VOYENNY VESTNIK correspondent Colonel Yu. Churkin; place and date not given: "Crucial Links in Command and Communications"—first three paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] One of the main directions of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff's activities is an improvement in the command and control system of the Army and the Navy and an increase in its effectiveness. This task can only be accomplished by using the latest in information technology (computers, military communications systems, etc.)

It is becoming increasingly obvious today that it is impossible in principle to ensure stable operational and secure command and control on all levels if the commanders (commanding officers) and staffs are not prepared psychologically to work with automated systems. Perestroyka, which is gathering strength in the military, also requires fundamental changes in the style, forms, and methods of activities of the command and control organs.

At the request of the magazine, our correspondent discussed the issues of the current status and future development of command and control and communications with Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff and first deputy USSR defense minister, and his deputy, Colonel General K. Kobets.

[Churkin] As is known, the General Staff is responsible for command and control of the Army and Navy. Many problems that have accumulated in this area are being resolved now. Do you not think that occasionally this is still being done too timidly? What, in your opinion, are the main problems afflicting the command and control of units, formations, and combined units?

[Moiseyev] I would not say that many problems have accumulated in this area at this time. There is a natural, ongoing process of developing further the means, forms, and methods of warfare, and with it, command and control systems.

However, the current stage of perestroyka in the Armed Forces has several new aspects, mandated by our defense doctrine. As it turned out, they have considerable influence on all command and control components. To begin with, calculations show that in the course of combat actions command and control will have to be conducted under severe time pressure in regard to operational speed and optimum solution level of decisionmaking. That is where we are going to have a conflict between the volume of information that the commander and the staff will need to process, and the time allowed for it.

I am convinced that the only way to solve this problem is to switch to paperless information systems, using a variety of computers extensively. What do you think, Konstantin Ivanovich?

[Kobets] Yes, we will have to move in the direction of universal implementation of technical information systems. The computer systems we will use will need to be networked and be a part of unified automated communications system, and we will need to develop software that will produce not only the data our commander and staffs need for their decisionmaking but also offer alternative solutions.

Certain things have already been accomplished in this area. I am getting ahead of myself, perhaps, but I can tell you that at this moment we are concentrating our efforts on the development of artificial intelligence systems. Our short-term task is to bring what has been accomplished so far to the level of practical applications, and to develop those applications.

[Churkin] Will it not happen that with all this attention on the new technology we will forget the people for whom all these machines are designed?

[Moiseyev] Not at all, although I must admit that the psychological preparation of officers and generals for dealing with the computers does present a problem. I think that they all face a lot of painstaking work learning how to use computers. Each of them will have to adopt a new mode of thinking so that eventually working with a computer will become a normal, mundane task. But it will take considerable efforts.

[Kobets] Mikhail Alekseyevich! Let me take it a little further. I think that for a successful transition to a new, higher command and control level in the Armed Forces we need universal computer literacy. We need an overall solution for this task—through officer development courses, through the system of commander training, plus, of course, special classes in colleges.

[Churkin] It is a commonly accepted notion that communications play a special role in the command structure of the Army and Navy. As they say in the Army: "Without communications there is no command." In your opinion, does the quality and reliability of communications meet the requirements of today's commanders and other military leaders?

[Moiseyev] It is not an easy question, but I will try to answer. The dynamics of the development of modern armed forces is such that while yesterday the task of communications was limited to the timely delivery of information, today this information needs to be processed first, which quite often requires the use of quite sophisticated algorithms.

Generally, if I were to give an overall evaluation of our current communications I would say that basically it meets the requirements of commanders and staffs. At the

same time, many of its features are at the limit of current technology. That is why we have such high hopes for automation.

I should also note that our communications specialists should work closely with staffs and other organs in developing new informational and intellectual capabilities for the command and control system. And, by the way, that is exactly what they are doing.

[Churkin] Konstantin Ivanovich! Could you tell us in more detail what kind of difficulties are likely to be encountered in the process of developing a multifunctional communications and automation system and keeping it in a condition of constant combat readiness?

[Kobets] In terms of equipment and tasks, our signal troops have already been transformed, to all intents and purposes, into communications and automation troops. By the way, in some armies they now use the term "Information Troops." Worldwide experience shows that integrating communication systems and automated command systems, as they say, raises the level of difficulty higher and higher.

We are now at a stage where, as noted earlier, we are developing solutions, or rather, implementing forward-looking programs. As a rule we are able to develop new components and include them in the existing structure without disrupting its work.

Unfortunately, many things here depend on factors outside of military signal specialists' control. Difficulties often arise because of the low quality of the equipment under development and its poor reliability. This barrier cannot always be overcome because of imperfections in both the technological and the raw material bases.

There are also situations when complex computerized systems work fine, but still the command system does not function properly because somebody has not delivered the means of documenting such information on time.

The installation of new equipment is not always a smooth process. Sometimes the developers fall behind in providing means to maintain communications systems and elements. There are also some difficulties with the software support for the process of planning and managing communications and automation systems.

It is especially disappointing that sometimes the operations staff of the command organ and the engineering personnel fail to maintain the necessary interaction. As a result, the technological capabilities are underused.

[Moiseyev] It is good that the communications chief can evaluate so soberly the status of his area of responsibility. I do think that he has touched upon a "sore" spot in the activities of the combined-arms commanders and staffs, which is that some officers and generals do not know how, or sometimes simply do not want, to work closely with the signal specialists and listen to their advice.

I am convinced that such an attitude is wrong. A good specialist is not only proficient in technical matters; he can evaluate combat situations as well. The right attitude is that of those commanders who teach their communications officers to act as chiefs of staff and consult with them on various issues.

[Churkin] Now we would like to hear the opinion of the chief of communications of our armed forces on the following problem. Tactical communications are considered to be the most difficult to operate properly. Some blame the means of communications, some refer to the inadequate special education of the troops or the combined-arms officers, and still others complain about a complicated radio-electronic environment. How do you evaluate this situation? What kind of effective measures can be taken?

[Kobets] That's some question, especially if we remember that my main concern, if you forgive the pun, is the highest link of command. Our tactical communications today are accomplished mostly through radio communications. In my opinion, they are equipped with everything that is necessary to ensure stable and reliable communications. However, I do understand "tacticians'" concerns, and this is what I can say on this subject.

We have a variety of programs, which are already being implemented, to substantially increase and qualitatively improve the systems and means of tactical communications, including long-term development.

At the same time, it is the responsibility of the officers of the various forces and services to learn how to use communications. And not just skim the surface but do it seriously, under conditions as close to combat situations as possible.

[Churkin] It is not a secret that both the Army and Navy keep getting new command and control devices and systems. However, in practice their implementation and use are often delayed. Why does this happen?

[Kobets] There are both objective and subjective reasons for this. For instance, until recently the development of prototypes of new weapons and other military technology has been conducted in a rather primitive way. Only some characteristics were being improved, and some new ones added. The troops were generally with it, too.

Now this kind of approach cannot be justified. Now the units and combined units receive not just stand-alone prototypes but entire unique communications systems and automated command systems. This, in turn, has presented us with the necessity of overhauling the whole system of service personnel training.

As to subjective factors, I will name just one: The design bureaus want to minimize their risks when developing new technology, because they are afraid to take responsibility. Perhaps some elements of competition and more

effective economic incentives will help us to overcome this stagnation in creativity?

Something else. There is a so-called psychological barrier that people often develop when dealing with new systems. This stands in the way of promptly putting these systems to practical use. I hope Mikhail Alekseyevich will not take offense, but this problem affects first of all operational command staffs.

[Moiseyev] Now I am put in a situation where I have to defend myself from my own colleague. All right, I will try.

It is a fact that many officers and generals treat new technology they have to learn to use with a degree of wariness, and sometimes plain distrust, and that goes on for quite a while. But both the Army and the Navy have accumulated certain experience in solving these kinds of problems. This experience comes from analyzing the causes of such behavior.

The crux of the matter lies first and foremost in the fact that decisions made by the command organs usually involve increased responsibility for the results. And the higher the link in the command chain, the more mistakes may cost. This explains the desire to work using tried-and-true methods. Another thing that people often tend to forget is that yesterday's success is today's norm and tomorrow's failure, and nobody can afford to disregard this axiom.

However, we have to take appropriate and timely steps to prevent these factors from hindering our progress. Therefore, to overcome this psychological conservatism we need a flexible system that would let us to evaluate activities of the command organs and at the same time take into account changes in military doctrine, in armaments, and in the forms and methods of operations and combat.

It is also important to increase the general level of computer literacy. I should note that such a program already exists and is being implemented.

And, finally, I have to mention that in some instances the quality of communications and automation systems is quite low, especially when it comes to reliability. We have already discussed earlier in our conversation why this happens. Keeping that in mind, I would like to point to the psychological state of the people who work with such equipment. Equipment failure, or its inability to produce correct solutions to problems, quite often causes distrust toward both the hardware and the software. When such things happen, officers and generals tend to fall back on making their calculations and obtaining the necessary information with the aid of traditional methods.

That is why I appeal to our designers to do everything possible to increase the reliability of prospective command and control systems and components. And the communications specialists, in turn, should raise the

standards they require of new technology, and filter out poor-quality prototypes before they reach the troops. Unfortunately, we still have situations when, after many years of research and development, we have to refuse this or that system because of design problems.

[Churkin] Judging by quite concrete actions, other military commands, such as those of the United States, France, and West Germany, give priority to command and control and communications. Are we falling behind in this area, and specifically in space technology applications?

[Moiseyev] I can state with full responsibility that our Armed Forces leadership has always considered, and continues to consider, maintaining our technological parity and further developing our technical base as its highest priority.

In general, despite some lag in certain areas, which is mostly the result of shortcomings in technology and of the limited capacity of our economy, we are able to maintain parity in the command and control area. We have to admit, though, that until recently this parity has been achieved mostly because of excess structural and functional solutions, and sometimes also because of tremendous efforts on the part of our operational and technical command and control personnel.

However, today the efforts of the Ministry of Defense alone are not sufficient to support the system's infrastructure and the electronic component at the required level. In order to substantially raise the quality of our communications and automation systems while simultaneously lowering their cost, we need a clear program that would coordinate the actions of all industrial branches (including those not related to defense) and science.

It is important to remember that industries that are involved in the development and manufacture of telephone and facsimile equipment, radio and satellite communication devices, and industrial and personal computers do not need any conversion, since they not only solve problems of improving command and control of the Armed Forces, but, even more importantly, raise to a higher level the potential for improved information management for the entire country.

[Churkin] Mikhail Alekseyevich, it looks as though you deliberately skipped the part of the question relating to satellite command and control and communications. Are you leaving it for Konstantin Ivanovich?

[Moiseyev] That is right. Here, as they say, my deputy is the chief ideologue. He is the man for the job.

[Kobets] I do not think I would be bending the truth if I said that the main direction of our technical policy in developing military satellite systems is their suitability both for defense needs and for general-purpose peaceful programs of our state. I am convinced that satellite communications will soon overtake all other means of



communications, because they provide fast communications with command objects at practically unlimited distances, have a large number of high-quality channels, and are less vulnerable to various interfering and disabling actions.

As far as we know, we have kept our parity with the United States in developing and perfecting satellite communications. However, the technological level of our system and its elements still lags behind that achieved by developed countries. Therefore we are increasing our efforts to bridge this gap.

[Churkin] Now, a question that concerns many officers. What are the perspectives and the main directions in which the theory and practice of command and control, as well as communications, are going to develop?

[Moiseyev] Many parts and directions of this theory are being reappraised now in light of our defensive military doctrine. This is a systemwide task.

Speaking about priorities, I would like to note the following. First, we have to prepare ourselves in advance for the restructuring of command and control on the basis of future communications and automation (which we have already discussed). Work based on this concept is now going ahead in all directions.

Second, when we work on command and control organization, forms, and methods, we should use state-of-the-art achievements in science and technology. For instance, we should test existing systems with elements of artificial intelligence (multipurpose expert systems) in conjunction with existing computational and informational tasks and models.

Third, together with raising the level of computer and system literacy, we have to work on the task of equipping our troops with small-scale means of automation, personal computers, and means of document and facsimile transmission.

[Kobets] Today, the standard against which we should measure the level of development of the electronic component of the command and control system are international-level accomplishments in the area of communications and automation. We continuously study the directions of research and the results achieved by the leading scientific institutions. We thoroughly study existing tendencies and regularities in light of our tasks. The necessary scientific and technological potential for such work does exist.

Our analysis shows that the strategic, long-range directions in the development of technology, communications, and automation which we have adopted for our Armed Forces do not deviate from worldwide trends. In communications it is digitization, conversion to international standards and recommendations, the development of adaptive communications in the widest sense of this word, learning to use nontraditional frequencies, and increasing the equipment's reliability, useful life span, and resistance to interference, etc. We have already discussed the role of satellite communications and its place in the overall picture.

In the field of technology and software for automated systems, development should proceed along the lines of military robotics, artificial intelligence systems, distributed and multifunction processing, personal computers, and multipurpose networks.

Our main systemic task, I am firmly convinced, is to overcome a variety of negative consequences of the previous stages in automation and communications. First of all I have in mind the less than rational allocation of existing resources in the majority of various command and controls.

There is no doubt that there are quite a few problems, but they are being solved. The initial results are encouraging. In short, we have approached a very important phase of transformation. If we accomplish all that is on the drawing board, we will take the initiative in our own hands for a long time to come, and will substantially propel both the theory and practice of command and control and communications.

[Moiseyev] Let me say a few words in conclusion. Thanks to efforts of the people of the world, and to our renewed external policy, the international climate is warming up. It has become possible to lower somewhat the level of military confrontation. Despite some setbacks, the process of the relaxation of tensions continues.

However, we, the military, must remember that as armaments are being reduced and we move from quantitative to qualitative parameters, the role of command and control systems and their electronic component—communication and automation—objectively increases.

[Churkin] Thank you for your insights. Please forgive me for keeping you longer than we agreed on.

[Moiseyev] If it serves a useful purpose, we are ready to answer more questions from your readers.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyennyy vestnik", 1990

### **Lt-Gen Just Petukhov on Servicemen's Protection Decree**

90SV0049A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
9 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview with Lt Gen Justice N. Petukhov, chairman of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, by Maj I. Ivanyuk under the rubric "Topical Interview": "A Guarantee of Rights"]

[Text] *The necessity of increasing the social and legal protection of servicemen and their families is a topic that has not left the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA lately. Army society and the relatives and loved ones of those fulfilling their soldier's duty are awaiting decisive changes in this realm. They greeted the decree signed the other day by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev "Measures to Strengthen Social and Legal Protection for Servicemen" with satisfaction and hope.*

*The editors have asked the chairman of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, Lt Gen Justice N. Petukhov, to comment on it.*

[Petukhov] I will begin with the fact that this is a very timely document of fundamental significance. Even though it would seem at first glance that the life of the military person is regulated down to the last detail, this relates more to his duties than to rights, many of which have just been declared. Servicemen, to put it mildly, were passed over even in the new all-union laws that have been adopted in recent years.

Second, and especially important, the presidential decree is addressed to the individual, to protecting the rights of the individual person that could be violated by state institutions and officials or as the result of criminal infringements. This, I would say, is yet another step toward a law-governed state.

[Ivanyuk] You probably have in mind first and foremost the judicial protection of serviceman?

[Petukhov] Yes. The USSR law on the procedures for appealing illegal acts by officials and state administrative bodies that encroach on the rights of citizens, as is well known, was adopted on 2 Nov 89.

This rule at the same time did not extend to servicemen, since one of the articles of the law stated that "the actions of administrative bodies or officials may not be appealed to the court if another method of appeal is envisaged by legislation." The disciplinary charter thus namely envisages another procedure for appeals—only through the chain of command. All appeals of servicemen to military tribunals have thus up to now been concluded without result. Now, of course, since the adoption of the corresponding law by the USSR Supreme Court, this or that "wayward" official will have to answer for actions that go beyond the bounds of

charter regulations and encroach on the rights and personal dignity of servicemen. The discussion could concern, for example, an unwarranted discharge from military service, failure to confer a military rank, or the illegal deprivation of privileges and benefits stipulated by law.

The draft law on military tribunals now under consideration also proposes extending their functions through transferring to them for consideration cases connected with violations of administrative law committed by servicemen, as well as civil cases that arise among them or between servicemen and military units. This, I am sure, will promote a rise in the level of social and legal protection for the soldiers.

[Ivanyuk] Many parents who see their sons off to the army are troubled by the so-called "hazing." Will young soldiers be able to appeal to a military tribunal for protection against barracks hooligans?

[Petukhov] "Hazing" really has not yet been overcome in soldier's collectives. More than a thousand servicemen were convicted last year for non-regulation mutual relations. Some 3,800 people suffered from their actions, and 19 of them died.

In cases where the commander does not take effective steps against the offenders, the soldier or sailor will have the right of appeal to any state body, including a military tribunal, which is obliged to take legal steps to protect his honor, dignity and health right up to the institution of criminal proceedings. I think that the steps envisaged by the presidential decree, as well as the laws and other standard documents that will be adopted on the basis of it, will bring radical shifts in the fight against this social evil.

[Ivanyuk] We have reason to be proud that servicemen are the first in places where things are difficult, be it a natural disaster, an accident or a seat of social tension. And then it becomes clear that their selflessness is devoid of legal guarantees...

[Petukhov] Yes, that is so, it is enough to cite the example of the Chernobyl accident. And the specific nature of military service is such that they often have to perform duties that are associated with risk to health and life itself even in peacetime. The presidential ukaz contains two important provisions connected with this.

The first is to provide legal guarantees for the inviolability of the person of the serviceman. Instances have become more frequent of late, as is well known, of attacks on servicemen in their performance of official duties.

It is obvious that additional liability should be established for encroachments on the life and health of servicemen performing their constitutional duty. The law should moreover clearly regulate the conduct of servicemen in this or that situation—the right to use firearms, self-defense and the like.

Second—and no less important—is that the USSR Council of Ministers will resolve the issue of the institution of compulsory state personal insurance for servicemen, as well as those under military obligation during the completion of service or times of call-up, before 1 Jan 91. All of the expenses of this insurance will be borne by the state itself.

In the event of the loss of health or disability associated with the completion of military service, a serviceman will receive a considerable one-time benefit, and he will be designated for a higher pension for the corresponding groups of disabilities.

The size of these pensions and payments is not large today. At the same time, manual and office workers receive additional compensation in the form of the difference between the former wages and the designated pension due to the disability, or their families receive it in the event of the death of the breadwinner through the fault of the enterprise. Both servicemen and the members of their families will receive analogous compensation with the adoption of the corresponding law.

[Ivanyuk] Active work by legislators is needed to bring this decree to life all the more quickly...

[Petukhov] The preparation of the legislative documents that will, in the aggregate, comprise the foundation of the military reform is currently underway, as has already been reported by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The basic ones are the Law on Defense, Law on the Status of Servicemen and Law on Universal Military Obligation. They should obviously reflect all of the provisions of the presidential decree and define clearly the rights and obligations of the serviceman and the procedure for protecting those rights. They also have in mind a significant expansion of the benefits granted to them, especially the institution of mandatory leave for extended-service soldiers and sailors, an increase in their monetary allowance and improvements in material, consumer, medical and trade support for service personnel and their families. All of this will doubtless facilitate a rise in the prestige of military service.

#### **Maj-Gen Chudov: In Opposition to Computerized Command and Control**

90SV0049B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
9 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj Gen (Ret) V. Chudov: "Computers Out of Fashion... *Combat Readiness: A Look at the Problem*"]

[Text] I unwillingly ask myself a difficult question on the basis of personal observations, as well as a multitude of features in the press, on how difficult it is for the computer to penetrate into the operating practices of the staffs and other administrative structures of the army: do the armed forces need automated administrative equipment and computer technology at all?

It is not an idle question. The practices of administering troops here are such that automated equipment and computer technology very rarely take hold in them. I note for comparison that the armed forces command of the United States had incorporated cybernetic principles and mathematical apparatus into administration as early as World War II. Our own military leaders went no deeper than the four arithmetical operations with the inclusion of mathematical and other theoretical and scientific apparatus. The modeling of various combat situations allowing for a multitude of qualitative and quantitative features has not been disseminated broadly enough among the troops to this day, and it remains the property of scientific and military training establishments. The practices of troops, the charter and the manuals still give priority to standard solutions and the commander or superior officer's intuition. The commander thus simply selects the directive that fits a most complex combat situation and the recommended actions that go with it, instead of striving to obtain and process as much more quantitative and qualitative data as possible, involving computer technology and automation equipment, when making decisions. What does he need a computer for?

Second, troop administration has come to be divided into administration under everyday conditions and under combat conditions. One and the same people are to work in both cases, but... in completely different roles and in different places. The everyday activity of troops differs fundamentally from combat activity. It allows the administrator to manage using the simplest means in the form of a pen, a working notebook, a telegram pad and a telephone. The staff worker naturally usually has no inclination toward computer technology during this period.

There are many ways and means of slowing and impeding access to computer technology in the administrative organs, along with reasons for reductions in its efficiency. Some of them were described by Capt M. Kislov (KZ of 19 Jan 90) and Col N. Guzhev (KZ of 23 May 90). I will present another example.

It is well known that special demands are made of any military equipment. The contracting officer thus extends these requirements entirely to computer equipment as well. He wants it to be vibration-, shock-, cold-, heat- and moisture-proof, among other things! The Americans, for example, have as a result obtained computer equipment on transport vehicles in airtight cabs with floating floors and thermostatic control. This route has proven to be simpler for them than protecting each assembly and each unit.

Our contracting officer proceeds in a different manner. While the first assignment for a computer for military needs was being prepared, coordinated and approved, and while the developer and manufacturer were ducking and weaving so as to somehow fulfill it, series production had come out with a new and better model of the computer. The officer, finding out about this, took up a

study, and then issued new technical specifications or an addendum to the old ones. Once again development, coordination and approval, the "arm-twisting" of the developer and manufacturer to re-orient the project... And industry is meanwhile now issuing a new generation. And that is how it goes for several decades—time passes, money flows, generations of contracting officers are exchanged but there is no equipment at all. Or else grounds appear for Maj Gen A. Puchkov (KZ, 23 May 90) to write that "The principal restraining factors are the lack of a sufficient quantity of modern computer technology and equipment (systems) for data transmission with the essential features. This problem goes beyond the bounds of the armed forces."

But the problem itself was created by the armed forces. And what a problem! The military—rejecting series-produced computer equipment as supposedly unsuited for operations in the field, financing knowingly obsolete designs, futilely trying to update and modernize it—has deprived production of an important source of income able to provide a significant incentive for the development and output of truly promising systems. And staff officers, awaiting the "super-technology" promised by the contracting officer, are far behind not only the rank-and-file staffers of scientific institutions in knowledge and the ability to use the computer, but also the engineers of the industrial enterprises. The stages of assimilation of mini- and micro-computers skipped over and passed by the staff officers. They thus have a mistrustful and doubtful attitude toward the attempts of enthusiasts to incorporate personal computers at their workplaces. And they see the attempts to computerize staff work as no more than a tribute to fashion...

Scientific and technical revolution and the revolution in military science have made it possible not only to equip the armed forces with nuclear missiles and other new types of weapons, but also to alter substantially and raise the destructive might and maneuverability of traditional types as well. The tasks of those people who are engaged in administrative work in the army is made considerably more complicated under these conditions. The time allotted to them to generate decisions is being reduced more and more, and they have to take more and more factors and features into account therein. It will now be impossible to manage without a widely developed network of computers.

#### **Turkestan MD Appeals to Troops Not to Desert**

91UM0073A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
15 Sep 90 p 1

[Appeal from the Military Council of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Appeal of the Military Council of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District to All Military Servicemen Who Willfully Left Their Units, as well as to Their Parents"]

[Text] Comrades!

The Military Council of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District is appealing to you in this complex and crucial time in the life of our country and its Armed Forces. Important changes in the economy, the development of democracy, and the active inclusion of millions of people in political life have exposed many painful problems in every aspect of our lives.

The exacerbation of the socio-political situation is undoubtedly affecting life in military collectives, causing tensions and negative reactions. Especially dangerous are present-day attempts of certain separatist, extremist, and nationalistic forces to drive a wedge between the people and the army, to pull the army apart into separate national areas, to blacken the holiest of holy—the friendship of the peoples of the USSR—to destroy the tradition of fraternity, comradely mutual aid, and internationalism that were always inherent to our army.

All this cannot but have an effect on the state of military discipline. Unfortunately, there have been more cases recently of servicemen willfully leaving their units, including those drafted from the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan. And this undermines the military preparedness of the Armed Forces.

#### **Comrade soldiers and sergeants who have left their units!**

Think hard about what you have done. We understand that you took this step after encountering great difficulties with army service and with negative factors that are present in the military collective. It was done under the influence of emotions rather than reason. Willfully leaving your units is not the way to fight problems found in the army, but is more a manifestation of a weak will and passivity, qualities that do not enhance a man.

#### **Respected elders, veterans of war and labor, parents, and older brothers of the young soldiers!**

You have a great influence on young men. We ask you to help the youths realize that service in the Armed Forces of the USSR is an honorable duty and sacred obligation of every citizen of our country and to have them understand that only the army is capable of defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

Was your life really easier than that of your children and grandchildren?! Were the conditions of your life and work in your younger years really easier? After all, you were able to overcome difficulties.

We appeal to your wisdom and life experience. Do not allow your children, grandchildren, and brothers to become deserters. Explain to them that having willfully left their units, they have taken a stand for crime.

We are prepared to cooperate with you and, if necessary, to assist you and your sons.

The command authorities of okrugs, formations, and units are now doing a great deal to improve morale in army collectives, improve living conditions, purchasing

services, and medical support for servicemen. A decisive struggle against negative phenomena in military units has begun.

In appealing to you, we want to state that for those soldiers and sergeants who have realized that they were wrong and that their actions were illegal and unlawful, and who voluntarily return to their units, the question of releasing them from criminal responsibility will be examined favorably and an opportunity given to them to honorably fulfill their constitutional and patriotic duty to defend the Fatherland.

We trust that our appeal will bring a response and will meet with your support and understanding.

**Crimea: 8 Killed, 1 Wounded in Raid Near Feodosiya**

*91UM0073B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 11 Oct 90 p 4*

[Press release by the Press Center of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR: "Murderers Were on Guard Duty. Tragedy in the Crimea"]

[Text] On October 9th, while on duty guarding military stores in the area of Feodosiya, three soldiers from the guard detail, as we now know, conspiring in advance, killed eight servicemen and wounded one. The victims were also members of the guard detail. Taking three assault rifles, a pistol, and ammunition, the criminals disappeared.

As a result of measures taken by military authorities and the MVD, two of the criminals have been detained and two assault rifles confiscated. The search for the third criminal is continuing. An investigation is underway.

### **Tank Competition Raises Question of Training Quality**

*90SV0068A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Sep 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Captain A. Yegorov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Is Our Armor Strong? Thoughts Evoked by the Finals of the Tank Crewmen's Competition"]

[Text] Colonel V. Koshak, head of a department in the Ground Forces' Combat Training Directorate and assistant head judge in the finals of the competition for the title of best tank crew, with whom we talked immediately after the event, openly admitted that he was not satisfied with the results. And this is understandable: out of the sixteen crews which participated in the finals, only nine accomplished the assigned task. The other seven received unsatisfactory ratings.

To put it mildly, for such high level competitions the results are less than outstanding. Especially since the conditions of the finals were, one might say, simplified. If they were different at all from the usual exercises, it was by the fact that the gunner, for example, knew that there were not any surprises waiting for him on the gunnery range...

Nevertheless, even in such straightforward, comfortable conditions, Sergeant V. Karatchuk (a gunner from the Western Group of Forces) fired one shell after another below the target. And Sergeant M. Kereyev from the Turkestan Military District kept hitting his neighbor's target.

If one takes into account that the "underachievers" were the best of the best from their respective military districts and groups of forces, one can imagine the standard for the "average" tank crewmember. However, the officers from the combat training directorate, with whom we had occasion to talk apropos of this, did not agree with this generalization. They say, theoretically yes—every crew that competed rose to the finals from the platoon, company, and battalion. But in practice everything appears to be otherwise.

And at this point it was explained that far from all the participants in the finals competed in their platoon or company. For example, the competitions began with first place for the military district for tank crews in the Ural Military District. And for tank crews in the Siberian Military District it was directly here—the competitions began with the finals.

A question arises: on the whole, was it worth it to make such a fuss. To use up fuel and ammunition, to pay temporary duty allowances to scores of officers, and to transport tanks hundreds, and come to think of it thousands of kilometers by rail? (True, representatives from only two military districts came to the competition with their tanks). Is this not a luxury?

As far as the assistant chief judge is concerned, he agreed: it was an expensive amusement. However, in his

opinion, the question one should raise is not whether to conduct the competitions or not, but how to conduct them?

Viktor Yakovlevich stated—In spite of all the expenses, we still reached the goal that we set: we tested skills in using the equipment and the ability to fire at maximum ranges...

These words seemed not very convincing to me. I wanted so much to ask: "Was the goal of the competitions so simple because to demand more of specialists, who were trained by the notorious "method" of coaching for examinations, is senseless?" Well, as long as one is talking in general terms, the main purpose for this kind of competitions is probably to raise people's interest in training and their aspiration for expertise, and to awaken creative elements in their field operations. It is no secret that in many of our units, which are engaged in pursuits that are unrelated to combat training, the opportunity to conduct at least a few training sessions is becoming a great blessing for commanders. Is that not why there is this kind of attitude toward the final competitions among the troops? The finals are conducted under the guidance of the commander in chief of the Ground Forces and, as it turned out, he did not even get the attention of the armored forces' senior commanders, who did not consider it necessary to even meet with the crews. The hosts of the competitions—the Carpathian Military District commanders were the only exception to this.

Granted, there is no doubt that competitions among our fighting forces are necessary. This type of operation undoubtedly has prospects. Including the fact that there is no time for intensive, effective combat training in the units and through these competitions combat vehicles which have been parked too long are pulled out of their parking spaces before you know it. But one must think. There is much to think about. Including about the fact that today's officers and soldiers are no longer motivated to move mountains in exchange for a sweet roll and boiled egg for breakfast and a cartridge belt over the shoulder. A person is entitled to expect appropriate gratitude for serious business.

In many "civilian" bureaucracies it has long been understood that it is impossible to create good working conditions without the participation of the people themselves. And that material incentives provide discipline and motivate a search for all possible means of eliminating obstacles along the way to the goal, which has been set, better than any orders. Thus, can we demand perestroika from those who have forgotten what combat training is, from agricultural workers, dockworkers, and pig herders in military uniform, by relying upon the Army's enthusiasm?

No, let us nevertheless imagine the impossible: the commander in chief of the Ground Forces announces a prize for the winner of the competitions among the tank crews—a monetary prize. All crews from the tank forces,

including even those which have officers and warrant officers in them, are invited to participate. These competitions would probably require only one thing: that they be organized efficiently. Any unnecessary simplification of the situational conditions would be punished by the participants themselves. The conditions would become complicated similar to a self-sharpening blade: the higher the competitor's level, the tougher the demands upon the winner...

And the Army's budget would be compensated by the increased professionalism of its specialists—first and foremost of its tank drivers and gunners, who would save

a hundred times more rubles through their competent use of equipment and armaments. Those same rubles that today are spent on repairing equipment, which has been ruined because of inexperience.

If that were to happen, would anyone really ask: but are these competitions, which cost so much, necessary at all? For the time being however, in an attempt to find some justification for the current expenditures, one thing comes to mind: competition is good because many chronic defects of combat training once again become apparent in them.

**Local Executive Committee Seeks to Close Pipeline to Airfield**

*91UM0103A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA  
in Russian 14 Oct 90 p 3*

[Article by E. Uus (ETA): "The Tartu Military Airfield is Not Planning to Close Down the Pipeline"]

[Text] The Executive Committee of the Tartu District is trying to close down the pipeline of the Tartu military airfield as of November 1st. This decision of the district executive committee was upheld at the last meeting of the executive committee of the city of Tartu. Lt Col Yevgeniy Udovik, a member of the city council and Deputy Chief of the Political Section of the military airfield, said that the 12-kilometer pipeline is essential for bomber flights. Ye. Udovik's immediate superiors are located in Smolensk, and the "Tartu group" is subordinate not to the Baltic Military District, but to Moscow. Fuel is let into the pipeline from a military

railroad not far from Kyarkha and, when needed, is pumped out on land belonging to the military airfield. Both the railroad and the airfield are kept under military guard. The pipeline itself is on land belonging to the district, and is dug in at a depth of about two meters. Pipeline leaks cause considerable damage.

Ye. Udovik's reaction to the promise of the "greens" that they will deal with the closing of this pipeline route themselves, was expressed by his calling this action a diversion. Ye. Udovik maintains that the army, in conducting its activities, is guided by the laws of the USSR, and he is proposing that the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic begin to regulate the status of military bases located on Estonian territory in accordance with such laws. According to him, the Estonian Supreme Soviet should turn to the Ministry of Defense and the USSR Supreme Soviet in order to stabilize their mutual relations.



**Reduction Hits Pacific Fleet Computer Center***90SV0099B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
22 Sep 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Captain-Lieutenant G. Pasko, Pacific Fleet: "A Reader Poses a Problem: Who is Reducing Whom, or the Secret Battle with the Computer"]

[Text] The times are so unusual that at times even people who are very experienced and who possess solid professional knowledge cannot understand what is taking place. Why, for example, do we know, speak and write about how a thing must not be done but then go ahead and do it? And we go ahead and do it while forgetting everything that we have just said, written and known previously and while forgetting that at times we have no right regarding such matters.

At present every person in this country knows that perestroika demands the intelligent reduction of the command and bureaucratic apparatus. And this includes the Soviet armed forces. When the current cuts in military personnel got underway within the army and in the navy, the leadership emphasized in their documents and speeches that the cuts must be made intelligently without damaging the combat readiness of the armed forces.

How is this working out in practice? One of the directives of the Soviet Navy Main Staff, which appeared at the beginning of 1989, announced a ten percent reduction in management organs, command posts and support units as of 1 October 1990. No one had any doubts about the expediency of this measure. This included the (now former) chief of the Pacific Fleet Command Post, Captain First Rank A. Lukyanov. It was he who made the proposal to reduce by ten percent (within the framework, so to speak, of a reduction in management organs); and he did this without coordinating the action with the chief of information and computer center of the Pacific Fleet Staff. Who would you think it would have been? You are not guessing. Several officers and computer center warrant officers, who are professionals, operators, and computer programmers, were responsible for the reduction.

On 21 March 1990 reduction recommendations were forwarded to Moscow. In July the Pacific Fleet received the General Staff Directive of 4 June. This document pointed out that it was necessary to make changes in the staffing of the units and institutions of the Pacific Fleet in accordance with the attached list of changes. The list is attached. From it Captain First Rank A. Shuyev learned of the number of cuts in jobs for officers and warrant officers assigned to the computer center. As a professional user of the computer he immediately saw that the cut was not ten percent, but a full fifteen percent. He thought a bit about the matter and did not agree with the decision of the directive.

Here is what Shuyev thought. The reduction in the command post of just the personnel in the computer center was, in his words, the "undermining of the

combat readiness of the Pacific Fleet in particular and the Soviet Navy on the whole." Don't you agree that this is a harsh pronouncement? But, in my opinion, he has a very persuasive reasoning. Such as: the Pacific Fleet Staff Computer Center processes and analyzes a large volume of data every day.

And now let us consider the conditions, in which this work is performed. First of all, the computer center has two machine rooms which are located in two different places; but they should be in one place. Secondly, the computer equipment is used around the clock; the average work load for a single work space was 14.5 hours per day in 1989. Thirdly, in connection with the increased demand for software support to the work of the Fleet Staff there are plans to significantly increase the number of work spaces.

This means that in the near future skilled personnel will be needed. Instead of more effectively using existing specialists and preparing them for the future, the decision is being made to reduce the staff members of the computer center. If one considers the large personnel turnover among the civilians and the low pay scales, then the decision regarding the cuts in the computer center is absurd!

In addition, there is one other thing that neither the Fleet nor the Soviet Navy Main Staff have taken into consideration. A reduction in the Pacific Fleet Staff Computer Center makes it impossible to make further use of the automated management system. And here is a truism: do not cut down the tree limb on which you are sitting.

There are other arguments no less and perhaps even more compelling. I do not recount them only because I do not wish to disclose specific information.

In connection with the situation that has evolved, it is clear that the Soviet Navy Main Staff Directive of 4 June must be amended in the section that deals with the Pacific Fleet Staff Computer Center. Can it really be that in the century of universal progress and computerization there are people who do not understand the role of computer operators and programmers? Can it really be that it was impossible to find more suitable people for the reduction? In short, something is not right and not everything was carefully thought out. And it is necessary not just to think about today but to look into the future. To fight against the introduction of the computer is to go against progress. But it is necessary to fight against excess staff, where dozens of people are engaged in work that only the computer can do successfully.

**KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Journalists Personae Non Grata at Naval Main Staff***90SV0099A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Sep 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Captain Third Rank V. Maryukha, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Forbidden to Enter"]

[Text] The Soviet Navy often takes umbrage at the means of mass information for their impartial reporting. And, it would appear, the Soviet Navy is prepared to have a falling out with the newspaper that is favorably inclined toward it.

And so, judge for yourselves. In the combat training department of the Soviet Navy there is a total of four KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents who report on life in the Navy. For efficiency of work and for the preparation of objective publications each of these four correspondents must spend time in the Main Staff of the Soviet Navy. However, in recent times we have become "personae non grata." The author of these lines held a permanent pass for entrance into the Main Staff prior to joining the editorial staff of the newspaper; and he surrendered his pass upon reassignment to a new post. The preparation of a new pass has taken a long four months even though all documents were submitted within a very short period of time. However, due to still existing mysterious circumstances the Main Staff has asked for a second request as well as a written justification (?) for the issue of the pass. As the result of long-drawn-out telegrams and telephone explanations I was offered the chance to obtain two passes (!) right away. Attempts to clarify the status of my other co-workers (one of whom is the deputy department editor) were unsuccessful. And this in spite of the fact that the requests for the outgoing papers were submitted twice, as it was in my case. But the Soviet Navy Main Staff puts the blame on the AKhO [Administrative and Facilities Department of the Soviet Navy] and some other person, but it is as if there is not and has not been any one specific person who is responsible. The Main Staff consoles us by saying that if only the situation with passes for couriers, who have come to our assistance on more than one occasion, could be solved—and couriers have been denied permission to obtain passes. The motivating factor behind all of this is rather simple: the couriers do not work here and do not require passes. At the same time all of the other staffs and directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense long ago agreed to issue passes to both correspondents and editorial couriers. They understand both the importance and the need for unencumbered links with journalists.

It would be good if the incident over passes to the Soviet Navy Main Staff had been settled by our department or was just a vexing exception to the rule. But this is not the case. In the words of A. Pyatashikhin, the managing head of the editorial board, this is not the first year that the drawing up of passes for journalists [has been a problem]. Such practices are repeated year after year; but only within the Soviet Navy Main Staff.

### Aging of Navy's Long Range Bombers

91UM0101A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
13 Nov 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major S. Markin, Pacific Fleet: "Letters to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: How Long Should an Aircraft Serve?"]

[Text] The escape hatch in the cockpit of Captain A. Bulygin's aircraft blew out at an altitude of six thousand meters. Thanks only to the competent and knowledgeable actions of the commander himself, and Senior Lieutenant V. Balykbayev, co-pilot, and Captain M. Matvienko, navigator, the aircraft successfully landed at an airfield despite this extraordinary situation.

Let us touch upon the history of the Tu-16. As is well known, it was first demonstrated at the air show in Tushino in 1953. At the time it was a first-class bomber, weighing 72 tons and capable of carrying three tons of bombs, and having a range of 5,760 kilometers. Its maximum speed approached 1,000 kilometers per hour. The bomber's crew, consisting of six persons, had at its disposal powerful defensive cannon and machine gun armament. Subsequently, the Tu-16 was turned into a rocket carrier, capable of destroying enemy targets without entering his air defense zone. Its original operational life was set at twenty years, but later, experts realized that its high technical reliability would allow this life to be extended. Thus, its operational life became 25 years. Then, for various reasons, its life was extended to 30 years...

At the airfield, just as soon as the aircraft had landed, the command staff and representatives of numerous services showered the crew with questions. Everyone was interested in the circumstances of the event. The usual picture came out: The engineering-technical staff blamed the flight personnel, and vice-versa.

But something else is surprising. For as long as I have served in naval aviation, I have—for the same number of years—heard from various experts that the Tu-16 (the "youngest" in the regiment was manufactured in 1963) has long ago become obsolescent, not only spiritually, but also physically, and it is long overdue for a well-earned rest. It is also the internal equipment that very often goes bad and becomes inoperative during flights. The chronic shortage of spare parts forces engineering-technical personnel to hunt for various methods of making these aircraft operational. What can be done? After all, in this problem we have to think about people, as well as their safety.

True, the latest information about the decision to retrain flyers for the supersonic naval rocket-carrier, the Tu-22M, made everyone happy. But even here, the unexpected floated to the surface: A large number of these aircraft in air regiments of naval aviation have already completed their service life and because of this, stand idle...

**Col-Gen Kozhbakhteyev Discusses Changes to USSR Civil Defense**

90SV0080A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Report by A. Nikolayev on interview with USSR Civil Defense Chief of Staff, Col-Gen V. Kozhbakhteyev; place and date not given: "Don't Let Misfortune Occur"]

[Text] Earthquakes, floods, tornados,, accidents, and catastrophes -we know them all too well. And moreover, many of them result in real disaster. This was the case when nearly 25,000 people perished under the rubble of an earthquake in Spitak, and another 514,000 were left homeless. The material losses amounted to more than ten billion rubles. We are finding out, however, that the effects of this natural disaster could have been reduced if the system in place at that time for protecting human lives had not performed so inadequately.

Our country's civil defense is one of the components of that system. How has it changed in recent years? Is it capable of measuring up to the tasks which it is being asked to carry out? For the answers to these questions and others we turn to Col-Gen V. Kozhbakhteyev, Civil Defense Chief of Staff.

[Kozhbakhteyev] Often when people speak about natural disasters, they emphasize how they occur unexpectedly and how they are so unpredictable. And in this way they are able to justify someone's neglect of duty, or simply their incompetence. Today with the aid of a variety of space and land-based stations, it is possible with extreme accuracy to determine the probability of the occurrence of a broad range of cataclysmic events, as well as their possible effects. Take tidal waves as an example. This wave, often reaching heights of 20 meters, is capable of speeds of 700 kilometers an hour. However, with the aid of satellites and a highly developed broadcast system it is possible to avoid the deaths of hundreds of people. Science and technology have already made it possible to determine ahead of time where a tornado might strike or where floods and even famines are likely to occur. An earthquake, as a rule, is preceded by changes in the earth's crust which can also be detected by special sensors. So as you see, there is much that can be predicted in advance.

What has been done to strengthen our country's civil defense system to enable it to become a force for helping our people in the most difficult situations? Foremost is that we have developed new ideas concerning the activities of our scientific research institute which has at its disposal the necessary specialists and equipment to study all of the various ways that nature manifests itself, and to make critical recommendations from a scientific perspective. Over the past few years there were practically no accidents, catastrophes or natural disasters whose causes and effects could not have been carefully studied. In addition the majority of dwellings and industrial buildings located in seismically unstable areas of the country have been inspected and rated, while legal

provisions have been developed which define the role and jurisdiction of civil defense in the new system of state organizations, as well as its responsibilities and rights. Now the center of gravity in civil defense activity has shifted from a war to a peace footing, with all the resultant consequences. In this regard the structure of the civil defense system has undergone a change, having been called upon to closely interact with the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Extraordinary Situations. Mobile rescue forces have been formed and equipped with the latest technology and equipment. The entire training program for civil defense officer and supervisory personnel, enlisted men and non-commissioned officers, is being upgraded in order to ensure that each one is a consummate professional rescue worker.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But to train such a cadre of specialists is undoubtedly no trivial matter.

[Kozhbakhteyev] We have several training centers where people can obtain the necessary skills within six-to-eight months. But the problem lies elsewhere. Just like in the Soviet Army, our servicemen serve but two years, which if I can speak frankly, is insufficient for mastering a specialty.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] It is quite obvious that it is time to give consideration to professionalizing the rescue service work force.

[Kozhbakhteyev] That's correct. And we already have experimental units with professional rescue workers. Moreover, they are 25 years of age or older, since those younger than 20 years of age are neither psychologically nor physically ready for such work. While a final decision has not yet been reached concerning their pay, it appears that they will receive 500 rubles per month on the average.

It is also under consideration to remove in the future the entire civil defense system from under the auspices of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Yes, progress toward reorganizing the civil defense system is not far away. But how is this reflected in the day-to-day activity of your fellow workers who are charged with insuring the safety of the people?

[Kozhbakhteyev] Our workers are now resolving problems even remotely related to protecting the population from natural and other disasters in a more responsible and informed manner. An example of this is the earthquake in the Zaysansk region of the Eastern Kazakhstan Oblast which occurred during the evening of 14 June 1990. This earthquake was equivalent in strength to the one in Spitak—more than eight points [on a 12-point scale]. Nearly 87,000 people were left homeless as 8,874 dwellings were destroyed. And despite all this only a 30-month-old infant died. I must point out, however, that the seismologists predicted losses up to 10,000 people. But this is what happened. The Civil Defense Chief of Staff, Colonel Viktor Dmitriyevich Anikov,

immediately after the first underground tremor, sped to the command point, which luckily was located near his quarters. There he took control of the local radio network, ordering the people to evacuate all buildings, and not to reenter them during the next five-six hours. And 90 minutes later a strong quake occurred, but there were no casualties.

It should be said that information on what to do during emergencies has been disseminated here for quite a long time. Special reminders have been issued, civil defense officers and supervisors have appeared on television and radio, while school and even kindergarten-aged children

have been instructed in what to do during this or that situation. And these efforts, as you can see, have not been wasted. Today such work is being carried out in the Crimea and on Kamchatka, where dangerous seismic activity continues.

I only wish that our recommendations did not go unheeded by those for whom they are intended, the managers of our enterprises and organizations who are charged both by their professional responsibilities and their simple responsibility to mankind to protect people from death or injury.

**Designer of T-64 Interviewed**

90SV0089B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
22 Sep 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lenin Prize Laureate, Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General Nikolay Aleksandrovich Shomin, by S. Ptichkin: "Russian Work"]

[Text] Each person who has become involved with the military profession, although even at the initial military training level, has mastered the ABC's of the truth: Tanks are the ground force's main strike force. We have become accustomed to being proud of our tank crewmen and have become accustomed to thinking that Soviet tanks are absolutely the best in the world since the T-34.

Still we have learned that we have too many armored vehicles and that we should also reduce the number of models. And we are reducing them.... Photographs of once monstrous vehicles that have been prepared to be melted down flash by once in a while in newspapers and in popular magazines. But nevertheless, a tank remains a tank.

Today our guest is one of the leading designers of "awesome armor," Lenin Prize Laureate and Hero of Socialist Labor, Lieutenant General Nikolay Aleksandrovich Shomin.

[Ptichkin] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, your name is well known to only a narrow circle of tank experts and engineers. Briefly tell us about yourself.

[Shomin] I was born in 1923. I entered Kharkov Tank School a year prior to the war and had already sat behind the levers of a T-34 in June 1941. I fought, burned, and fought again.... At the end of the war, they sent me to study at the Armored and Mechanized Forces Military Academy from which I graduated with distinction. Our graduating class (engineering department) was very strong and had a high yield of subsequently renowned designers. Arkadiy Kartsev, future designer of the T-62 tank, and Valeriy Venediktov, future designer of the T-72 tank, also graduated at the same time I did. They sent all of us to serve at Ural which had become the primary weapons forge during the war.

[Ptichkin] What did your work at Ural begin with?

[Shomin] I ended up in the KB [design bureau] headed by Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Morozov—the prominent Soviet designer, a really exceptionally talented person, and one of the developers of the best tank of the Second World War—the T-34. Morozov very warmly received me and immediately tasked me to head work to design a prime mover based on the T-54 medium tank. I successfully dealt with this assigned task and the new BTS-2 prime mover began to enter the inventory of Soviet Army engineering units at the beginning of the 1950's. I also received the Order of the Red Star for its design.

[Ptichkin] Yes, you turned out to have a successful beginning but how did the rest of your service career develop?

[Shomin] Quite unevenly. I quite rapidly became Morozov's assistant but they quite unexpectedly transferred me out of the tank industry and into the missile [industry]. The fact was that we did not have solid fuel intercontinental missiles at the beginning of the 1960's and the Americans did. So a retaliatory strike was real problematical for us. The primary mass of our missiles, even those on launch pads, were not fueled and several hours were required to bring them to full combat readiness.

The mission was assigned to reduce missile fuel tank refueling time and to extend the storage time for already fueled missiles. Experts from the most varied fields were enlisted to solve this very difficult problem. I was also in this group. We managed to overcome colossal technical difficulties and finally reduced missile refueling and launch preparation time to 15 minutes.

But I nevertheless remained a tanker in spirit. I did not lose contact with Morozov and when the first real opportunity appeared I immediately returned to his design bureau which I also headed after Aleksandr Aleksandrovich retired.

[Ptichkin] And after that came the T-64 tank?

[Shomin] Yes, work progressed from morning until the dark of night. Far from everything turned out the way we wanted it to, there were many failures and claims for replacement of defective equipment from the troops, but we believed in success and we worked untiringly.

[Ptichkin] I need to say that little is known about this vehicle. And, even to this day, it, like its colleagues and contemporaries, is surrounded by an aura of secrecy.

[Shomin] You could write a fascinating novel about how this tank was designed. Really, from the very beginning this vehicle was thought of as completely original, not like any other tank in the world. Its series production was set up in the mid 1960's but it only passed through Red Square in a parade formation once—in 1985 and naturally little is known about this vehicle.

Morozov had already conducted the first design critical analysis of the new tank in the early 1950's when a sort of solid stereotype of an ideal armored vehicle that had been tested by war took shape. Morozov departed from all accepted dogma and proposed this design which simply shocked many people.

What differentiated the T-64 from all previous vehicles? An automatic gun loader was installed on the new tank and the crew was reduced accordingly to three men. The tank belonged to the medium vehicle class but a gun was installed on it whose power exceeded that of all tank guns in the world, even including those installed on heavy tanks.

A rangefinder was installed for the first time in a domestically produced tank: At first an optical and later also a laser [rangefinder] that significantly increased the target probability of kill with the first round [fired]. Once again for the first time, combined armor protection was applied with the use of ceramic elements, in particular, that significantly increased the tank's survivability.

The original running gear was lighter than the traditional one by several tons—and the armor plate on the turret and hull was increased by several tons accordingly. For its time, the T-64 turned out to be the most invulnerable vehicle, considering its maneuverability and armor protection.

Finally, a completely original two cycle dual diesel engine that was specially designed for the T-64 was installed in the tank.

In short, our tank became a sort of laboratory based on which many innovations were tested that were subsequently solidly introduced not only in domestic but in world tank engineering. Morozov detected those trends along which the development of armored tank equipment proceeded ahead of everyone else.

[Ptichkin] Nevertheless another combat vehicle became our primary tank as we are accustomed to consider it. I have in mind the T-72 which is well known both in the USSR and beyond its borders.

[Shomin] We cannot examine this fact in isolation from the specific historical situation. Naturally, progressive ideas were incorporated into the T-64 and the tank had broad opportunities for subsequent modernization but there were excessive failures during the first stage of its series production. And what was the situation in the world at that time? A war was occurring in Vietnam, Israel had defeated its Arab neighbors and practically ruled the entire Middle East, relations with China had drastically worsened, and matters had been reduced to direct military clashes.

Furthermore, practically all types of weapons for the ground forces produced by our industry had been

designed during the 1950's. The qualitative priority of our armored vehicles was literally lost before our eyes. Certainly this is the only reason why the decision was made to urgently initiate production of vehicles that combined the primary advantages of the T-64 but with the traditional tank engine—a modified diesel that was still based on the T-34....

[Ptichkin] Nikolay Aleksandrovich, today a significant portion of our tanks are broken down and are being scrapped. Demands are being heard to retool tank production. What is your point of view on all of these problems?

[Shomin] Sometimes it is no less difficult to eliminate some model of a weapon than to produce it. Tank armor is distinguished by its high quality, great content of alloy additives, and therefore naturally it must be melted down under a strictly defined designation for peaceful purposes and not together with all scrap metal. Of course, the West would buy our tank steel at scrap metal prices with great satisfaction but this would be equivalent to suddenly beginning to sell gold ingots at copper prices. I would not be in a hurry to immediately melt down all tanks even if they are obviously obsolete and furthermore would not sell them abroad as utilizable scrap.

They have rashly approached this very conversion [process] in the sector, putting it mildly. We have enormous experience in the design of transport vehicles. For example, we are capable of producing buses that meet the same standards as those Mercedes produces. But no, they have decided to purchase Mercedes buses in Turkey as far as I know and they have tasked our design bureau to develop... a cattle slaughtering line and equipment for the production of instant coffee. This is really amusing but just so....

[Ptichkin] Right now we are undergoing a difficult time, many values are being reassessed, and many former myths are being discredited. Looking back at your life, can you say that you did not err in selecting your path?

[Shomin] I not only did not err, but I am very grateful to fate for everything that it has given me.

**Latvian Commentary on Fall Draft**

90SV0100A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 23 Aug 90 p3

[Interview of Colonel V. Teymer, chief of the Latvian Republic Draft Board, by Konstantin Gayvoronskij, student: "To Serve Or Not To Serve?"]

[Text] While the debate is still raging in our country over whether or not we need a professional army composed of volunteers, it looks as if Latvia has already taken the first step in that direction. No, the soldiers are not receiving \$600 per month. But this fall only volunteers are being drafted into the ranks of the Soviet Army.

[Gayvoronskij] How did this come about?

[Teymer] This call-up was truly an unusual one, primarily due to its contradictory legal basis. On 15 May the Latvian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution stating that the Law on Universal Military Service provided a guarantee for those who wish to serve in the army, while at the same time the Supreme Soviet completely changed the administrative and criminal liability for refusal to serve in the armed forces. In respect to alternative service, it is not even required that one be a conscientious objector based on religion or other convictions. All you have to do is provide a written statement. Therefore, this fall only those who decided themselves to serve joined the army.

[Gayvoronskij] How many signed up?

[Teymer] Two thirds of the young people subject to the draft reported to the military commissariate upon receiving their draft notice. And one out of three were Latvians by nationality. This proves that the majority of young people feel a sense of responsibility toward defending their country. But in as much as more than 1500 of the draftees who reported were either physically unfit for service or received deferments for other reasons, the quota for the fall draft in the republic was only 55 percent fulfilled.

[Gayvoronskij] Where will the draftees serve?

[Teymer] Almost 80 percent will be sent to the Baltic Military District. This is more than double the number sent there last year. The remainder will serve outside the USSR (in Germany and Poland) and in the Moscow and Belorussian Oblasts. One lad who raises dogs was sent to Transbaykal with his dog. But such assignments today are only isolated incidences, and strictly voluntary at that.

There is still one more thing of special interest. If in the past we sent a thousand men to construction units, now we only send one tenth of that number. And even then those units are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and are located in the Baltics. We did not send a single person to construction units subordinate to other entities, such as the Far East Special Construction Organization.

[Gayvoronskij] Is this not just a one-time policy? How will assignments for draftees during future call-ups be apportioned?

[Teymer] My opinion is that it is entirely possible that the bulk of them will serve in the Baltic Military District. But in truth this is not entirely the decision of the military commissariates.

[Gayvoronskij] There have been many who have refused to serve.

[Teymer] That's correct, unfortunately there have been many. The main reason, which I have already alluded to, is the contradictory legal situation which exists in the republic. Secondly, there is the social atmosphere that is being created in a number of regions by certain groups—the leaders of civilian committees such as "Geneva 49", "Ugunskrusts", and others. Meetings and calls for boycotting military commissariates have created a situation such that when young people do want to join the army, they are afraid of what people will think. For example, one lad called the military commissariate from the farm, saying: "I am ready to serve, but please send someone for me so that my neighbors will think that I am not going of my own free will."

Alternative service was chosen by 2500 men. The executive committees are managing this, the military commissariate is completely divorced from this issue. This has led to absurdities. For example, among those choosing alternative service are the approximately 1500 men deemed physically unfit for service in the army or eligible for a deferment. This constitutes a violation of the Alternative Service Law. If they were to appear before the military commissariate medical commission there would be no such mistakes. But it is obvious that someone doesn't want that to happen. Perhaps they will suddenly change their minds?

At the same time 861 men completely refused to serve in the military service or perform alternative service. So rather than perform alternative service, since that is considered to carry little prestige, many young people are preparing to enter trade schools, or they will continue to work as chauffeurs and cooks.

[Gayvoronskij] And what will happen with the 861 men who refuse to serve altogether?

[Teymer] Right now we are not taking any action toward them, but we haven't forgotten about them. We are sending lists with their names to the executive committees and publishing them in the local newspapers. A few of them have even begun to belatedly send letters seeking to perform alternative service. It's having an effect on them. But in order to avoid such a situation in the future whereby if someone doesn't want to serve then he doesn't have to because someone else will serve in his place, we must straighten out the legal basis, rethink the Alternative Service Law and transfer the responsibilities for maintaining its registry to the draft board. We discussed this at the joint session with the Latvian

Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense in July. The deputies agreed with us, and I think that the fall call-up will proceed in a more organized fashion.

[Gayvoronskij] Valdis Vyacheslavovich, do the draftees and their parents not come to you with complaints? And what do you do when this happens?

[Teymer] All the time. We try to help them. Last year about 100 men were transferred to the Baltic Military District from other areas, or either received early releases from active duty as a result of our intercession. There were many reasons for this—domestic situations, mistreatment of personnel (in such cases we turn this over to the office of the procurator), and reasons of health. There was, for example, a case in which a young man concealed from the medical board that he suffered from enuresis and reported to his unit. Of course it was very difficult for him there and they began to haze him. We stepped in and appointed a medical commission which led to his early release from service.

[Gayvoronskij] Presently there are many units in Latvia which do not grant leave to its soldiers. What is the reason for this?

[Teymer] Unfortunately there are instances when those on leave did not return to their units. At present there are more than 100 soldiers AWOL in Latvia. Of course a commander now thinks long and hard before he grants a soldier leave. Those that have already been apprehended talk about hazing and beatings in their units. But the statistics show that the number of incidents involving mistreatment of personnel have been reduced by 40 percent, while the number of AWOL soldiers during this same period has tripled. It appears that the problem lies elsewhere. Many soldiers have been lured by irresponsible political activists who have convinced them to boycott military service, and they decided to go AWOL while passions were running high, hoping that later everyone would forget about them. This is attested to by the fact that the commanding officer of the Baltic Military District attempted to establish contact with deserters from units in our military district through the League of Women, promising them that if they would return that they would not be punished and would be transferred to other units, assuming they had not committed any crimes. To date no one has returned of his own free will. I would like to appeal to them once more. Think about your fate.

[Gayvoronskij] Thank you for our conversation.

### Concern Over Fall Draft in Armenia

90SV0089A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian,  
20 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col V. Kaushanskiy: "Fall Draft Call Threatened"]

[Text] Well, who is going to defend our Homeland, anyway? This question resounded in the stillness of the

auditorium and hung in the air. The question did not have even a hint of pathos or rhetoric; only concern and only sadness that came from a feeling of uncertainty and the duplicity of the situation. This was the situation in which the workers of military commissariats in Armenia found themselves, together with Major General A. Arutyunyan, the military commissar of the republic. A year ago, in this very auditorium, many of them were receiving commendations precisely for organizing the draft call in a superior way.

And this year, after the spring callup was curtailed and the autumn "pressure" is at our doorstep? No, no one is scaring anyone about punishing officers, for whom the present day is probably more bitter than anything else. They are literate and industrious people. We are speaking about something else. The present situation does not entirely depend on them. Nominally, military commissariats exist, work, and carry out their voluminous documentation, but in reality they greatly resemble electric motors without driving belts: rotation is not transformed into energy.

The resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers about the coming fall draft call has not yet been passed, but the Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Colonel General V. Patrikeyev had his own reason for meeting both with the officers of the commissariats and with the leadership of the republic, as a step in anticipating—so to speak—what was to come. During the spring, Armenia "owed" the military headquarters some recruits. In the fall, this debt may double, and it will turn out that the plans issued from above will be in conflict with the situation that has become an obstacle, a real barrier, in the path of the new recruits.

A short note about the pre-history of this barrier: On May 3rd, an extraordinary session of the republic Supreme Soviet passed a resolution halting the draft call for active military duty and, simultaneously, absolving from criminal prosecution the young men from Armenia who had, on their own volition, left their units. This kind of double shot, if I may say so, placed the military commissariats in a pre-crisis situation. The formal excuse for this parliamentary decision was the alleged discriminatory policy existing in the Soviet Army toward recruits from Armenia. The fact that this does not correspond to reality is, to put it mildly, axiomatic. But we are not talking about this. As a result of lengthy and difficult negotiations, out of several thousand youths we were able to draft ... 411 persons. Some remained to serve in Armenia and some were sent to the okrug training center.

The parliamentarians promised to decide the fate of the fall call-up somewhat later, but this "somewhat" is taking exactly as long as the session marathon, whose end is not in sight yet. And there is still no decision; nor is it known when one will be made. The problems of the military commissariat, however, piling up one after the other, make the most steadfast optimists shudder: Preparations of military instructors are disrupted because



their staffs are leaving the pedagogical field; they are disappearing like water into sand. The materiel supply of training institutions became much shallower after newly-formed gang units really began to hunt for arms. Some twenty city district military commissariats do not have draft centers. Many doctors on the staffs of draft commissions have been left, for all practical purposes, without anything to do. But none of the problems enumerated above are global in nature; they arise from one main question: Will there be or will there not be a fall draft call in the republic?

The situation is not unfolding in the best possible way. The variations being proposed today are purely speculative in nature. In particular, sharing the anxiety of officers of the military commissariats, it was V. Manukyan, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic, who gave his personal opinion at a meeting. The gist is that some of the draftees could fill the ranks of the revived forces of the Armenian MVD, some would remain in the republic to do their service in the ranks of the Soviet Army, some would be sent to military schools around the country and, having received an officer's commission would return home to head the future national military formations. "Whatever the parliament decides, that is the way it is going to be," remarked Vazgen Mikazlovich, "and the Council of Ministers, on its part, will do everything to implement the deputies' position."

It is difficult to conjecture what the impending decision of the parliament will be. But here are the opinions of its representatives, members of a deputies' group that we had the opportunity of hearing. There were variations on familiar themes: The general nature of anti-Armenian sentiments in the Armed Forces, guarantees on living conditions for Armenian servicemen, and the interrelationship between the draft call and the problems of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast]. Emotional and assertive, but ... not constructive. It is true that a proposal surfaced to send all the draftees to local garrisons for duty, but even this was in the realm of fantasy.

"Where would I put all of them?" was the reasonable question asked by Lieutenant General N. Pishchev, Commander of the Yerevan garrison. "I don't even have enough duties for all of them, nor do I need them all. Furthermore, soldiers receive the most important specialty training in training subunits stationed outside Armenia."

It is necessary to speak about the incipient structure being looked at by many in the republic as the model for the future "military organization." At the same republic assembly location where the conference was taking place, we became acquainted with Colonel of the Militia G. Galstyan, Commander of a Special Regiment of the MVD. In a short time, under his command will be over one thousand men out of the total number of youths who fulfilled their service obligations in Armenia. Four battalions for technical and armament duties. High pay and

privileges, all authorized for military servicemen of the MVD. In addition, five separate companies are being formed which will guarantee the security of Armenia on its borders with Azerbaijan.

In the courtyard of the assembly area (to get organized, the new regiment was given some of its buildings) I met several volunteers. Strong, bearded fellows dressed in varied-color uniforms or half-military clothing. Some came here for ideological reasons, while others decided to try their luck after their independent combat detachments had been disbanded. Col Galstyan's head is swollen from all the problems. The new recruits have become unaccustomed to discipline and are pushing for being partisans. Already there have been complications with qualified cadres, with the training base, and with many others. The tentative cost of the regiment, according to one officer's estimate, is around 35 million rubles. When the new structure will become reality, and not just a nominal formation, no one knows. But it is already getting a great deal of publicity.

On the other hand, the concerns of Maj Gen A. Arutyunyan, Military Commander of the republic and a veteran of Afghanistan, seem to be in a vacuum of obscurity. He also has great hopes for a wise parliamentary decision, but there, in turn, they think that questions about the draft are not of the first priority. It is a closed circle. In any case, I still think there is one move: It has been proposed to include also representatives of the army in the parliamentary group which handles questions of defense and internal affairs; this is for consulting and for working out compromise decisions. This idea was also approved by L. Ter-Petrosyan, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia.

We examined only one side of the coin. The other side is: Who will replace the soldiers and sergeants, people from other regions of the country, when they are discharged this autumn in Armenia? The closer the time comes, the more insistent is the deputies' pressure on military commanders, the more categorical are parents' letters to their soldier offspring telling them to leave their garrisons and come home while they are "in one piece," the more voluble are the travelers' speeches in Yerevan given in the name of the parliaments of Russia, the Ukraine, and other republics, insisting on having their draftees serve in their "own" areas and on withdrawing the troops from the inflammable areas of the Transcaucasus. I was told of the complexity of the situation by both Major General M. Surkov, People's Deputy of the USSR and by Colonel Yu. Bobrikov, division commander of the MVD of the USSR, whose subordinates have become a living buffer on the border between two, previously fraternal republics. What will happen if this (in effect, a purely psychological) buffer is removed in today's—for now, unfortunately—hopeless situation? In the worst case, bullets will fly again through the vineyards, tearing the vines; again, agricultural work will stop in the fields now guarded by the military; once again, houses will become empty because of fear, and children

and wives from both sides will run to hide with relatives and friends in nearby villages.

What does all this mean? It means that the situation regarding the fall draft call in Armenia cannot be examined in isolation, without connecting it with analogous situations in those union republics and parliaments which placed an "embargo" on draft calls into the Armed Forces for their youths and are loudly demanding the creation of national military units. Here you have the "carabinieri" and the "sicheviks" and the "marksmen," and God knows what else. One gets the impression that the people's deputies, with the tenacity of the conquerors of the Klondike, are trying to stake out their claims on this very sector of land, using the pretext of lawmaking. First, stake out your claim, and only then think about how these armies will be clothed, fed, trained, and armed. And will the very modest budgets of the republics be able to handle such a large burden, which only our entire Union can manage? Let us remember: Only one special regiment in Armenia "pulls out" 35 million rubles.

"Enough dilettante decisions! We are speaking about the country's security," Lieutenant General N. Pishchev cried out passionately. "What are our parliamentarians in Moscow and the republic capitals waiting for? Or are they going to be happy to see empty garrisons toward the end of the year?" Many, too many non-rhetorical questions hung in the air today regarding what we, the military, like to emphasize as being the most stable institution of the state: the Armed Forces. The fall draft call will simply bring matters to a head and force those in responsible positions to finally make responsible decisions which will not permit our military ship that is awaiting the reforms to be rocked any further. But will the draft force this action? Oh, there are so many grounds for doubt.

And in the meantime, ringing in our ears is the voice of the officer of the military commissariat in Yerevan, crying out as if in the wilderness: "Well, who is going to defend our Homeland, anyway?"

Actually, who is?

**Lithuanian Territorial Problem in Inter-war Years**

90SV0087A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY  
ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, July 90 pp 20-28

[Article by S.A. Gorlov, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Administration attache: "The USSR and Lithuanian Territorial Problems" under the rubric: "In Search of the Truth"]

[Text] In this article, an attempt has been undertaken to objectively set forth the difficult question of Lithuanian territorial problems during the period between the two world wars based on USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] archive documents, the majority of which have not previously been published.

The Great October Revolution in 1917 in Russia and the November Revolution in 1918 in Germany in conjunction with the defeat of Germany which had occupied all Lithuanian territory—these were the factors that caused the intensification of the revolutionary struggle in Lithuania. The establishment of quasi-legal Soviets and revolutionary committees of workers and peasants began there in November 1918. A Provisional Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government headed by V. Mitskyavichus-Kapsukas was formed on December 8, 1918 in Vilnius where German occupation troops were still located. V. Mitskyavichus-Kapsukas had already headed the Provisional Central Bureau of Lithuanian Sections under the RSDRP (b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee since October 1917.

On December 16, 1918, the Lithuanian Government published a manifesto proclaiming the establishment of Soviet rule in Lithuania. They also proclaimed the intention to "proceed hand in hand with Soviet Russia and all other countries that have embarked on the path of world socialist revolution." By the beginning of 1919, Soviet rule had been established in the greater portion of Lithuanian territory and Soviets had already been formed in the German forces rear areas. For the purpose of impeding the establishment of workers rule throughout Lithuania, the countries of the Entente included a provision in the Kompenskiy [transliterated] Armistice with Germany about leaving German troops on the territories of the former Russian Empire that they had occupied.

Somewhat earlier (September 1917), the Lithuanian Tariba (Soviet) had been formed on the territories that were under the control and under the protection of German occupation forces (Kaunas and the south-western, western, and northern parts of Lithuania). In the declaration of independence dated December 11, 1917, the Tariba proclaimed the restoration of the Lithuanian State and establishment of "eternal and solid allied ties" with Germany that were to have been strengthened by a military convention, a convention on transportation lines, a customs union, and by the introduction of a single currency. The declaration with regard to obligations on concluding conventions with Germany

was assessed in Lithuania as a betrayal of the people's national interests and therefore the December 16, 1918 act adopted by the Lithuanian Tariba on the intention to conclude a convention with Germany was already not mentioned. The act contained the statement of the Lithuanian Tariba which at that moment was the only legally constituted organizational representative of the Lithuanian people to the governments of Russia, Germany, and other states on the restoration of the Lithuanian State.

While intending to rely on Germany, the Tariba decided to establish a monarchist form of government and in July 1918 invited the Count of Württemberg, Duke Vilhelm von Urach, to take the Lithuanian Throne. The Duke was to have been crowned and would have assumed the Lithuanian throne under the name of King Mindaugas II.

However, after Germany's military fortunes changed, Lithuania momentarily turned away from her and took the Entente's side. The coronation of Vilhelm von Urach was canceled and a republic and not a monarchy was chosen as the state form. A. Voldemaras formed the first Lithuanian Government from November 5-11, 1918.

After a revolution took place in Germany on November 9, 1918 and Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated from the throne, German troops left Vilna. The Voldemaras Government moved to Kovno (Kaunas—S.G.).

So, essentially there was a diarchy in Lithuania from December 8, 1918 through August 26, 1919: Lithuania's Bourgeois Government was in session in Kovno and the Provisional Workers and Peasants Government—in Vilna. The Government of Soviet Russia recognized the independence of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic and the rule of V. Mitskyavichus-Kapsukas' Lithuanian Provisional Revolutionary Government through a December 22, 1918 RSFSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] Decree signed by V.I. Lenin.<sup>1</sup>

A decision was made in February 1919 at the 1st Congress of Soviets of Lithuania and the 1st Congress of Soviets of Belorussia to unite Lithuania and Belorussia into a single Soviet Socialist Republic (Litbel). On February 28, 1919, the Government of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Lithuania and Belorussia was elected in Vilnius at a joint session of the Lithuanian and Belorussian TsIK's [Central Executive Committees]. It was headed by V. Mitskyavichus-Kapsukas. Vilna (Vilnius) became the republic's capital.

During the spring of 1919, the Entente began its first campaign against all Soviet republics and Poland also participated in it. Yu. Pilsudskiy's Polish Legions invaded Lithuanian territory. They captured Vilnius on April 21st. Soviet Lithuania defended itself throughout the spring and summer. Soviet rule on Lithuanian territory fell on August 26 when its last point—the city of Zarasay—was abandoned.

During the conflict between Poland and Lithuania over Vilna, the Entente sided with Poland and the Entente Supreme Council decided on June 18 and later on June 27, 1919 to draw a demarcation line that divided the conflicting parties. Poland retained the lands it occupied, including Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast.

Incidentally, the Lithuanian State arose contrary to the intentions of England and France and they did not rush to recognize Lithuania since they counted on creating a strong anti-Soviet Poland near the borders of Soviet Russia into which Lithuania would also enter on a federative basis.

On September 11, 1919, Soviet Russia proposed the conclusion of peace treaties to the Baltic Region's bourgeois governments. Estonia was the first to do this on February 2, 1920. Soviet-Lithuanian negotiations began in Moscow on May 7th. They concluded on July 12th with the signing of a peace treaty between Soviet Russia and Lithuania. The Soviet side unconditionally recognized Lithuania's independence (Article 1). Article 2 of the Treaty was a description of the Soviet-Lithuanian border. Lithuania consisted not only of Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast but also Grodno, Lida, and Oshmyany. Both parties were bound to prevent the use of their territories for military preparations against the other party (Article 4). In the event of international recognition of Lithuania's permanent neutrality, Russia pledged to observe it and participate in its guarantees (Article 5). Considering Lithuania's difficult economic situation, Soviet Russia also expressed its agreement to allocate three million gold rubles to Lithuania (Article 12). Article 15 provided for the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations immediately after ratification of this treaty.<sup>2</sup> Soviet Russia became the first state to recognize Lithuania's independence.

While recognizing Vilna as part of Lithuania, the Soviet Government did not hide from the Lithuanians that recognition was based not on the ethnographic principle but on the desire to accommodate Lithuania's economic, cultural, and administrative interests. This is apparent from the protocols of the treaties that were conducted with the Lithuanian delegation for conclusion of a Soviet-Lithuanian peace treaty in Moscow in the summer of 1920 and is indicated in a USSR NKID [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs] communique on the Vilenskiy question that had been prepared in 1939.<sup>3</sup> The peace treaty with Lithuania was concluded during the days when the Red Army was conducting an offensive against Poland during the Soviet-Polish War of 1920. The Red Army entered Lithuania on July 14, 1920, two days after the Soviet-Lithuanian peace treaty was signed. An agreement to cede Vilna to Lithuania was concluded between the Soviet and Lithuanian military commanders on August 8th. The Lithuanian Government immediately transferred its seat of government from Kovno to Vilna and afterward transferred all foreign states' diplomatic and consular representation there.

Lithuanian troops entered the city on August 27th. They held it even after a successful Polish counterattack during the Soviet-Polish War. Having unleashed an offensive, the latter invaded the territory that was under the control of the Lithuanian Government. Armed clashes occurred between Lithuanian and Polish troops. Then the Western powers undertook resolution of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute. With their participation, the Treaty of Suwalki was concluded on October 7, 1920 according to which Vilna remained part of Lithuania. However, on October 9th, Polish units consisting of Vilenskiy Oblast natives under the command of General L. Zheligovskiy, seized Vilna in violation of the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty signed at Suwalki. According to the November 29, 1920 armistice that was developed with the participation of Zheligovskiy, League of Nation's representatives, and the Lithuanian Government, Vilna and the eastern portion of Lithuania remained part of Poland.

After unsuccessful attempts to normalize Polish-Lithuanian relations and to subordinate Lithuania to Poland's interests, in Paris on March 15, 1923 the Conference of Ambassadors established the state border between Lithuania and Poland based on the demarcation line and left Vilna as part of Poland. The USSR, which continued to render moral assistance to Lithuania in its struggle for the return of Vilnius, firmly advocated its state affiliation with Lithuania and a whole series of documents sent to both the Lithuanian and Polish governments reflects this, including notes dated February 17, March 14, and April 5, 1923.<sup>4</sup>

After the Conference of Ambassadors approved the borders that left Vilna as part of Poland, the Soviet side did not recognize this border and stated that the Conference of Ambassadors' decision "does not have any force whatsoever for Russia and its allies" in its April 5, 1923 note.<sup>5</sup>

The treaty on mutual nonaggression and neutrality concluded between the USSR and Lithuania on September 28, 1926 and the Soviet note of the same date that was addressed to the Lithuanian side stressed that the Government of the USSR as previously recognizes Vilnius only as part of Lithuania.<sup>6</sup>

The Polish side based their claims on Vilna on the fact that after the Lublin Union of 1569 based on which Vilna became part of the Polish State—the Rzeczpospolita [Polish Republic]—and afterward shared the fate of the Polish State (three partitions of Poland after which Vilenskiy Province was made a part of Russia). Vilna completely lost the traits of a Lithuanian city, including in an ethnographic regard. Therefore, it should have belonged only to Poland as part of its territory that had been ceded to Russia within the framework of the third partition of the latter in 1795. The Polish Government considered the Treaty of Suwalki dated October 7, 1920 to be invalid since it was covered by later decisions of the

Council of the League of Nations dated February 3, 1923 and of the Conference of Ambassadors dated March 15, 1923.

Poland did not wish to recognize Vilna's affiliation to the Lithuanian Republic. As a result, Lithuania considered it to be impossible to establish diplomatic relations with Poland since it would have signified a renunciation of its capital. Its closest neighbor—Germany—attempted to subordinate Lithuania's economy and policy to its own interests. When conflicts arose, England and France always applied pressure on Lithuania, demanding concessions to both Poland and Germany.

Twice, in 1927 and in 1938, Polish-Lithuanian relations worsened and threatened to evolve into an armed conflict and both times the USSR came to the aid of Lithuania.

Thanks to a Soviet diplomatic initiative in November 1927, the state of war between Poland and Lithuania was already eliminated at the December session of the League of Nations although diplomatic relations were not established between them.

In the situation of the incitement of tensions in the world during the second half of the 1930's caused by the increase in aggressiveness of Hitler's Germany, anti-Lithuanian chauvinist propaganda increased in Poland in 1936, anti-Lithuanian demonstrations were organized, and provocations were increasingly organized on the Polish-Lithuanian border. Before the seizure of Austria (March 11, 1938), Hitler informed the Polish Government of his intentions and promised Poland access to the sea at Lithuania's expense. A new Polish-Lithuanian border incident occurred on March 11, 1938 that ended in the death of a Polish border guard. Using these grounds, Poland presented an ultimatum to Lithuania on March 17th in which Poland demanded that Lithuania restore normal diplomatic relations, offer guarantees to Polish minorities in Lithuania, renounce [claims] to Vilna once and for all, etc.

The day before the Polish ultimatum was handed to Lithuania, the Soviet Government made a statement that the USSR "could not be a spectator to the events on the Polish-Lithuanian border if Lithuania's independence was threatened."<sup>7</sup> However, the Lithuanian Government accepted the Polish ultimatum on March 19, 1938.

Parallel with the increased pressure from Poland, Lithuania was also subjected to significant pressure from Germany and primarily due to Memel and to Memel Oblast.<sup>8</sup> The fact was that, still prior to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Germany had repudiated all rights to the territory that made up the 2,848 km which afterward began to be called Memel Oblast in favor of the main allied and united powers.

According to the Versailles Peace Treaty (Article 99), this oblast, which was a part of East Prussia and had been separated from Germany,<sup>9</sup> was occupied by French

troops during 1920-1923 and was under the rule of the countries of the Entente. The Lithuanian Government demanded Memel's annexation to Lithuania. It even resorted to limiting economic ties with Klaypeda Kray in order to prove that the Kray could not exist without ties to Lithuania and increased propaganda for its annexation to Lithuania.

While attempting to draw Lithuania into the anti-Soviet block, in 1920-1921 the countries of the Entente attempted to resolve the Vilenskiy question by ceding Vilna and afterward also Memel to Lithuania and by the simultaneous federative unification of the latter with Poland (the Gimans [transliterated] Plan).

France presided over negotiations between Poland and Lithuania in Paris November 1922 that a delegation from Memel also attended. Poland proposed the establishment of a Free Memel (the "Free State of Memel") for a ten-year period on November 19, 1922. The Memel delegation approved this draft but it did not suit Lithuania and a decision was once again not made.

Obviously the course of the negotiations provided Lithuania grounds to fear that Poland, having seized Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast in October 1920 through a putsch, would afterward also seize Memel using the same method. The Lithuanians had reason to believe this. They thought that Vilenshchina and Memel in Polish hands would signify the end of Lithuanian independence. Furthermore, the Polish adventure with the seizure of Vilna was staring them in the face. The Lithuanians acted in a similar fashion by taking advantage of a favorable opportunity: Knowing about France's intent to occupy the Ruhr area on January 11, 1923 due to Germany's refusal to continue reparations payments, they urgently summoned E. Simonaytis, leader of Memel's "Lithuanian nationalists," to Kaunas on January 3, 1923 and discussed all the details of the impending putsch with him.

On January 10th, the day before French troops entered the Ruhr, Lithuanian servicemen dressed in civilian clothing and volunteers, the majority of whom were young students and members of "Shaulyu Sayunga" (the "Union of Marksmen"), a militarized organization, were sent into Memel Oblast.

A "rebellion" was incited in Memel during which one Frenchman was killed and two were wounded. The "rebels" occupied the city and then all of Memel Oblast. French troops laid down their arms practically without resistance. The directorate formed by the Lithuanian "rebels" announced Memel's annexation to Lithuania as a fait accompli.

The French and the Conference of Ambassadors attempted to protest but the Lithuanian Government, like the Polish Government in the case of Vilna, stated that it did not have any connection with this [incident] and that here they were talking about the restoration of the rights of oppressed Lithuanians in Memel. France

and Poland sent a squadron of warships to Memel but it only observed the evacuation of French troops at the port.

The French occupation of the Ruhr with which the "rebellion" in Memel was timed to coincide caused profound dissatisfaction among the other countries of the Entente and England openly condemned the French action. As a result, the Entente was limited to only sending a commission to Memel to study the situation on site.

On February 16, 1923, the Conference of Ambassadors decided to cede Memel's and Memel Oblast's sovereign rights to Lithuania if Lithuania fulfilled certain conditions: Autonomy of Memel Oblast, freedom of transit and use of Memel Port by Poland, development of Memel Oblast's status and conclusion of an appropriate convention. This was a sort of compensation to Lithuania for the loss of Vilna.

On March 13, 1923, Lithuania announced its unconditional acceptance of all conditions since the fact that Memel is an ice-free port had great significance for Lithuania.

On May 7, 1923, Lithuanian Prime Minister Ye. Galvanauskas proclaimed autonomy for Memel Oblast.

After Hitler's accession to power the mood significantly increased in favor of restoring German sovereignty over Memel Oblast both within Germany itself and among the German portion of the population of Memel. Since the beginning of 1935, the Lithuanian Government essentially already had not impeded the activities of those German Nazis who also turned out to have local power in their hands. (During the elections in December 1938, the Nazi Party garnered 87 percent of the vote). In January 1939, a new directorate was formed there that proclaimed National Socialism as its ideology and which began preparations for Memel Oblast's merger with Germany.

Memel's turn came after the elimination of the independent Czechoslovak State by Germany on March 15, 1939. Lithuania was actually presented an ultimatum on March 20, 1939. On March 22, 1939, the USSR Charges d'Affaires ad interim N.G. Pozdnyakov reported in a telegram to the USSR NKID: "Ribbentrop<sup>10</sup> told Urbsys<sup>11</sup> that the annexation of Klaypeda to Germany is a vital and urgent need for Klaypeda Germans. If the Lithuanian Government cannot voluntarily clean up Klaypeda, disorders will immediately flare up there which will call for Reichswehr intervention. If just one German is killed during the disorders, the Reichswehr will penetrate into the depth of Greater Lithuania."<sup>12</sup>

Considering the growth of the force of Germany's foreign policy which was based on aggression, the Lithuanian Government began to seek ways to improve relations with Berlin and decided to cede Klaypeda to Germany on March 21, 1939 and the German-Lithuanian Treaty on the Annexation of Memel to

Germany was signed on March 22. According to the treaty, all of Lithuania's military and police forces had to immediately leave the ceded territory. Germany pledged to afford Lithuania the opportunity to establish a free zone in Klaypeda (Memel) Port.

On March 29, 1939, the Lithuanian Ambassador to the USSR Yu. Baltrushaytis reported the details of German-Lithuanian negotiations during a conversation with Soviet People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov: "Ribbentrop treated Urbsys quite rudely, having handed him a draft agreement and demanding that he immediately sign it. When Urbsys began to object, Ribbentrop stated that Kovno<sup>13</sup> will be leveled to the ground and that the Germans have everything ready to do this."<sup>14</sup>

On May 4, 1939, Lithuanian Ambassador to Germany K. Shkirpa was authorized by the central government to sound out the Vilenskiy Oblast issue in the event of a German-Polish conflict during a conversation with V. Grundher, a highly placed bureaucrat in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The calculation was to achieve a resolution of this issue not from the Poles but from the Germans. At the same time, Lithuania constantly stated its strict neutrality....

On May 20, 1939, four German-Lithuanian treaties were signed: On trade, payments, border crossings, and equipping the Lithuanian free port in Memel. As a result, Germany's share of Lithuanian exports reached 40 percent and imports reached 50 percent. Under conditions of the growing threat of war, this actually signified the reorientation of Lithuania's policy toward a close alliance with Germany.

While considering the actual threat that emanated from Germany, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union began political negotiations to develop a unified position in the event of new German aggression in April 1939. As one of the main elements of the system to confront German aggression, the USSR insisted that Great Britain, France, and the USSR offer treaty guarantees to states that neighbor Germany and primarily to the Baltic States (We are talking about Finland, Estonia, and Latvia). We were not talking about guarantees to Lithuania due to its "special" relationship with Germany and its involvement in the channel of German policy, especially after the signing of the German-Lithuanian agreements in March-May 1939, although the Lithuanians, sensing the danger and the precariousness of their situation, were not against receiving "guarantees of a unilateral nature from the USSR," about which Natkevichus had already informed Molotov on May 10, 1939 during the previously mentioned conversation.<sup>15</sup>

The signing of the Nonaggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union took place on the night of August 24, 1939. A supplementary secret protocol on the delimitation of mutual spheres of interests in Eastern Europe was attached to the document itself. The first

paragraph stated that "in the event of a territorial-political restructuring of areas that make up the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Lithuania's northern border is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. Furthermore, Lithuania's interests with regard to Vilenskiy Oblast are recognized by both sides...."<sup>16</sup> In other words, Lithuania was in Germany's sphere of interests in accordance with this protocol. And the issue of reuniting the ancient Lithuanian Capital of Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast with Lithuania was practically resolved at the same time. It is true that this moment *de jure* arrived two months later—on October 10, 1939 with the signing of the Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty on Ceding the City of Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast to the Lithuanian Republic and on Mutual Assistance.

On September 1, 1939, Germany began the Second World War with an attack against Poland.<sup>17</sup> Germany repeatedly attempted to compel the Soviet Union to act against Poland and occupy corresponding Polish territory. However, Stalin and Molotov bided their time. On September 16, 1939, when the issue of the entry of Soviet troops was nevertheless resolved, Molotov posed the question of how things would be with Vilna during a conversation with Schulenburg. The Soviet Government really wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and therefore wanted to know if any sort of agreement had been reached with Lithuania on Vilenskiy Oblast and in particular who should occupy the city.

Two quite curious documents have come to light that are also related to approximately this time: The draft "Treaty on Defense Between the German Reich and the Lithuanian Republic" dated September 20, 1939 and German Armed Forces Supreme High Command Directive No. 4 dated September 25, 1939. The first document stated that to support the "mutually complementary interests of both countries" and "not to the detriment of its state sovereignty, Lithuania is placing itself under the protection of the German Reich" (Article 1). The conclusion of a bilateral military convention (Article 2) and development of the "foundations of close and comprehensive economic ties between both countries" was stipulated.

The second document discussed "holding forces in readiness in East Prussia that are adequate to rapidly seize Lithuania even in the event of its armed resistance."<sup>18</sup>

So, there is basis to assume that only the urgent appeal of September 25, 1939 at the Kremlin by Stalin and Molotov to the German Ambassador Schulenburg and the very subject of the subsequent conversation at that time provided a different direction to the development of events with regard to Lithuania.

On September 25, 1939, Schulenburg telegraphed Berlin about the meeting with Stalin and Molotov at the Kremlin. The German Ambassador reported that during the course of the conversation, Stalin, with the aim of a


final resolution of the Polish question and to avoid tensions between the USSR and Germany in the future because of this, expressed a desire to disavow plans to leave an independent fragmented Poland and to cede Lublin Province and a portion of Warsaw Province to Germany. In exchange, Germany would renounce its intentions regarding Lithuania. Stalin characterized this proposal as "material for impending negotiations" with Ribbentrop who was expected in Moscow for final resolution of the question on Polish territory.<sup>19</sup>

In one of the secret protocols—in an amendment to paragraph one of the supplementary secret protocol dated August 23, 1939—Lithuanian territory was included in the USSR's sphere of interests and Lublin Province and a portion of Warsaw Province—in Germany's sphere of interests. It also indicated that the German-Lithuanian border would be adjusted so that Lithuanian territory to the southwest from the line indicated on the map would be ceded to Germany.

On October 4, 1939, Ribbentrop sent E. Tsekhlin [transliterated], German Ambassador to Lithuania, a communique which contained the following: "For the purpose of avoiding complications in Eastern Europe during the signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact dated August 23rd, negotiations on the delimitation of spheres of German and Soviet interests occurred between us and the Soviet Government. Furthermore, I advocated that Vilenskiy Oblast be ceded to Lithuania as the Soviet Government also promised me. During negotiations on the conclusion of the September 28th Treaty of Friendship and the Border which cuts a wedge-shaped piece of territory with its center located at Suwalki between Germany and Lithuania, it follows from the well-known conduct of the German-Soviet border that the territory was ceded to Germany. Since a complicated and impractical border has arisen at this location as a result of this [treaty], I reserved the right for Germany to adjust the border in accordance with which a narrow strip of Lithuanian territory is being ceded to Germany. Lithuania's annexation of Vilna was also discussed during these negotiations. You are now authorized to inform the Lithuanian Government that the Imperial Government does not consider the question on adjusting the border to be urgent at the present time. However, at the same time we are proceeding from the premise that the Lithuanian Government will view this question as strictly secret." On October 5, 1939, Tsekhlin announced to the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs that the "German Government does not consider urgent" the question about changing the German-Lithuanian border despite its "impracticality." This was perceived with "noticeable relief" and gratitude. In a telegram to Berlin, Tsekhlin wrote that "after the passage of the German-Soviet border became known, local political circles are nurturing high hopes of obtaining the territory with its center at Suwalki from Germany."<sup>20</sup>

On October 8, 1939, an exchange of letters with identical content proposed by Ribbentrop took place between Molotov and Schulenburg. The letters stated that, as a

Map Illustrating the Formation of the Lithuanian SSR's Borders During the Post-Revolutionary Period



result of the supplementary secret protocol dated 28 September 1939 with regard to Lithuania, agreement exists between the parties about the fact that:

"1. The Lithuanian territory mentioned above and designated on the map attached to it will not be occupied by RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] troops in the event they are introduced into Lithuania;

2. Germany retains the right to determine the moment to execute the understanding with regard to ceding the aforementioned Lithuanian territory to Germany."

The signing of the Treaty To Cede the City of Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast and on Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania took place in Moscow on October 10, 1939. It stressed mutual interest in the just resolution of the "question on the state affiliation of Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast that Poland had illegally forcibly detached from Lithuania." Article 1 "for the purpose of strengthening friendship" recorded the Soviet Union's transfer of Vilna and Vilenskiy Oblast to Lithuania for their inclusion within the state territory of Lithuania. Both parties promised to render to each other "every kind of aid, including military, in the event of an attack or the threat of an attack against one of the parties by any European power" (Article 2). The USSR pledged

to deliver arms and war materials to the Lithuanian Army under favorable terms (Article 3). Article 4 granted the USSR the right to "to maintain at points established through mutual agreement" in Lithuania a "strictly limited number of air and ground military forces." Soviet troop deployment locations "would remain an integral part of the Lithuanian Republic under all circumstances." The treaty would remain in force for 15 years. The treaty was signed by V. Molotov and J. [Juozas] Urbys.

The USSR's right to deploy a total of 20,000 men in Lithuania was stipulated in a confidential protocol to the treaty.

The size of the ceded territory totaled 6,655.5 square kilometers and the number of residents who resided on them totaled 457,500 people<sup>21</sup> and, furthermore, Lithuanians were a minority—approximately 100,000 people with the remainder consisting of Poles, Belorussians, and Jews.

On October 11, 1939, the USSR Charges d'Affaires ad interim N.G. Pozdnyakov wrote as a result of the conclusion of the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty: "Since morning, the entire city (Kaunas—S.G.) has been decorated with state flags. Excitement has reigned in the streets: People



have been kissing, congratulating each other, exchanging opinions, etc. It struck you that the primary cause of the excitement among the street masses was ceding Vilna and Vilenskiy Kray to Lithuania."<sup>22</sup>

When the Soviet Union transferred Vilenskiy Oblast, three small sections of territory where Belorussians and Lithuanians lived (Rymshanskiy, Radunskiy, and Davgelishskiy volosts [small administrative districts] and the area of Sventsyan with the city of Svenchana) were annexed to Belorussia. But afterward, obviously proceeding from the fact that Lithuania had become part of the USSR, Sventstanskiy Rayon and "parts of the territory of the Belorussian SSR's Vidzovskiy, Godutishkovskiy, Ostrovetskiy, Voronovskiy, and Radunskiy rayons with a predominantly Lithuanian population" were annexed as part of the Lithuanian SSR in accordance with a Belorussian SSR proposal and the USSR Law on the Acceptance of Lithuania into the USSR dated August 3, 1940. This same Law provided for the submission of the draft establishment of border points between Belorussia and Lithuania by the BSSR and LiSSR Supreme Soviets to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In September 1939, Hitler issued the order to organize the efficient resettlement to Germany of individuals of German nationality residing in Estonia and Latvia and announcements by German citizens "in the event of anarchy" in these countries. On July 12, 1940, Schulenburg, the German ambassador to Moscow, told Molotov of the German Government's intent to "resettle individuals of German nationality from Lithuania to Germany just like it had already been done in Latvia and Estonia." In the event of agreement by the Soviet side, Germany intended to propose this to the Lithuanian Government. And then right here it would seem that it spilled out that, [concerning] the already resolved issue on the southwestern border of Lithuania, Schulenburg stated that the "German Government did not intend to resettle individuals of German nationality from that area of Lithuania about which a special agreement had been made in the protocol dated September 28, 1939. The German Government reminded [the USSR] that Germany had been granted the right to designate the time when Germany could occupy this area."

Schulenburg's announcement provided the grounds to think that Germany intended to begin deploying its troops into this portion of Lithuania.

On July 13, 1940, Molotov told Schulenburg that the "Soviet Government totally confirms Germany's formal rights" to this portion of Lithuanian territory. But Stalin and Molotov nevertheless "request" the German Government "to find the possibility to waive [its claim] to this small portion of Lithuanian territory."<sup>23</sup>

On August 7, 1940, the German Government, through Schulenburg, stated its readiness to become involved with this issue while noting that "waiving [its claim] to this territory is a big sacrifice for it." The question was raised about compensation.

The compensation sum (7.5 million gold dollars or 31.5 million German marks) and the procedure and terms for its payment (one eighth—through deliveries of non-ferrous metals during a three month period from the day the agreement was signed and the remaining seven-eighths through gold by means of deductions from German payments to the Soviet Union which Germany should have conducted prior to February 11, 1941) were settled as a result of a series of negotiations.<sup>24</sup>

The Parties agreed that the 22 million marks which Germany had pledged to pay to the Soviet Union to cover its deficit in the trade balance between both countries by February 11, 1941 will be covered from the compensation sum in gold (27.57 million marks), and 5.57 million marks will cover the portion of German payments (23 million marks) for grain deliveries from Bessarabia.<sup>25</sup>

On January 10, 1941, the Soviet Union and Germany signed several bilateral agreements, including a secret protocol on compensation for the southwestern "slice" of Lithuania. Naturally, the resolution of the issue on compensation for the "slice" of Lithuanian territory that had been achieved was not mentioned in the press.

After Germany's attack against the Soviet Union, Lithuania was occupied by German troops during a five-day period and was transformed into a portion of "Ostland" Province. According to the "Ost" Plan, the Baltic peoples were doomed to mass destruction and slavery. During the entire three-year occupation period, the Lithuanian population was subjected to massive repression. Mass destruction of Soviet people was conducted in Kaunas, Paneryaj, near Vilnius, Alitus, and in many other parts of Lithuania. The Nazis annihilated nearly half a million civilians and 200,000 prisoners of war on Lithuanian territory.

Nearly 138,000 Soviet Army soldiers of many nationalities died during the liberation of the Lithuanian SSR from Fascist occupation which began in July 1944. On 13 July, troops from the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovskiy liberated the capital of Lithuania—Vilnius, and on August 1st—Kaunas. Troops of the 1st Baltic Front commanded by General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan liberated Klaypeda on January 28, 1945.

It must be pointed out that the question of Memel was also raised at international conferences during the Second World War. During discussion of the Polish question, the Western Allies did not oppose the northern portion of East Prussia with the ports of Memel and Koenigsberg being ceded to the USSR. The USSR, U.S., and British delegations agreed that "Poland must be granted compensation at Germany's expense including that portion of East Prussia that is located to the south of the Koenigsberg line...."<sup>26</sup>

Taking into account the position of the Western powers, the Soviet Government proceeded based on the premise that the issue of ceding Klaypeda to the Soviet Union had been predetermined. Considering Lithuania to be a

part of the federation of Soviet republics, it decided to include the city within the Lithuanian SSR.

In the Protocol of the Berlin Conference dated August 1, 1945, part 5 states: "The city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it" has been set: "The Conference has agreed in principle with the Soviet Government's proposal to transfer the city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it to the Soviet Union."

In conclusion, it is difficult not to state that the Soviet Union's policy with regard to Lithuania and its territorial problems in 1939-1941 and the entire course of events caused by it that affected Lithuania would have developed in such a way that today familiarity with the documents of that time on this issue causes a sense of profound internal discomfort. And today it is awkward because of how Stalin and Molotov, under the cover of the prestige of the Soviet Union, resolved the territorial problems of sovereign Lithuania. And the fact that today Soviet Lithuania lives within its own ethnic borders and that Stalin, Hitler, Molotov, and Ribbentrop had a hand in forming these borders can hardly justify all of this.

However, it would hardly be correct to approach these events of that time only using today's criteria. Diplomatic history is replete with all kinds of examples of the conclusion of secret, confidential, classified, and "not to be divulged" treaties, agreements, and protocols. The secret Soviet-German protocols of 1939 and 1941 occupy their historical place among them.

Furthermore, the attentive reader, having become familiar with this article, has obviously noted that not only the actions of the USSR but also those of Lithuania do not quite "come up to" today's standards. Having proclaimed its strict neutrality in 1939, Lithuania essentially rushed about between stronger neighbors—Germany and the USSR, while being guided by not nearly altruistic motives. On one hand, aggressive Germany, having deprived Lithuania of its one ice-free port of Klaypeda, and, on the other hand, the USSR, having certainly fought for collective security in Europe until the middle of 1939 and afterward having entered into a deal with Germany....

While proceeding from the situation that existed at that time and the thinking and type of actions that predominated in the world, we can essentially view the agreement between Germany and the USSR on reallocation of spheres of influence that was recorded in one of the secret protocols dated September 28, 1939 as the extension of Lithuania's independent existence. And this is actually so since the dangerous trend of Lithuania's economic "anschluss" appeared after Klaypeda Kray became a part of the "Third Reich" and the conclusion of a series of German-Lithuanian treaties.

It is also difficult to simply assess the Soviet side's next step with regard to the "purchase" of the southwestern "slice" of Lithuania from Germany. In any case, no matter how you regard this from the point of view of

morality, you must admit that the result of the trade was the preservation of Lithuania's integrity.

**From the Editor:** We want to acquaint our readers with the Soviet leadership's position on territorial issues at that time. It is quite clearly and precisely set forth in the July 8, 1921 letter of the Soviet Russian People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin to B.V. Legran, its representative in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan:

"We have already many times spoken about the fact the self-determination is a principle applied generally and totally and not at individual geographic points. In all of our treaties, not only in the Brest [Treaty], but also in all of our subsequent treaties, we have violated this principle with regard to individual areas. We gave Estonia a purely Russian piece, we gave Finland Pechenga where the population stubbornly did not want this, we did not ask Latgallia when we transferred it to Latvia, and we gave a purely Belorussian area to Poland. This is all tied in with the fact that the self-preservation of the Soviet Republic as the citadel of the revolution is the highest principle under the current general situation and during the Soviet Republic's struggle with the capitalist encirclement. Due to this supreme principle, we have to resort to treaties with bourgeois states in which our principles are not realized. Because of this principle, we have to insist on the maintenance of any geographic points required for the very existence of the Soviet Republic, that is, for the supreme principle of its self-preservation. We are guided not by national interests but by the interests of the world revolution." (USSR FPD, 21).

The Soviet Government's support of Lithuania's claims on Vilna and Vilenshchina, just like other territories, has been explained by the desire to have neighboring Lithuania as a state that is friendly toward the Soviet Union.

#### Footnotes

1. USSR Foreign Policy Documents (Henceforth—USSR FPD), Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1957, p 662.
2. USSR FPD, Vol 3, 1959, pp 28-42.
3. USSR Foreign Policy Archives (USSR FPA), f 06, op 1, p 12, d 124, ll 24-25.
4. USSR FPD, Vol 6, 1962, pp 192-193, 228-230, 241-242.
5. Ibid., p 242.
6. This same position of the USSR was set forth in the protocols on extending the force of the aforementioned treaty, signed on May 6, 1931 and on April 4, 1934. See: USSR FPD, Vol 14, 1968, pp 318-319; Vol 17, 1971, pp 229-230.
7. USSR FPD, Vol 21, 1977, p 154.
8. The German name for Klaypeda and Klaypeda Kray.

9. According to the situation on September 20, 1920, 140,746 people resided in Memel Oblast of which 71,156 were Germans and 67,269 were Lithuanians. Valsonokas, R. Klaipedos Problems, Klaipeda, 1932, p 270 [last portion of footnote in English in original].
  10. German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
  11. Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
  12. USSR FPD, f 059, op 1, p 299, d 2063, ll 31-32.
  13. Kaunas.
  14. USSR FPD, f 06, op 1, p 1, d 5, l 138.
  15. USSR FPD, f 06, op 1, p 1, d 2, l 12.
  16. The initiative obviously originated from the German side. In any case, Mr. Ribbentrop's telegram dated October 4, 1939 informed E. Tsekhlin, the German Ambassador to Lithuania, about the fact that, during the signing of the Soviet-German Treaty in Moscow on August 23, 1939 that he "advocated that Vilenskiy Oblast would be ceded to Lithuania and that the Soviet Government also promised me this." (Akten zur deutschen answärtigen Politik (ADAP), Ser. D. Bd. 8, S. 167).
  17. On the eve of war, Germany and Lithuania were in close, including diplomatic, cooperation. Thus, on August 29, 1939, E. von Weizsäcker, secretary of state of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instructed E. Tsekhlin, German ambassador to Lithuania: "Carefully sound out whether the Lithuanian Government is prepared to undertake a show of force by massing its troops on the Polish border" (ADAP, Ser. D Bd, 8, S 353). In instructions to Tsekhlin dated August 30, 1939, Weizsäcker wrote: "In conversations with the local government... say that if territorial transformations occur between Germany and Poland, that existing Lithuanian claims to Vilenskiy Oblast will be completely taken into account" (Ibid. S. 375). On August 31, 1939, Mr. Tsekhlin wired Berlin about the step taken by Lithuania to increase troop strength on the Polish border (Ibid. S. 375). On the other hand, a mood began to spread among Lithuanians since the second half of August 1939 "for the seizure of Vilna from the Poles" (USSR FPD, f 06, op 1, p 12, d 126, l 26).
  18. Danichev, V.I., "Bankrotstvo strategii germanskogo fashizma" [Bankruptcy of the Strategy of German Fascism], Vol 1, Moscow, Nauka, 1973, pp 388-389.
  19. ADAP, Ser. D, Bd 8, S 101.
  20. Ibid., S 167-168.
  21. USSR FPD, f 151, op 24, p 28, d 1, l 41.
  22. Ibid., f 06, op 1, p 12, d 126, l 60.
  23. Ibid., op 2, p 2, d 14, l 126.
  24. Ibid., op 3, p 1, d 4, ll 1-6, 9-12, 16-20, 26-28, 29-33; op 2, p 17, d 191, ll 23-24.
  25. Ibid., op 3, p 1, d 4, l 31.
  26. Crimea Conference of Leaders of the Three Allied Powers—USSR, U.S., and Great Britain. February 4-11, 1945. Collection of documents, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 65-66, 130-131.
- COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal", 1990.
- 1978 Turret Explosion Aboard Cruiser 'Adm Senyavin'**  
90SV0048A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Sep 90 First Edition p 2
- [Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Capt 2nd Rank O. Odnokolenko: "Explosion on the Cruiser 'Admiral Senyavin'"]
- [Text] *The tragedy occurred on 13 Jun 78. On that day, an unlucky one according to superstition, the conventional gun-armed Pacific Fleet cruiser Admiral Senyavin was performing main-battery gunnery practice firing. The vessel shuddered from a powerful explosion on the ninth salvo. Contact with the forward main-battery turret was lost...*
- Capt 2nd Rank L. Mrochko, at the time editor of the ship sailors' newspaper, relates: "It was a dreary day, and the ship was full of guests—artists and a delegation of writers. The preparatory firing had been performed (and quite successfully!). And then the commander of the task force, Vice-Admiral Varganov, gave permission, supposedly at the request of the crew, to fire a performance-graded salvo. I and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Capt 2nd Rank L. Klimchenko were to have gone to the forward turret, but they brought us the galley proofs of the latest edition of the paper, and I was delayed. He went alone. The firing started while I was making corrections. Suddenly there was an explosion. I ran out onto the weather deck and saw the forward turret shrouded in smoke. No one had a clear idea yet of what had happened.
- "When they opened the armored door, there proved to be no one alive in the turret. All thirty seven men—the crews of the gun and loading compartments, as well as those attending the firing—had perished."
- To this day, not a single newspaper has related the tragedy that played itself out twelve years ago in the Sea of Japan. And only a brief report in our newspaper on the death of Capt 2nd Rank Leonid Klimchenko in the performance of his official duties broke the vow of silence prescribed for the press a little.
- In my opinion, another definition could be given to the era of stagnation—the time of exclusively good news. Various things happened around the world and in our country, but one could promulgate these facts only after special permission. Precisely nothing depended on the press. The more so in the case of the Admiral Senyavin. The point was that practically the night before, the

cruiser had been visited by L. Brezhnev. Going to sea on a combat vessel had been, as it were, the exclamation point for his trip, surrounded by great pomp, to the Far East.

The newspapers wrote at the time that "the appearance of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Comrade L.I. Brezhnev on the cruiser will be a golden page in its history... The sailors who had just come from their posts, still excited from the battle exercise that had just been thundering and carrying with them the powder smell of the gunnery salvos, listened to the words of Leonid Ilich, which included an assessment of their martial labors... The impressive appearance of Leonid Ilich Brezhnev on the cruiser Admiral Senyavin inspires the Pacific Fleet sailors, as well as all Soviet warriors, to the achievement of new frontiers in combat and political training and in socialist competition." USSR Minister of Defense and Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov and the commander in chief of the Navy, Fleet Adm of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov, accompanied Brezhnev during his trip to sea.

The results of the gunnery exercise, as far as can be concluded from the speech of Brezhnev, were also good. Cruiser commander Capt 2nd Rank V. Plakhov and the ship's deputy for political affairs, Capt 3rd Rank I. Spitsyn, received watches from him with the laconic inscription "From L.I. Brezhnev. 1978." Knowing the traditions of those years, it is not difficult to assume that both the good results and the inscribed watches had all been scripted in advance. But even if that were really so, the sailors here were guilty of nothing. At the time I myself was serving on a cruiser of analogous design and I know firsthand how highly the combat capabilities of these vessels and the traditionally good training of the crews were rated.

But the misfortune is that a special propaganda role had now been predestined for the Admiral Senyavin. Gladdened by the brief visit of the General Secretary, it was to "go further and achieve more." It was destined for show, for a host of visitors, for the sugary attentions of the press, radio and television, for leadership in the competition for much more, which poisons the already difficult life of the sailors. And this was now not a young vessel. More than two decades of service, more than 200,000 miles at sea...

And so an accident occurred on the Admiral Senyavin two months and six days after Brezhnev's visit to the cruiser. It was called "grave" even in official documents. Here is what the result of investigation showed. "Upon issue of the electrical signal to fire the ninth salvo, the right gun of Turret No. 1 did not fire. The next shell was erroneously loaded into the charged gun. The ignition of the charge in the breech chamber occurred as a result. The streams of gases flying out ignited the charges that had been prepared for firing, and a fire broke out in the turret that quickly spread to the upper loading compartment."

At that instant the turret compartment was turned into absolute hell. Any description pales before the real picture, and who could take it upon himself to describe the suffering of these people, bottled up inside the armor according to the battle bill...

The investigation materials further mention the following: "The cause of the accident was the erroneous actions of the gun team of the right gun of the turret and the inadequate training of the personnel in eliminating possible flaws and impediments in firing." It was also noted that the accident was facilitated by serious omissions on the part of the task force and ship command. It was pointed out in particular that many experienced sailors and petty officers from the turret gun crews had been discharged into the reserves practically the night before. They included the commander of the ill-fated gun. But proper attention was not devoted to this important circumstance. And the youth, as was clarified, had not yet acquired the essential skills and became confused in a non-standard situation. The shift of the graded firing from August to June was also deemed to be unfounded. It was pointed out quite fairly that it had been performed without analysis and study of the preparatory firing. And how could they find the time for analysis and study when it all happened in one day? It was an interval of a few hours.

We do not judge the lost. The living participants in this firing, it turned out, were punished "as an example." The cruiser commander and his deputy for political affairs were relieved of their duties and demoted by order of the minister of defense. The same happened with the gunnery commander, Capt Lt A. Shubin. The task force commander, Vice Admiral V. Varganov, who had permitted the rescheduling of the firing, was reprimanded by the minister of defense for insufficient conformity to duties. Other officers were also reprimanded. Although what's that—relieved of duties for the death of thirty seven men!

No, I am not thirsting for the "blood" of those to blame. I moreover sympathize with them to a certain extent. After all, if you look at it closely, they were all doomed—there, as they say, but for the grace of God—from the very moment when it was decided somewhere upstairs to bring Brezhnev to namely the cruiser Admiral Senyavin. They all understood very well, after all, that the crew would not now have normal opportunities for performing combat training according to plan. As other military units do not have the chance when they fall into the fateful role of "demonstration" units.

Let's investigate—was it just the great skills of the crew that predetermined this lot for the cruiser? I think not. The wooden decks scrubbed to a noble yellow, the interior of the flag officer's cabin decorated in the old style—all of this splendor did not now exist on more modern ships, where the appointments of both the lieutenants' and the captain's quarters were appreciably more decorative. But then—we can only see what will happen!—they took into account the fact that two of the

lofty guests had a direct connection to naval gunnery in their younger years. Navy Commander-in-Chief Flt Adm SU S.G. Gorshkov had commanded gun-armed vessels, while USSR Minister of Defense and Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, a deputy chief designer before the war, had installed and fine-tuned large-caliber gunnery systems on the light cruiser Kirov, to a certain extent the prototype for the Admiral Senyavin. In short, many nuances. And how could it not be predestined that the role of the infamous gem among stones would be prepared for the Admiral Senyavin during the visit of the lofty guests to the Pacific Fleet? It was to win them over, surprise them and remind them...

And here are some more ideas that give me no peace. Many feel that the shift of the firing was caused exclusively by the political-meeting considerations of the ship's command—to report out ahead of schedule, to eclipse the successes of others... But another version seems to me more likely. The ships of this design, as has already been noted, were built back in the fifties. Their mechanisms and instruments had become exceedingly worn out, as well as functionally obsolete, over two decades of service. I myself remember how difficult it had been for the crew of our ship to fire each salvo... And the sailors of the Admiral Senyavin had good luck in the preparatory firing! It was not for nothing that they decided to fire the graded one, as they say, before the sights got skewed.

But this, I emphasize, is in the realm of supposition. It was not in the places where I sought the answers to the questions that had arisen, in the documents on the tragedy on the cruiser Admiral Senyavin. The secret-keepers made it clear that these documents had been destroyed on order from above. This occurred under the previous leadership of the navy.

What secrets were consigned to the fire? We can only guess today. But of one there is no doubt—everything possible was done so as not to vex Comrade L.I. Brezhnev with any reminders of the tragedy on the vessel that had unwillingly been linked directly with his name. A thick curtain of silence has evidently still been lowered around this tragedy for this reason. They tried to make it so that it was not even felt possible to send people on their last voyage in a humane manner—with the official words of sympathy that are appropriate in such cases.

And perhaps Brezhnev knew nothing of it? They are asserting today that they did not report bad news to him in the later years...

### **Air Support to Egypt in Early 1970's**

90SV0090A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Sep 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel Konstantin Andreyevich Korotyuk and Retired Lieutenant General Yuriy Nastenko by IAN Correspondent Aleksey Basenko—special to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "In the Air Over Egypt" under the rubric "The Time Has Come To Discuss"]

[Text] Konstantin Andreyevich Korotyuk still remembers the map of Egypt. His memory retains even the smallest details.

"There is the [Suez] Canal and the coastline of the Gulf of Suez. Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez." The pencil rapidly slides across the sheet of paper from the school notebook, tracing the cobweb of roads, the channel of the Nile, and the contours of hills and mountains. "My regiment's primary airfield was here at Bani-Suwayf and the second was at Qom-Aushim. Alternate airfields were near Cairo and at Al-Mansurah. And that is the location where our [pilots] shot down the first Israeli aircraft—a Skyhawk. Each of our pilots who fought in Egypt certainly remembers that date—June 22—to this very day."

Soviet pilots appeared in Egypt in March 1970. They arrived there after President Nasser requested that the Soviet government beef up Egyptian air defenses. This was a time of despair for Egypt. The Israeli command, having rejected attempts to break through Egyptian troop ground defenses on the Suez Canal, had selected the "air terror" tactic—inflicting mass air strikes. An avalanche of Israeli bombs crashed down on Egypt. Units of the Egyptian Forces deployed along the canal suffered very heavy losses. Peaceful people were killed by bombs. Israeli aircraft operated in Egyptian airspace practically with impunity and the Egyptian Air Force and Air Defense could not withstand their onslaught.

An air defense unit commanded by Aleksey Smirnov was rapidly formed and sent to Egypt. A fighter regiment and an independent fighter squadron from the Soviet Union were rushed to Egypt soon thereafter. Their personnel were very carefully selected—pilots 1st and 2nd class and each had several thousand flying hours. They took only volunteers. The equipment was the latest, for that time, a version of the MiG-21 fighter aircraft. Soviet pilots were tasked with the following mission: "To prevent Israeli air strikes against Egypt's rear area targets: Industrial enterprises, military bases, Nile River crossings, and population centers."

The mission was complex. Colonel Konstantin Korotyuk's regiment had to defend an enormous sector of Egyptian territory south of the Hulwan-Suez Line. Colonel Yuriy Nastenko's independent squadron's zone of responsibility included the northeastern area of Egypt—the coastal waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the section of land between Alexandria, the Suez Canal, and Cairo. Cairo itself by that time was defended by a triple ring of Soviet anti-aircraft missile battalions.

The appearance of new combat aircraft did not go unnoticed. "They immediately located us from the air as soon as we landed at Egyptian airfields," recalls Konstantin Korotyuk. "And several days later Golda Meir's statement [was transmitted] via Israeli radio: 'We know that Russian pilots are in Egypt. We are prepared to fight them. When we are required to do so, we will...'"

"After this, the Israeli Air Force ceased raids into Egypt's depth. Internal areas were no longer bombarded. Only

reconnaissance aircraft appeared which attempted to avoid contact with our pilots," said Yuriy Nastenکو, who recently retired with the rank of lieutenant general. "Our presence alone had already cleared the situation in Egyptian skies. The Israeli air forces transferred their primary activities to the Canal zone. A war of nerves and character and a struggle to wear down [resistance] and to [produce] exhaustion began for us."

"A group of Israeli aircraft at high altitude appeared over the Sinai headed for Egypt. They were clearly visible on the screens of airfield radar sites. We did not know where they were headed or why. To Cairo, to Hulwan? Did they intend to bomb the Green Zone? We had to send our aircraft up at a minimum range of 200 kilometers to prevent attacks on these targets and to manage to intercept the enemy," explained Korotyuk. "One flight took off and proceeded to intercept the Israelis. The latter would enter 30-40 kilometers into Egyptian territory, allow our aircraft to approach to within 25-30 kilometers, and then they would turn around and go back. We could only pursue them to the Canal, we were prohibited from crossing it. Our aircraft went home and a new group of aircraft, or sometimes two, would appear on the [radar] screen right after them. A second flight of MiG's would climb out and...the story was repeated."

This "game" continued daily. And there were four to five intercept sorties per day. "There was constant tension and everyone's nerves were on edge," recalls Yuriy Nastenکو. "As a rule, only one group of Israeli aircraft flew at high altitude as a show of force. But another group, long invisible to our radars, flew just over the ground somewhere to the left, to the right, or behind [the group at high altitude]. We also had to manage to intercept and neutralize it. Therefore, as soon as one flight took off, all others were placed on combat readiness. Pilots had to sit in aircraft cockpits parked in shelters in total readiness—just press the engine ignition button, taxi out onto the runway, and takeoff. The pilots sat in their high-altitude suits in shelters with neither a draft nor a breeze and it was over 40 degrees [Celsius] on the street. And the takeoff wait could last for hours...."

They flew to Egypt to fight and they trained for dog fights during countless training exercises. And each time they took off for an intercept, the pilots girded themselves for combat. But the Israelis preferred not to engage. This futile monotony exhausted people. Fatigue built up and

reactions slowed. And this is the most dangerous thing—a tired pilot becomes careless and his combat readiness drops. Therefore, after each flight and prior to landing, each pilot began to execute a series of acrobatic maneuvers and we began to regularly conduct mock combat.

Soon they had studied the tactics of Israeli pilots and their favorite methods in sufficient detail. "The enemy was serious," recalls Yuriy Nastenکو. "They had a wonderful pilot school and some—mainly Jews of American descent—had Vietnam combat experience behind them. They fought intelligently and prudently, although at times somewhat stereotypically. They avoided combat with equals, they were cautious...."

"But nevertheless we 'outplayed' the Israelis," Yuriy Nastenکو recalled with satisfaction.

"On the morning of June 22, Janaklis radar site 'fixed' the location of a group of Skyhawks headed for Ismailia. Several other blips also flashed and dropped off the radar screen. They were rapidly identified: Mirages. A defensive group. They were flying at low altitude. Several MiG flights rose into the air. They immediately went to altitude, luring the Mirages to themselves. The latter did not delay their appearance, beginning, as always, the 'air carousel.' At the same time, Captain Salnik's pair of MiG's, hiding from radars, rushed toward Ismailia at an altitude of 10 meters. Neither the Mirage pilots whose attention was focused on the primary group of MiG's, the Hawkeye-E 'flying radar' reconnaissance aircraft, nor the Skyhawk crews noticed the MiG's that had appeared on their tails. All of the rest was a matter of skill," said Yuriy Nastenکو. "They brought wreckage to us from the Skyhawk that had crashed on the western bank of the Canal. They came from Egyptian Air Force Headquarters, congratulated us, and thanked us. We conducted similar operations three more times and we were successful each time."

Having suffered losses, the Israelis became even more careful. At first, there were no flights at all for nearly a week. It had been a shock and the Israeli pilots had to regain control of themselves. Afterward, they began to fly at night for the first time in a long while—prior to this, just during the day. An Israeli pilot who had been shot down and captured had an interesting opinion on this: "It is hard to fight the Russians, they fight to the last. It is hard for our pilots to come out of combat with them unharmed."

**Udmurt ASSR Problems from Defense Conversion**  
*90SV0088A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Sep 90  
Morning Edition p 2*

[IZVESTIYA interview with V. Solovyev, first deputy chairman, Council of Ministers, Udmurt ASSR, in Izhevsk: "Soviets and Conversion"; date of interview not given; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] IZVESTIYA's correspondent speaks with V. Solovyev, RSFSR People's Deputy and first deputy chairman, Council of Ministers, Udmurt ASSR, on the subject of effecting harmony between the interests of local authority and the military-industrial complex.

[IZVESTIYA] Now that the veil of excessive secrecy is being lifted in various areas of our life, including defense, the Soviet individual is starting to experience revelations. I mention the term "Soviet individual" for a reason. Foreign countries have known about our "secrets" for some time, judging from what we read in the press. Nevertheless, the fact that Udmurtiya possesses a tremendous economic potential that is employed to fill defense needs has come to light only recently. Vitaliy Aleksandrovich, is it possible that the republic and its people derived great benefits from this situation, even though this was something that was not made public?

[Solovyev] Be that as it may, industrial development progressed largely because of the increasing military-industrial complex. Instrumental here have been the latest technologies, which are responsive to the most modern requirements. Likewise, this attracted the best cadres, the intellectual elite, I may say. Compared with other branches, these people had no complaints about their salaries or social benefits. Nevertheless, to say that the defense complex made a major contribution to the area's welfare would be an overstatement.

[IZVESTIYA] In that case, can conversion help to improve the situation in a short period of time, by adding more goods to store shelves and providing local soviets with the means to satisfy the populace's needs?

[Solovyev] Well, conversion is not something that came about yesterday. Good minds tackled the problem some time ago and even initiated undertakings in this regard. Take the association Iz mash. The consumer goods it produces are 190,000 motor vehicles a year, more than 350,000 motorcycles, and quite a number of other products. It produces more goods per ruble of pay than any other branch facility, incidentally. Defense plants manufacture washing machines, baby carriages, home radios and tape recorders, hunting and sporting guns, and tools for use in the home. In the offing are compact disc players, microwave ovens, multipurpose food preparation utensils for the home kitchen, video cassette recorders, watches, insulated food containers, etc.

However, the general picture is not particularly comforting. We supply commerce with almost 3.5 billion

rubles' worth of merchandise, an amount that places us in a leading position in Russia, but we still cannot make ends meet. We are being strangled by all manner of shortages, the same as the entire country. Conversion could be a great help in overcoming these difficulties, to be sure. But only if it is implemented in an effective, well-thought-out manner, not haphazardly. In this connection, the initiative should shift progressively from the central departments to regional control organs and local soviets.

[IZVESTIYA] These organs until very recently were kept completely uninformed and powerless as far as the defense establishment was concerned. The story is told of how about a dozen generals arrived by helicopter to make their "airborne landing" in the local stadium of the town of Kambarka. It was only then that many local residents learned of the existence of an installation known by number only. Can it be said unequivocally and without exaggeration that our taxpayers and voters living in thousands of towns and villages have no idea of where, how and why their hard-earned money is being spent? These people's interests are clearly being ignored. How to overcome this inveterate alienation? Is it not possible to lay out all the cards on the table in front of the people?

[Solovyev] It is not only possible, but necessary. And the sooner, the better. In my view, this—not merely demilitarization of the economy—constitutes the essence of conversion. Until very recently it was not possible to mention in conversation let alone in print that the Meteor plant was under construction in Izhevsk. Only certain specialists were aware of special-purpose products that were to be manufactured there. The plant has since been realigned to produce civilian items, such as the first lot of the Infit, a device that relieves a feeling of tiredness, reduces blood pressure, and alleviates stress and pain symptoms suffered by a patient after an operation. It is there that plans are being laid to produce microwave ovens, an item that is very convenient for housewives.

It seems that we are interested in mastering the production of new articles and manufacturing them in amounts greater than the plans would call for. The idea here is for a certain portion of the output—exactly half, to be exact—to remain with us for our disposal. Thus, the Votkinskiy Zavod association, which initiated conversion as far back as the time of stagnation and ceased producing SS-20 missiles, has made plans to go beyond the production quota for Feya washing machines by 80,000 units. So, it has come about that at least 40,000 units will appear in the intrarepublic marketplace. In the event an even larger amount will be produced, say 600,000 Feyas instead of 500,000, we will be able to expand our barter arrangements with other areas.

However, what sense is there in Udmurtiya's receiving 370 passenger cars when it produces 100,000 of them? Our auto plant has a 100-percent state plan, and there are no signs of a letup. We do not have our eyes set on all items produced in the republic. Nevertheless, the latter



has a vital need for a kind of "merchandise bank," the absence of which renders the conclusion of mutually advantageous arrangements with partners difficult and even at times impossible.

[IZVESTIYA] Vitaliy Aleksandrovich, it is a fact that the Americans are very diligently looking for all kinds of ways to restructure their military-industrial complex. They realize that they can make a mistake if they do not proceed carefully. Can it be assumed that our country has made suitable plans and that they have been coordinated with local soviets? How are they being implemented in Udmurtiya?

[Solovyev] Conversion should provide an increase in consumer goods output of 54 million rubles this year and almost half a billion rubles by the end of 1995. Fantastic growth is indicated for some places. For example, the Chapetskiy Mechanical Plant association is effecting a 20-fold increase in consumer goods production. It would appear that we could rub our hands with glee, with fewer demands made by defense branches. Alas!—that is not the case. With the commencement of disarmament, industrial output in our republic has already decreased by over one billion rubles. This has brought about a number of losses for labor collectives, that is, for residents of the republic.

In the first phase of conversion, local authority, which in this area is interested in working closely with the military-industrial complex, has been shunted aside. It is as if there is shame attached to asking the territory what kinds of goods should be made to satisfy its needs. It is essential for the chairman of the local soviet, as it is for the enterprise, that reduction in output of military products be compensated for by civilian items, including consumer goods, of commensurate complexity. Importance attaches to maintaining the present level of profit and wages, quality of technology and product prestige, social privileges and qualification status of cadres.

Retention of the above advantages is only rarely possible. It is more the exception than the rule. In this connection, conversion started off on the wrong foot: Product planning was done without rhyme or reason; no arrangements were made for supplying raw materials; organizational blunders were committed. In addition, some enterprises have not terminated but merely reduced their production of military items. This has resulted in sharp drops in output, disappearance of assignments, and diminishing of pay. This kind of situation leads to the formation of pockets of economic want and unemployment, to human dramas, in general.

[IZVESTIYA] It resounded far beyond the borders of Udmurtiya—the "quiet shot" with which V. Sadovnikov ended his life. He, the former director general of the Votkinskiy Zavod association, was an outstanding captain of domestic industry and twice-decorated Hero of Socialist Labor. If we ignore the strictly personal

motives, this tragic case serves to illustrate the sometimes extremely difficult changes in outlook and sacrifices that conversion can wreak. Vitaliy Aleksandrovich, does it not seem to you that we have set into motion a highly complex process without creating a mechanism that would soften the impact of critical situations, without providing a system for effecting social adaptation of people?

[Solovyev] I count myself among the pupils of Vladimir Gennadiyevich Sadovnikov, and I would like to here and now dispel the untruths that are being attached to his name. Speaking of the problem in general, I say that, even in the noble matter of conversion, we seem to be returning to a time of darkness by exhibiting a crude technocratic approach whereby managers, engineers, laborers—all people—are treated as mere cogs. This kind of approach has already exacted a toll from tens of thousands of highly-skilled cadres. Many of them left manufacturing to work for cooperatives, and there is no way to bring them back to their former jobs. Of the ones that remain, many must undergo retraining to take up work requiring lower qualifications, with attendant drop in pay. In addition, they have lost the benefits that went with their jobs, be it their position on the apartment waiting list or the privilege of purchasing a particular item distributed through the collective. This cannot fail to cause conflict in the workplace. In my view, that is why it is essential to effect a set of measures designed to relieve social tensions. This would include making available considerable sums of money to compensate for material losses and to pay for job retraining.

The time has also come to set up a labor exchange. The town of Glazov is already in need of this kind of institution. Estimates have it that 12,000 to 15,000 of our workers will lose their jobs in about the next two years due to conversion. Our specialists, working jointly with the SRI for Labor at the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems], have arrived at a concept of labor exchange for modern times which would utilize the entire Russian experience. What are the provisions of the bill that has been submitted for approval to the Udmurt Republic's Supreme Soviet? One of them states that the jobs offered by the labor exchange should be assignable as a strictly municipal function; they would in no case be taken away from local authority, instead be always kept for the unemployed.

[IZVESTIYA] It is obvious that the human aspect of conversion depends entirely upon constructive activity of the territorial organs of local control and authority. However, the way is being paved for a market economy, and this does not permit any interference with the functioning of enterprises. What can the soviet do about this kind of situation?

[Solovyev] Let me answer that by saying that the soviet itself is endowed with the authority to launch activities of an enterprising nature, an example being the creation of enterprises of widely divergent types. The labor



exchange itself must function as a commercial organization so that it does not suffer failure. In addition, a municipality can acquire shares to become a co-owner of joint stock companies, even of enterprises that are undergoing conversion. A share owner is legally authorized to participate both in product management and selling the products, to say nothing of enjoying the profits.

[IZVESTIYA] Nevertheless, the reality is still such that in Udmurtiya, the same as in dozens of republics, krays, and oblasts that are experiencing pain in the conversion process, the influence of local authority on this process is minimal. In this area, soviets are just starting out on this thorny path. What is it that is most essential to the initiation of harmony of mutual interests of the territory and defense branch?

[Solovyev] Measures to that effect we are developing will be incorporated into a republic conversion program. You may think of it as a program representing a common meeting ground for us and the defense people, one flying in a new and higher orbit. On a broader scale, we must become a part of the Uralkonversiya program in progress, one that is very important to the establishment and strengthening of manufacturing ties to related industries in the far-flung Ural area. Another point of cooperation is expansion of contacts with the Ural and Volga republics.

It is unfortunate that in much of this we must feel our way, suffering falls and bruises as we go. That may be permissible in the beginning, but in the future—and demilitarization will continue for some time, I assume—the trial and error method must eventually be abandoned. This means that there is an urgent need for a USSR law on conversion. It would have as a primary purpose the delineation of the interrelationship between the central and local authorities in the implementation of conversion and higher political, economic, and military management cooperation with regional organs and labor collectives of defense enterprises slated for realignment. There also is a need to implement on a state level a general program that would furnish a clear statement of priorities and of a system for everyone that would cover the financial, technical, and materials aspects.

In conclusion, I wish to state that the military-industrial complex possesses a potential that could radically transform the national economy via conversion. Izhevsk weapons are known throughout the world. This being so, there should be more Kalashnikovs who could create goods for the people. The renowned plants are fully capable of producing for us goods of the highest quality.

#### Commercial Use of Military Transport Flights

90SV0098A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Colonel A. Andryushkov: "Cucumber via Aircraft"]

[Text] The June 30, 1990 Council of Ministers Order states that the "USSR Ministry of Defense will provide

additional transportation of fresh fruit and vegetable products during July and August using its own aircraft...."

"There is a department headed by Colonel Kryuchkov to resolve organizational issues," explained Major General of Aviation V. Ustinov, VTA [Military Transport Aviation] deputy chief of staff. However, the workload on aviators is great and we are experiencing problems...."

He personally became convinced of this while flying with the crew of an IL-76md on the Tashkent-Kamchatka route. But in order to get on the airplane, he had to drive to Belorussia from where Military Pilot 1st Class Major S. Trushevich raised the IL-76md into the air. The aircraft's capabilities permit it to carry several dozen tons of cargo into the air. There were a total of 18 passengers on board.

Why did they carry air from Belorussia to Tashkent? Let us assume that VTA headquarters did not find a cargo headed that way: Flight number 76734 had already been paid for by a different department of the Ministry of Defense—the Main Directorate of Trade. Then why did Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Trade not load the IL, say, with fresh potatoes to supply Central Asian garrisons?

"Do you know how much additional manpower is required to organize these transport movements?" asked Colonel Yuzhik.

Thus, VTA does not have to trouble itself over empty sorties—the money has already been received and it is less expensive and less troublesome for military trade to carry air. The crew had another opinion: This is mismanagement. Transporting air cost the directorate of trade more than 2,800 rubles. And this is at a reduced rate.

"The Council of Ministers' order," said Colonel Yuzhik, "can only be carried out under precise organization of flight movements. Holding up an aircraft on the route leads to long delays...."

No one met flight number 76734 at Tashkent. Flight Service Warrant Officer I. Chertkov, having received the information that a crew is being requested from Belorussia to transport fruit, did not issue the "clearance" to receive it: He said there was no room on the ramp. And although Minister of Defense and Air Force commander in chief orders required them to take all steps to immediately support movement of "green" flights, their execution in many ways depends on the airfield commander.

"When the Council of Ministers resolution for USSR Ministry of Defense aircraft to carry out transport of cargo for the needs of the national economy came out in April 1989, we here, in Tashkent," said D. Bazylev, military trade representative in the Turkestan Military

District, "wasting so much time that we barely managed to load one aircraft before another landed. Gradually, everything settled down."

In order to execute the monthly request plan, Bazylev has to work a lot even today. The schedule has been developed for when and where an aircraft loaded with vegetables will go. It seems that everything has been provided so that there will be no delays in the "green" flight movement schedule. But reality is much harsher.

Basylev said, "We waited for an aircraft to load on July 27. We had rushed to transport vegetables to Tiksi. Each hour was precious. The aircraft only arrived on the 30th. Tashkent did not receive any aircraft for four days. Local aviation management begged off due both to the absence of ramp space and fuel. The dispatcher is nervous and our prestige is falling."

Flight number 76755 and Crew Commander Major Filipovich was ahead of us at Tashkent. His IL-76md was loaded with tomatoes, peaches, and melons on July 30. Transbaykal and Siberian Military District garrisons were waiting for them. For two days the crew commander requested [clearance] to either of these military districts' airfields in order to deliver the produce with minimal losses. They did not receive the flight.

I think that the fate of perishable produce on board the aircraft was similar to one about which "green" Flight Expediter A. Saydalkhanov told me about: "They only delivered potatoes intact to Chukotka and they lost nearly 700 kilograms of three tons of tomatoes."

Did anyone assume responsibility for the lost produce? V. Tsyupko, Commissary Commander on Kamchatka, has worked in trade for 34 years: "There is only one guilty party in these cases—the recipient. No system of liability has been developed whatsoever. Liability must be material and personal. And we need to encourage people not only with words but with rubles."

The crew commander's instruction booklet states that he "...does not assume responsibility for untimely delivery of cargo or spoilage of fruit and vegetable products for causes that do not depend on him." There is no incentive for pilots to deliver cargoes without losses. Officer V. Rozin on Kamchatka also was not troubled by the fact that 26 tons of fruit are rotting that are intended for the families of his very own subordinates. He is not assuming responsibility for this.

I learned from reliable sources that losses of fruit and vegetables carried by Air Force VTA aircraft throughout Kamchatka totaled more than 50 tons worth 140,000 rubles by the end of August.

Cost accounting and market relations that are confirmed in the country's economy have placed management and the Ministry of Defense into new conditions. The Ministry of Defense has been granted the right for VTA aircraft to carry out paid transport of national economic

cargoes (without reducing the level of unit combat readiness) in accordance with direct contracts with enterprises and organizations of all ministries, departments, and ispolkoms of local Soviets of people's deputies and, please note, with cooperators. So, military aviators flew into dense layers of commerce a year ago.

"I cannot say that we were novices in the conduct of commercial operations," said Major General of Aviation V. Ustinov, "but we did not manage to participate on such a scale like today."

The department headed by Colonel Ye. Kryuchkov now works to exhaustion. There are not enough workers to coordinate movement of aircraft with cargoes. VTA aviators have felt for the first time the movement of enormous monetary sums. They cannot skillfully conduct an accounting of the experience. And here, as they say, cash money has poured into their hands. For example, it costs 5,200 rubles per hour to transport cargo on an IL-76md aircraft.

According to the Ministry of Defense Main Directorate of Trade policy alone, planned requests for transporting fruit and vegetables total 150 flights per year. Fifty additional aircraft were required in 1989. This figure will be significantly greater this year.

Besides the directorate of trade, various civilian departments and cooperatives are chartering aircraft from the VTA. They pay for transport beforehand: Money in the morning and the aircraft by supper. But the money in advance. Life has taught this.

In 1989, military aviators carried national economic cargoes worth 35 million rubles. There were eight million rubles of unpaid accounts. They had to resort to arbitration. I think that gentlemen's agreements will not soon be introduced into our market economy.

The aviation regiment where Major S. Trushevich serves earned 577,000 rubles last year. But only....

"The greatest part of it, 403,900 rubles," said Finance Unit Commander Captain G. Fazliyev, "was sent as profit to the union fund. Incidentally, those who call military personnel parasites need to think about that.... Ten percent of the remaining funds is allocated to the aviators as bonuses. Each one has the right to get a sum in the size of two month's wages at the end of the year."

Major Trushevich said, "Not everyone in our unit who directly participated in transporting national economic cargo received even one month's salary."

Yes, the Army is the first to come to the aid of its people in extreme situations. It is too bad that today some people do not wish to see this. Military aviators are authorized to use the money earned while transporting these cargoes to improve living conditions and to equip training facilities. And dozens of officers' and warrant officers' families do not have their own apartments. The VTA commander has authorized unit commanders to carry out construction of apartment buildings.

"But," one of them said to me, "where will I find a contractor? The Air Force does not have its own construction organizations. The military district headquarters sees us as the last priority. Civilian contractors charge exorbitant prices or they ask for building materials. And where do I get them?"

O. Vasilchenko, head of MGA [Ministry of Civilian Aviation] (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy) air transport service organization, stated a proposal to lower expenses. He set forth the idea, which also found support at VTA headquarters, about centralized, on a state scale, conduct of commercial air operations, that is, organization of a sort of aviation commodities market. Equipped with an electronic information system that reflects supply and demand on the market and the movement of aircraft at any moment in time, the market will be able to establish control for conduct of commercial operations. Today, the primary instrument in the hands of Air Force VTA officers is the telephone and piles of documentation.

For example, Commissary Commander V. Tsyupko proposed having a stockbroker in each area whose mission would be to search for a client wishing to conclude a contract with VTA to ship cargo from the route termination point in order not to carry air. Vladimir Nikiforovich said, "aircraft are leaving here empty and there are cargoes [to be shipped]. For example, transporting the personnel effects and automobiles of officers' families to the mainland when they are being reassigned to a new duty location. But crew commanders are prohibited from conducting such operations. Although the delivery will pay a man's wages and a profit to both the state and VTA...."

For many years, aviators have lived by the slogan: "Really learn military duties." Today we also need to seriously learn commerce. Then flight service personnel on Kamchatka will not have to answer when flight 76734 departs for the mainland without a cargo. No, Major Trushevich carried 277 cubic meters of the cleanest Kamchatka air to his native Belorussia. But already not at the previous price but four times more expensive. The distance and fuel consumption were greater.

But the first commodities market in the country has been established in Moscow through an initiative of the Association of Young Enterprise Leaders. The country's government requested that aircraft be allocated to deliver products to Moscow and Leningrad. VTA aircraft are ready. There are still no cargoes.

### Troops Work in Food Distribution System

91UM0105A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Nov 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by Colonel of the Reserve F. Semyanovskiy: "If It Were Not for the Help of the Military"]

[Text] I came to the operational group that manages the personnel who are working in Moscow's fruit and vegetable storehouses on 9 November. Lieutenant Colonel

Mikhail Fedorovich Shalin, who met me, showed me reports and charts that characterized the work of the soldiers of the Moscow Military District who were helping Muscovites in the procurement of fruit and vegetable products. All told, 1,094 soldiers and sergeants, 133 officers and warrant officers, and 351 military drivers are working at 20 fruit and vegetable storehouses. They are engaged in the procurement of potatoes and vegetables, their sorting, storage, and delivery to municipal stores, and in unloading freight cars as they arrive.

On holidays, when city residents were at demonstrations and rallies and were resting, the soldiers of the district continued to work intensively to provide the capital with an adequate amount of vegetables and potatoes. On 7 November, they processed 4,705 tons of various agricultural products, and they unloaded trucks, sorted cabbages, and removed waste. On 8 November, they processed 3,168 tons of agricultural products, and on 9 November, 4,500 tons.

Working at the fruit and vegetable storehouses are soldiers of the Tamanskaya Guards Motorized Rifle Division, the Kantemirovskaya Guards Tank Division, soldiers of units [chast] of civil defense, and representatives of other branches of troops and services of the Armed Forces.

At that time, Major General Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Sorokin, the chief of the operational group, called at the headquarters. Incidentally, he just came from Colonel General N. Kalinin, commander of the troops of the district, who keeps this work under his continuous control.

Gen. Sorokin and I drove to the largest fruit and vegetable storehouse of the Moskvoretskiy fruit and vegetable association, where we were met by Vasilyi Nikolayevich Doroshin, the director of the storehouse and deputy chairman of the Moskvoretskiy rayon soviet executive committee. As he himself said, this storehouse provides fruit and vegetable products to Moskvoretskiy and Sovetskiy rayons with a population of 800,000 persons, where there are 60 large enterprises.

However, on that day we almost did not run into any civilians on the territory of the storehouse, with the exception of the dispatchers. At that time, the soldiers were working here with all of their strength. They were representing the Taman Guards Division. They were led by Captain Sergey Milovidov, Lieutenant Sergey Kutevov, Captain Vladimir Karpov, and Lieutenant Vladimir Ishmakov. They were engaged in the sorting of cabbage. It turns out that six freight cars arrived at night and four during the day.

"If it were not for the help of the military," said Vasilyi Nikolayevich Doroshin, "not only the storehouse itself,

but also those Muscovites that it supplies with agricultural products, could end up in a very difficult position. And it is only their selfless work that guarantees the resolution of an essentially simple but important task—to give the people food.”

The soldiers who were called up into the service have a lot of tasks in the maintenance of a high state of combat readiness and in the defense of the work of the Soviet people. But, as always, they are there where the people need their help.